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ABSTRACT 
Enlightenment evidential ism argues that a belief is 
rational for a person only if that person has sufficient 
evidence, arguments, or reasons for that belief. Sufficient 
evidence under this conception of rationality typically 
follows a classical foundationalist system which argues that 
the belief that P is rational if and only if P is (1) 
self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible, or (2) 
inferable from a set of beliefs that are self-evident, evident 
to the senses, or incorrigible. In order to be rational about 
one's beliefs, a cognizer must be able to trace all of one's 
non-basic beliefs back to self-presenting basic beliefs which 
coerce (either rationally or probabilistically) one's 
non-basic beliefs. This approach to rationality carries with 
it profound implications for the rationality of theistic 
belief (i.e., the belief that God exists). Most non-theistic 
evidentialists argue that theistic belief does not satisfy the 
criteria for rationality because it typically fails to supply 
the sufficient evidence required to maintain it. 
By incorporating the valid insights of three 
contemporary religious epistemologists (Nancey Murphy, 
Alvin Plantinga, and Richard Swinburne), it is argued that one 
can arrive at a model of rationality in which sufficient 
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evidence for the rationality of one's beliefs (theistic or 
otherwise) does not require that a cognizer trace all 
of one's non-basic beliefs (e.q., belief in God) back to 
self-presentinq basic beliefs that are thouqht to be coercive 
on all rationally attentive people. 
The proposed model of rationality arques that, on 
one level, sufficient evidence for the rationality of one's 
beliefs (includinq theistic belief) incorporates a 
reason-based conception of justification which may coincide 
with (but need not) a cognizer's attempts to offer rationally 
convincing evidence that one's beliefs are true or certain. 
On another level, being rational about one's beliefs involves 
attempts to marshall enough of the appropriate kind, quality, 
and amount of evidence so as to be so rationally convinced of 
the truth or certainty of a qiven belief that one can no 
longer maintain a reasonable doubt. 
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CHAPTER 1 
SOME CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO THE RATIONALITY 
OF THEISTIC BELIEF 
The inquiry of this study arises out of the context of 
what is sometimes re~erred to as Enlightenment evidential is. 
and some current approaches within religious epistemology 
offered as viable responses to the conception of rationality 
often associated with it. This assumption, traditionally 
referred to as evidential ism, maintains that a belief is 
rational for a person only if that person has sufficient 
evidence, arguments or reasons for that belief. l The 
implication of this form of rationality for theistic belief 
is monumental. It is argued by many non-theistic 
evidentialists that an Enlightenment commitment to 
evidentialism necessarily implies that theistic belief does 
not stand the test of rationality because it typically fails 
to supply the sufficient evidence required to maintain it. 2 
lKelly James Clark, Return to Reason (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), 3. 
2see , for example, William K. Clifford, "The Ethics 
of Belief," in Lectures and Essays, ed. Leslie Stephen and 
Frederick Pollock, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1886), 339-63. 
See also, Antony Flew, The Presumption of Atheism (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1976). 
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It has been suqqested that until recently, the vast 
majority of reliqious epistemoloqies have remained within the 
evidentialist tradition. Some have attempted to provide the 
necessary evidence for rationality of belief in God, aqreeinq 
with Enliqhtenment thinkers that theistic belief is rational 
only when such a belief is warranted by sufficient evidence. 
This position, aptly called theistic evidentialism, embraces 
the Enliqhtenment conception of reason and arques that 
theistic belief is rational precisely because it does in fact 
meet the Enliqhtenment criterion of sufficient evidence. 
Theistic evidentialists, accordinq to Alvin Plantinqa 
and Kelly James Clark, typically function under classical 
foundationalist conceptions of epistemology (althouqh not 
exclusively) and attempt to offer evidence for theistic belief 
that is thouqht to be rationally compellinq in virtue of 
classical foundationalist criteria for rationality.J 
Non-theistic evidentialist objectors, however, criticize this 
position in assertinq that theistic evidentialists have 
consistently failed in their attempts to provide the 
sufficient evidence required for rational theistic belief. 
Another form of reliqious epistemology that is said to 
be a product of the evidentialist tradition is the position of 
theistic fideism. Theistic fideists essentially aqree with 
3 I t is recoqnized that evidentialists also employ 
coherentist or reliabilist theories of knowledqe. Plantinqa's 
primary criticisms, however, are directed aqainst classical 
foundationalists. 
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the evidentialist assumption that theistic belier is rational 
only if there is sufricient evidence for such belief. But 
rather than attemptinq to provide evidences to meet the 
evidentialist's conditions for rational belief in God, 
theistic fideists abandon the enterprize altoqether and arque 
that it is epistemically acceptable to hold theistic belief 
without beinq compelled to supply the requisite evidence 
(whether or not such evidence is thouqht to eXist).4 Since 
theistic fideism holds that it is not necessary to provide 
sufficient evidence (or that no sufficient evidence exists) 
for rational theistic belief, many contemporary theists (both 
evidentialists and non-evidentialists) who maintain that 
theistic belief fits consistently within one's theory of 
knowledqe, arque that the position of theistic fideism is 
irrational. 
Notwithstandinq, there are others on the landscape of 
contemporary reliqious epistemoloqy who suqqest a conception 
of rationality which seriously challenqes Enliqhtenment 
critiques of the reasonableness of theistic belief. s With 
the advent of Kuhnian epistemoloqy,6 along with its 
4Kelly Clark, Return to Reason, 7. 
SC. stephen Evans and Merold Westphal, Christian 
Perspectives on Religious Knowledge (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1993), 2. 
6The reference here is to Thomas S. Kuhn, The 
structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of 
Chicaqo Press, 1962); Cf. Kuhn's revisions of paradigm 
incommensurability in his second edition of the aforementioned 
text (1970) and his The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in 
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subsequent revisions by various philosophers of science,' 
some recent religious epistemologists have promoted the 
rational acceptability ot theistic belief from arenas outside 
the Enlightenment conception ot rationality. The resu~t of 
this endeavor has provided the field of religious epistemology 
with three contemporary, innovative and intriguing conceptions 
of rationality for theistic belief: (1) There is the notion 
suggested by postmodern thinker Nancey Murphy that claims to 
knowledge and rationality in both science and theology are at 
best tentative (or fallible) and in need of continual 
revision. 8 Theistic belief (or a theological system) is 
considered rational when the evidence for that theory or 
belief fits the best explanation at the time. (2) There is 
the argument advanced by Reformed epistemologist, 
scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1977). 
'For example, lmre Lakatos, and A. Musgrave, eds., 
criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridqe: University 
Press, 1970); Cf. Larry Laudan's competitive improvement on 
Lakatos's system in his Progress and its Problems (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977). See also, Paul 
Feyerabend, "Consolations for the Specialist," in Criticism 
and the Growth of Knowledge, 197-230; idem, Against Method 
(London: New Left Books, 1975); and idem, Science in a Free 
Society (London: New Left Books, 1978). 
8We will define Murphy's conception of postaodernity 
in more detail in chapter two. For purposes of the present 
study, while it is recoqnized that there are various forms 
of postmodern thought in the theological and philosophical 
disciplines, our focus will concentrate on Murphy's efforts 
to qo beyond Enlqhtenment conceptions of truth and knowledge 
by rejecting all approaches to epistemic justification, 
rationality, and evidentialism which rely on any form of 
foundationalism in knowledge and correspondence in truth. 
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Alvin Plantinga, that belief in God is rationally acceptable 
apart from meeting the demands for rational and empirical 
certitude thought to be contained in the Enlightenment 
standards of evidentialism and rationality. For Plantinga, 
there is an appreciable difference between providing evidence 
for a belief (in a manner si.ilar to Enlightenment standards) 
and providinq the grounds or warrant for a belief (in teras of 
what we would expect to be the case if the belief in question 
is true). (3) Richard Swinburne, as a logical outgrowth of 
his cumulative case evidentialism for theistic belief (in 
which the rational case for theistic belief is offered through 
a series of inductive arguments in which the evidence and 
premises argue only for the probablity of the existence of 
God), argues that one is rational in holding theistic belief 
because that belief does in fact meet adequate evidential 
conditions for rationalty. What is offered in support of any 
rational belief (scientific, theistic, or otherwise) should be 
the best avai1able evidence (along with standards for 
evaluating the evidence) that can lead one to credibly accept 
the likelihood (or probability) of truth with respect to the 
belief in question. 
Both Murphy and Plantinga (albeit for different 
epistemic reasons) seriously attack conceptions of knowledge 
which are said to uncritically adopt Enlightenment standards 
for rationality in religious epistemology. Inherent to the 
Enlightenment theory of knowledge is the notion that (a) all 
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rational beliefs must be supported with propositional evidence 
or arguments, and (b) that an epistemic process of this nature 
most often takes place within the ranks of some form of 
foundationalist conception of knowledge. Consequently, while 
non-theistic evidentialists argue that traditional religious 
epistemology has repeatedly failed to supply sufficient (or 
undisputed) evidence for theistic belief, Murphy and Plantinga 
offer differing and competing conceptions of rationality that 
challenge the notion of sufficient evidence for theistic 
belief based on the Enlightenment criteria for rationality. 
As a case in point, exponents of antifoundational 
epistemologies (e.g., Nancey Murphy and Nancy Frankenberry) 
argue that a rejection of all forms of foundationalism (i.e., 
the methodology through which a good part of Enlightenment 
evidentialism is thought to receive its rational impetus) in 
epistemology is necessary if there is to be a rational basis 
for theistic belief. And yet both Murphy and Frankenberry 
insist that abandoning foundationalism as part of a rational 
approach to acceptable truth-claims in science or theology 
does not necessarily force one to the inevitable positions of 
radical skepticism or relativism. 9 The empirical approach 
9This is the position held in a cogent article by 
Nancy Frankenberry, "Pragmatism, Truth, and Objectivity" 
Soundings 74 (Fall-winter 1991): 514. See also, Frankenberry, 
Religion and Radical Empiricism (Albany: Suny, 1987), 4-19. 
See also, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, "Is the Postmodernist 
Always a Postfoundationalist? Nancey Murphy's Lakatosian Model 
for Theology" in Essays in Post-foundationalist Theology 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 73-90. A1so, there are 
different forms of foundationalism, and as we will see, Nancey 
7 
espoused by Frankenberry, for example, argues that such 
alternatives do not exhaust the epistemic possibilities 
available for those who reject foundationalist models for 
producing acceptable claims to truth in conceptual 
endeavors. 10 Frankenberry and other antifoundationalists 
further insist that an absence of all forms of foundational ism 
in religious knowledge does not necessarily warrant a position 
that all constructions of meaning are relative and 
incommensurable. Rather, they argue, it is precisely through 
some anti-foundational theory of knowledge that one is not 
forced to epistemoloqical skepticism and a purely arbitrary 
methodology for seeking an intellectual warrant for preferring 
some beliefs and ways of knowing over others. 11 
The contemporary significance of antifoundationalism 
for postmodern thought is, as scientific theoloqian Nancey 
Murphy has stated, found in a thorough rejection of the 
Murphy rejects all forms of foundationalism, whereas Avin 
Plantinga specifically centers his arguments against the 
classical version of foundationalism. 
10Frankenberry, "Pragmaticism," 5. 
11Ibid. See also, Robert J. Priest, "CUltural 
Anthropology, Sin, and the Missionary," in God and culture, 
ed. John D. Woodbridge and D. A. Carson (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1993), 85-105; Richard Bernstein, Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and 
Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 
8, 4, 11; and Richard Rorty, Consequences or Pragmatism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 162. See 
also, Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror or Nature (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979). 
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exclusive scientific empiricism and evidentialism underqirdinq 
Enliqhtenment epistemoloqy.12 The impetus for Murphy's 
lanquaqe comes out of some recent conceptions of knowledqe in 
the philosophy of science. Murphy's writinqs advocate a 
postpositivistic methodology for theistic belief which she 
claims complies with the current standards of evidence within 
the philosophy of science. ll She further proposes that 
theistic theories take on a new collaborative effort with 
science, one that concerns itself with the extent to which an 
epistemology adequate for science should approximate an 
epistemology suitable for the truth-claims of reliqion. 14 
At another point on the spectrum of concepts of 
rationality is the revolutionary notion of rationality 
evidenced in the writinqs of Reformed epistemoloqist, Alvin 
Plantinqa. 15 Plantinqa, amonq others, approaches the issue 
l2See Nancey Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific 
Reasoning (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 13, n. 18. 
See also, Jeffrey stout, The Flight from Authority (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). 
llIbid., 192. 
l4Nancey Murphy, Theology, X11. See also, Nancey 
Murphy, "Truth, Relativism, and Crossword Puzzles," 
Zygon 24, no.3 (1989): 299; and J. Mouton and J. C. Pauw, 
"Foundationalism and Fundamentalism: A critique," in Paradigms 
and Progress in Theology, ed. J. Mouton, A. G. van Aarde, and 
W. s. Voster (Human Sciences Research council, 1988), 176-186. 
See also, Nicholas Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth 
(Washinqton, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982). 
l5Alvin Plantinqa, "Reason and Belief in God," in 
Faith and Rationality, ed. Alvin Plantinqa and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1983), 16-93. Cf. Kelly James Clark, Return to Reason (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990). The discussion concerninq Reformed 
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of rationality on the assumption that the classical 
foundationalist model for rationality is no lonqer a viable 
option in epistemoloqy. A critical feature of Plantinqa's 
system is his arqument that classical foundational ism does not 
satisfy its own criteria for rationality. Classical 
foundationalism holds that belief P is rational if and only if 
P is either (a) self-evident, evident to the senses, or 
incorriqible or (b) inferable from a set of beliefs that are 
self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorriqible. 16 
By consequence, then, theistic belief that is argued for (and 
ultimately accepted) under a classical foundationalist system 
of rationality is neither a basic belief nor inferable from 
such beliefs. Accordinq to this analysis, reliqious 
epistemoloqies based on classical foundationalism are on the 
same tenuous epistemic qrounds as their non-reliqious 
counterparts. 
Since classical foundationalism is said ultimately to 
fail as a compellinq theory of knowledqe (and consequently 
fails as part of a system of rationality), Plantinqa contends 
that reliqious epistemoloqists should abandon altoqether any 
epistemic system which cannot satisfy its own conditions for 
rationality. By rejectinq the Enlightenment's reliance on 
classical foundational ism and evidentialism, Reformed 
epistemoloqy will essentially follow the literature contained 
in Clark's volume. 
16P l antinqa, "Is Belief in God Rational?" 24-25. 
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epistemologists like Plantinga argue that there no longer 
remains a leqitimate evidentialist objection to theistic 
belief (i.e., belief in God). The reason is that belief in 
God is thouqht to escape any objections based on the 
evidentialist assumption of rationality. Plantinga's approach 
to rationality is thought to go beyond the limits of 
traditional evidentialism and offer less rigorous and 
demanding criteria tor what is legitimately rational and basic 
among one's set of beliefs. Plantinqa argues that beliefs of 
this nature are in fact rational, even though they do not 
satisfy the conditions for rationality under classical 
foundational ism. 
With the work of Swinburne, there is a return to the 
program of theistic evidentialism. Swinburne also attempts to 
show that theistic theories and beliefs can follow a model of 
rationality consistent with scientific theorizing. His 
approach, however, differs significantly from Murphy'S in that 
he argues that such a methodology is one in which our best 
inductive arguments of the available evidence can result in 
conclusions of probability for theistic belief; that is, we 
can judge our theories and beliefs on evidence (includinq 
theistic belief) to be more likely true than not. 
Swinburne's system further differs from Murphy's in 
that he accepts a form of correspondence in truth, and argues 
for an epistemic structure which is essentially foundational 
in nature. It will be suggested that his approach comes 
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closest to satisfying the features necessary to an adequate 
model of rationality. Swinburne will argue, for example, that 
there are degrees of rationality which increasingly account 
for greater evidence and greater likelihood of truth. The 
highest degree of rationality one can apply to a belief 
(theistic or otherwise) is one in which a cognizer has in fact 
verified a belief as true on the total available evidence. 
All other acceptable degrees of rationality are such that a 
cognizer may have good reason to continue questioning what the 
evidence delivers in terms of the likelihood of truth. 
~he Dissertation Question 
It may be stated, then, that the epistemic theories 
underlying the systems of Murphy, Plantinga, and Swinburne 
represent some of the most influential attempts at formulating 
a concept of rationality for belief in God among the religious 
epistemologies currently fashionable as either (a) offering 
alternative answers to the evidentialist assumption that 
surfaced out of the classical foundationalist epistemology of 
the Enlightenment, or (b) in some way satisfying the 
18th-century evidentialist objections forever enshrined in the 
tomb of Humean skepticism. The central question of the 
present study may be put forth as follows: Do the 
aforementioned systems of nonfoundational religious 
epistemology (e.g., Murphy), Reformed epistemology (e.g., 
Plantinga), and theistic evidentialism (e.g., Swinburne) 
provide tenable models of rationality for belief in God? If 
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not, what are the necessary features which make a belief 
(whether scientific, theistic, or otherwise) rational? Such 
an inquiry attempts to make a distinction between the content 
of religious belief (e.g., the trinity) and the specific 
epistemic reasons that warrant or justify theisitic belief as 
being rational. 
Various secondary questions naturally arise out of 
this concern. For example, if it can be established that the 
evidentialist assumption is not without its own epistemic 
difficulties, as Plantinga suggests, then to what extent are 
theistic evidentialists compelled to provide only what 
evidentialists would accept as sufficient evidence (either 
rational or empirical) for theistic belief? Additionally, 
must one reject all forms of foundationalism in epistemoloqy, 
as does Murphy, if one is to have an acceptable notion of 
rationality for belief in God? Are epistemic systems that 
fail to supply evidentialist notions of sufficient reasons for 
theistic belief necessarily fideistic in nature? Or is it 
possible to offer, as C. Stephen Evans and Merold Westphal 
suggest, a middle ground theory of rationality for theistic 
belief that attempts to strike a balance between the 
epistemological arrogance of evidentialism and extreme systems 
of irrationality, relativism and skepticism?17 In 
addressing these concerns, our purpose is to offer a 
17see , for example, their Christian Perspectives on 
Religious Knowledge (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1993), 3. 
13 
constructive analysis of the internal logic of the systems in 
question (as opposed to their historical developments) and 
provide a plausible system of rationality which draws upon 
various credible epistemic features residing within those 
systems. 
As we will see, Murphy and Plantinga offer competing 
systems of rationality in response to what Alvin Plantinqa 
refers to as the collapse of classical foundationalism in 
epistemoloqy.18 As such, the evidentialist objection since 
Hume and the Enlightenment is ultimately satisfied in the 
adoption of rational systems incommensurable with the form of 
rationality embraced under the original objection. And as we 
will further see, while some contemporary theistic 
evidentialists are committed to developinq rational systems 
for theistic belief which attempt to provide evidential 
responses to the objections raised by non-theistic 
evidentialist (e.q., Richard Swinburne's cumulative case 
evidential arguments), Murphy and Plantinqa offer rational 
systems for belief in God which attempt to escape 
evidential ism altogether. The cognitive claim of theistic 
belief, they assert, is ultimately satisfied in a context that 
accepts the criteria of an entirely different system of 
rationality, one that is at the same time consistent with 
18P l antinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 60-61. See 
also, "Is Belief in God Rational?" in Rationality and 
Religious Belief, ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 7-27. 
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either the dictates of scientific knowledqe or some other 
alternative form of rationality. But is there a more 
preferable alternative to the three systems mentioned above? 
Is there, for example, an option for rationality in theistic 
belief that combines the positive features of all three 
epistemic models? 
'l'he Purpose or the Study 
It is the intention of this study to suqqest that a 
more tenable model of rationality for theistic belief may be 
found in a synthesis of certain epistemic features of Murphy's 
postmodern scientific epistemology for theology, Plantinqa's 
Reformed epistemology, and Swinburne's cumulative case 
evidential ism. The impetus for such a synthesis is fueled in 
part by the role philosophy of reliqion plays in furnishinq a 
substantive epistemology for the acceptable truth-claims of 
theistic belief in an increasinqly scientific and 
technoloqical society. The form of epistemology we ultimately 
embrace as satisfyinq the conditions for what constitutes 
rational claims in science and reliqion will in turn radically 
shape the future epistemic practices of these conceptual 
enterprises. This particularly concerns the type of claims 
that can be leqitimately constructed and accepted by adherents 
of both disciplines. 
Since the advent of Enliqhtenment standards of 
rationality, the claims of reliqion and theology appear to 
have cowered increasinqly in the face of .odern conceptions of 
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scientism. If, however, it can be argued effectively that the 
truth-claims of both science and reliqion do in fact share the 
same essential epistemic conditions for rationality, then 
perhaps future discussions between the two disciplines can 
proqress alonq more acceptable lines without either enterprise 
capitulatinq to indefensible criteria for rationality. 
Qualifications on the Areas of Inquiry 
In attemptinq to meet this aqenda, it must be 
stipulated that it would be impossible in a study of this 
length to deal adequately with the extensive literature 
devoted to the whole discipline of reliqious epistemology. 
The followinq factors, then, have been brouqht into 
consideration: first, our primary objective is to identify the 
essential features to each of the models of rationality 
indicated above. While it is recoqnized that the respective 
epistemic systems up for consideration have broader 
application to a wider ranqe of concepts within the realm of 
theistic belief, our focus will be to consider the inner loqic 
that constitutes these rational systems and offer analysis 
with respect to whether the features and criteria of these 
systems do in fact provide adequate approaches to rational 
theistic belief. It will be suqqested that there are inherent 
difficulties to each system, and that such difficulties 
require further criteria to make a stronqer argument for 
rational belief (theistic or otherwise). Second, in keepinq 
with the many studies in reliqious epistemology involved in 
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investigating the rationale for theistic beliefs seeking a 
middle ground between epistemological arrogance and 
relativistic skepticism,19 the present study proposes to 
contribute to this discussion by attempting a synthesis of the 
three forms of religious epistemology described above. 
The Method and Scope of the study 
In order to develop the proposed project successfully, 
chapter two will set forth the essential tenets of Nancey 
Murphy's brand of postmodern rationality. Discussion will 
ensue with respect to some of the positive contributions in 
this line of thinking. Much of Murphy's thinking is done in 
the silhouette of recent philosophy of science (Thomas Kuhn, 
Karl Popper, Paul Feyerabend, and Imre Lakatos) in which a 
clarion call has been sounded against scientific positivism's 
role in modernity as the final arbiter of rationality and 
certitude in the truth-claims of the social sciences of which 
religious knowledge plays so crucial a role. It is 
anticipated that the epistemic concerns raised in this chapter 
will set the tone and rationale for the remainder of the 
study. 
Murphy proposes what she regards as a thoroughly 
postmodern alternative to aodern notions of rationality in 
19As mentioned above, c. stephen Evans and Merold 
Westphal, Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge, 3. 
17 
reliqious knowledqe. 20 Murphy is chosen specifically for 
her scientific methodology which emerqes as a natural 
outqrowth of the epistemology of recent philosophy of science. 
It will be arqued that, when compared aqainst the rational 
systems of Plantinqa and Swinburne, Murphy's brand of 
postmodern epistemology represents the most radical step away 
from the rationality of Enliqhtenment evidentialism. This 
chapter will review her insiqhts and suqqested modifications 
of recent philosophy of science and offer initial critiques of 
the epistemie limitations inherent to the Lakatosian system 
she proposes as a viable rational approach to theistic belief. 
Chapter three will investiqate the manner in which the 
rationality of Alvin Plantinqa's Reformed epistemoloqy is 
offered as a competinq alternative aqainst postmodernism in 
the rejection of classical foundational ism in reliqious 
epistemoloqy. Once aqain, the purpose of this chapter will be 
to define Plantinqa's notion of rationality and consider its 
20I bid., 13 and 201. See also, Murphy and James Wm. 
McClendon, Jr., "Distinquishinq Modern and Postmodern 
Theoloqies," Modern Theology 5 (Apil 1989): 145-168; J. L. 
Austin's Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); 
and Ludwiq wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations 
(New York: Macmillan, 1953). For an analysis of community and 
consensus knowledqe, see Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue, 2d 
ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); 
and Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985). See also, Peter Berger 
and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New 
YorK: Doubleday, 1967). Cf. Murphy, Theology in the Age of 
Scientific Reasoning, 7-8; W. V. o. Quine, "Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism," in Philosophical Review 40 (1951): 20-43; and 
W. V. o. Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief (New York: 
Random House, 1979). 
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insights and potential limitations in offering a credible 
approach to the rationality of theistic belief. Initial 
criticisms will be offered for the purposes of directing the 
project toward its ultimate objective of a middle ground 
position incorporating various epistemic features in all three 
systems. 
Chapter four will consider Richard Swinburne's 
cumUlative case evidentialism for theistic belief. The 
rationale for reconsidering an evidentialist model of 
rationality for theistic belief surfaces out of the argument 
that there are fundamental epistemic principles that govern 
rational claims to truth (whether scientific, theistic, or 
otherwise), and that such a system of rationality does in fact 
follow (and need not jettison) a moderate foundational 
structure of evidentialism. Swinburne's notion of rationality 
(as a form of evidentialism) involves the epistemic features 
necessary to avoid the tendencies toward relativism that are 
often inherent in many postmodern systems (e.g., Murphy's 
Lakatosian model of rationality). It will be argued that his 
system salvages many of the positive features of 
foundationalist structures of epistemic justification, while 
at the same time offering a tempered view of the prospects of 
evidentialist arguments that follow an inductive and 
pobabilistic approach to the rationality of belief. 
Chapter five, then, will propose an actual concept of 
rationality that borrows from various insights of the three 
19 
systems considered, yet without succumbinq to the problems 
they have been shown to have. That is, after examininq the 
critical features in the rational models of Murphy's 
antifoundational episteaoloqy, Plantinqa's Reformed 
epistemology, and SWinburne's rationality for theistic belief 
based on its probability on evidence, chapter five will seek 
to contribute to the field of enquiry by incorporatinq certain 
features from the rational models of all three systems in the 
attempt to arrive at a model of rationality which seeks a 
middle qround position between the rational certitude of 
evidential ism and the potential forms of praqmatism and 
extreme relativism characteristic of many recent rational 
systems. 
CHAPTER 2 
A TENTATIVE APPROACH TO RATIONALITY 
THE PROVISIONAL STATUS OF BELIEFS 
It was indicated in chapter one that recent challenges 
directed against Enlightenment standards of rationality have 
urged epistemoloqists on the contemporary scene to advance 
novel (or siqnficantly revised) conceptions of rationality to 
show that one is rational in holding one's beliefs. Fueled by 
the belief that we are experiencing a new crisis in our 
ability to provide rational claims to knowledge in the 
coqnitive disciplines, particularly in science and religion, 
many critical thinkers in the field of religious epistemoloqy, 
particularly scientific theologian Nancey Murphy, are focusing 
their efforts on building a marketplace of remarkably 
innovative and provocative options for the rational 
justification of theistic belief. l It is at the horizon of 
this context that we observe one of the most elaborate efforts 
lFor example, see R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan 
Sweetman, Contemporary Persprectives on Religious Epistemology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). See also, Michael 
Peterson et al., Reason & Religious Belief: An Introduction to 
the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991); C. Stephen Evans and Merold Westphal, eds., Christian 
Perspectives on Re~igious Knowledge (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1993); and David S. Dockery, ad., The Cha~~enge of 
Postmodernism: An Evangelica~ Engageaent (Nashville: Broadman 
Press, 1995). 
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(fueled by recent philosophy of science) aimed at exposing 
what are thought to be the weaknesses of traditional models of 
rationality in demonstratinq when one is rational in holding 
the basis claim of theism. 
Nancey Murphy proposes a model of rationality in which 
she arques that religious epistemology has both the ability 
and the obligation to provide rational support for theistic 
belief. Like many current models of rationality, Murphy's 
criticisms of evidentialist conceptions of rationality are 
rooted in a thorough rejection of any form of epistemology 
(whether in philosophy, science or reliqion) which attempts 
to rationally support its coqnitive claims accordinq to 
Enlightenment (modern) conceptions of truth, justification, 
and rational belief. Murphy's model for the rationality of 
cognitive claims in theism, for example, advocates what she 
views as an approach which complies with the qoing standards 
of evidence and rationality currently fashionable within 
certain models of rationality in the philosophy of science. 2 
2Nancey Murphy, Theology in an Age of Scientific 
Reasoning (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 
192. Murphy's work was developed through a number of articles 
before it reached the form in her book cited above. See, for 
example, "Theology, the Transformation of Science: A 
Niebuhrian Typology for the Relation of Theology to Science," 
Pacific Theological Review 18 (Spring 1985): 16-23; "Relating 
Theoloqy and Science in a Postmodern Age,· Center for ~heology 
and the Natural Sciences Bulletin 7 (Autumn 1987): 1-10; 
"Acceptability Criteria for Work in Theology and Science," 
Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 22 (1987): 279-98; 
"From Critical Realism to a Methodoloqical Approach: Response 
to Robbins, Van Huyssteen, and Hefner," Zygon 23, no. 3 
(1988): 287-90; "Theology: An Experimental Science?" 
Perspectives in Religious Studies 15 (Fall 1988): 219-34; 
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Murphy's model of rationality is directed aqainst all 
forms of (or attempts at) certainty in knowledqe. This, she 
contends, is most often associated with classical 
foundationalist approaches to rationality. Foundationalist 
theories of knowledqe take a limited class of beliefs (i.e., 
epistemoloqically basic) to have a privileqed epistemic 
status. It is thouqht that basic beliefs are self-justifyinq, 
and so they do not stand in need of any further justification 
from other beliefs. Non-basic beliefs, on the other hand, 
require justification by appeal to basic beliefs. 3 Murphy 
believes that all forms of certainty and foundational ism in 
knowledqe represent episteaic commitments that make it 
difficult for us to revise our beliefs or theories in liqht of 
new evidence. The foundationalist commitment to basic beliefs 
that are indubitable, for example, betrays a methodology which 
she believes is far too strict and unworkable for any model of 
rationality. 4 Since the foundationalist commitment is one of 
"Theology: An Experimental Science?" Perspectives in Religious 
studies 15 (Fall 1988): 219-34. "Truth, Relativism, and 
Crossword Puzzles," Zygon 24, no. 3 (1989): 299-314; "Another 
Look at Novel Facts," Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science 20, no. 3 (1989): 385-88. "Scientific Realism and 
Postmodern Philosophy," ~he British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science 41 (June 1990): 291-303; and "Theology and the 
Social sciences--Discipline and Antidiscipline," Zygon 25 
(1990): 309-16. 
3John L. Pollock, Contemporary ~heories of Knowledge 
(Savaqe, Md.: Rowman , Littlefield, 1986), 26. 
4see , for example, Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy, 
and Mark Nation, eds., Theology ~ithout Foundations: Religious 
Practice & the Future of Theological Truth (Nashville: 
23 
cartesian certainty and indubitability (an unworkable model in 
the thinkinq of many contemporary epistemoloqists),5 what is 
needed is a rationality model that is much more open to the 
possibility that our current scientific (or theistic) beliefs 
may be wronq and in need of serious revision. 
Murphy's model of rationality, then, contends that one 
is rational in holdinq one's belief on the basis of evidence 
that fits the best explanation at the time. This requires 
specifyinq a criterion for choice between competinq theories 
and beliefs. Evidence that represents the best explanatory 
fit is the kind of evidence that is likely to offer solutions 
to the anomalies of our previous theories and beliefs, so lonq 
as those solutions do not represent ad hoc explanations of the 
data. Such a model of rationality for theistic belief follows 
an essentially Lakatosian model of reasoninq, in which our 
theories and beliefs about the world are at best tentative and 
provisional. Even if our beliefs are thouqht to be true in 
Abingdon Press, 1996); Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism & 
Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy set the 
Theological Agenda (Valley Forqe, Pa.: Trinity Press 
International, 1996); and Richard R. Toppinq, "The 
Anti-Foundationalist Challanqe to Evanqelical Apoloqetics," 
The Evangelical Quarterly 63, no. 4 (1991): 45-60. 
5see , for example, the introductory remarks in the 
first chapter. See also, Alvin Plantinqa, "Reason and Belief 
in God," in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, 
ed. Alvin Plantinqa and Nicholas Wolterstorff, 16-93 (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); and 
Plantinqa, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" in contemporary 
Perspectives on Religious Epistemology, ed. R. Douqlas Geivett 
and Brendan Sweetman, 133-41 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992). 
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some correspondence sense, Murphy's contention is that there 
is no likelihood that we could know this for certain, given 
our rational and evidential limitations. 
One is not rational if one holds one's beliefs with 
certainty. For this would suggest that one is not open to the 
possibility that future evidence could falsify a given belief. 
We are justified (and consequently rational) in holding our 
beliefs on the basis of a wide variety of experiences and 
other beliefs, even though we fully expect them to be 
provisional and tentative, so long as our reasons for holding 
them square with the current standards of rationality in 
certain approaches to scientific theorizing. Verification of 
a belief's truthfulness, then, is not so much a matter of 
determining whether a belief corresponds to the world (while 
this may be possible), but rather of determining whether a 
belief is likely to be unsurpassed in its claims. On this 
conception of rationality, it is highly likely that most 
views, because they are provisional in nature, will be 
surpassed. The reason for this, as we will see, is that 
Murphy's criterion for the truthfulness of a belief must be 
consistent with what she views as the tentativeness of one's 
belief. Beliefs are at best tentative because the evidential 
reasons for holding them must comply with the best explanatory 
fit available at the time. 
As we will see, Murphy'S system represents the 
furthest move away from the model of rationality we will 
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propose as beinq a more adequate approach to demonstratinq the 
rationality of our beliefs on evidence. Her rejection of 
approaches to rationality based on foundationalist theories 
leads to an inevitable relativism in truth and knowledqe which 
is unnecessary on our model of rationality. We will arque in 
chapter five that problems of certainty in rational belief 
(includinq theistic belief), while not requirinq the 
sufficient evidence of Enliqhtenment evidentialism, can be 
adequately resolved by appealinq to a model of rationality 
that accounts for appropriate evidence of the riqht kind and 
amount. 
~he Pos~modern Con~ex~ 
It is no easy task to qet a qrasp on Murphy's notion 
of rationality in coqnitive and conceptual activities, 
especially where it concerns the matter of truth and epistemic 
justification that are so closely associated with admittedly 
postmodern systems of reliqious epistemology and theoloqical 
proleqomenon. While much of Murphy's thinkinq focuses on 
scientific and theoloqical theorizinq, we can make reasonable 
application of the essential features of her model of 
rationality to the matter of rational belief on evidence. It 
may be necessary, therefore, at the outset of a survey of 
Murphy's particular brand of postmodernity to distinquish it 
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from the more popular forms of postmodernism familiar to the 
theological enterprise.' 
Althouqh the term postmodern is often employed to 
represent collective efforts on the part of some thinkers to 
go beyond Enlightenment conceptions of knowledqe and truth 
(i.e., the conserted effort at rejectinq all approaches to 
epistemic justification, rationality and evidentialis. which 
rely on any form of foundational ism in knowledge and 
correspondence in truth) some thinkers such as David Griffin 
have attempted to show that a more precise use of 
postmodernity refers to "a diffuse sentiment rather than to 
any set of doctrines. "7 . . . While Griffin's description 
appears to cover much of the essence of postmodernis., and 
while the various forms of postmodernism do share certian 
characteristics in common, Griffin more importantly goes on to 
capture some of the more salient features of postmodern 
theology which result in clear distinctions within the 
'see, for example, David Ray Griffin, "Introduction: 
varieties of Postmodern Theoloqy," in Varieties or Postmodern 
Theology, ed. David Ray Griffin, William A. Beardslee, and Joe 
Holland (Albany: state University of New York Press, 1989), 
1-7. See also, the abundance of primary and secondary sources 
on deconstruction (mostly on Derrida) listed in Gary John 
Percesepe's challenging article, "The Unbearable Lightness of 
Being Postmodern," Christian Scholar's Review 20, no. 2 
(1990): 118-35; and Merold Westphal, "The Ostrich and the 
Boogeyman: Placing postmodernism," Christian Scholar's Review 
20, no. 2 (1990): 114-117. 
7 David Griffin, "Introduction to SUNY Series in 
constructive Postmodern Thouqht," in varieties or Postmodern 
Theoloy, xii. 
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movement, most notably, the distinctions between its 
deconstructive and constructive forms. 8 
The more deconstructive brand of postmodern theology, 
argues Griffin, attempts to overcome the modern 
(Enlightenment) worldview by eliminating "the inqredients 
necessary for a worldview, such as God, self, purpose, 
meaning, a real world, and truth as correspondence."9 In 
contrast to this deconstructive brand of the movement, writes 
Griffin, is a far more constructive form of postmodernism: 
It seeks to overcome the modern worldview not by 
eliminating the possibility of worldviews as such, but by 
constructing a postmodern worldview through a revision of 
modern premises and traditional concepts. This 
constructive or revisionary postmodernism involves a new 
unity of scientific, ethical, aesthetic, and religious 
institutions. It rejects not science as such but only 
that scientism in which the data of the modern natural 
sciences are alone allowed to contribute to the 
construction of our worldview. 10 
Given these distinctions, it is helpful to see that Murphy's 
model of rationality is probably closer to a constructive form 
of postmodernism. She contends, nevertheless, that it is not 
possible to go beyond the tenets of modernity (i.e., 
traditional approaches to rationality based on evidential ism) 
8Although Griffin describes four basic types of 
postmodern theology (e.g., constructive, deconstructive, 
liberationist and restorationist), our purpose at this point 
is to provide a place for Murphy's brand of postmodernism by 
comparing and contrasting its relation with the deconstructive 
and constructive aspects of the movement. See, for example, 
Griffin's "Introduction: Varieties of Postmodern Theology," in 
varieties of Postmodern Theology, 2. 
9Griffin, "Introduction to SUNY Series," xii. 
lOIbid., xii. 
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if one's system continues to cling to outdated concepts, such 
as foundationalist theories of knowledge, referentialism and 
representationalism in the philosophy of language, truth as 
some form of correspondence, and atomistic notions of the 
human person (individualism) and historical meaning. ll 
While Murphy agrees with some postmodern efforts to 
reject any notion of truth as correspondence, she explicitly 
argues, however, for the construction of a model of 
rationality which attempts to formulate criteria for theory 
choice (and rational belief) that those of the more 
deconstructionist brand typically want to jettison. l2 
Murphy's postmodern constructive thought, however, differs to 
some extent from the form of constructionism described in 
Griffin's taxonomy of postmodern theology. Murphy contends 
that the very arguments between 'mainline' epistemologists and 
their skeptical opponents have shifted. The modern framework 
tended to presuppose foundationalism in epistemology as the 
one commensurable feature among them, but the dawning of 
postmodernism (if it is truly postmodern) brings with it a 
whole new realm of epistemic possibilities. Her particular 
style of postmodernism is characterized by changes in the last 
l1I bid., xiii. See Nancey Murphy's "Scientific Realism 
and Postmodern Philosophy," in Anglo-American Pos~moderni~y: 
Philosophical Perspec~ives on Science, Religion, and E~hics 
(Boulder, Colo.: westview Press, 1997), 1 and 44-5. 
12see , for example, Murphy's description of Lakatosian 
Theology in Theology in an Age of Scien~ific Reasoning, 
183-192. 
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fifty years in three specific domains of philosophical 
discourse: epistemology, philosophy of lanquage, and 
metaphysics: 
In epistemology and philosophy of science, there was the 
rejection of foundational ism in favor of the holist views 
of the likes of Quine and Kuhn. In philosophy of 
language, there was the shift from theories of meaninq 
based on reference or representationalism to a focus on 
the social uses of language! found especially in the works 
of Austin and Wittgenstein. 3 
Murphy believes this represents a gestalt switch far more 
radical than other constructive approaches representing a 
synthesis of modern and premodern worldviews. 14 The shifts 
in the philosophical areas mentioned above are so 
incommensurable with modern conceptions of thought that there 
is no modern mooring that can safely harbor them. But they do 
not, for Murphy, represent aimless driftings toward the 
horizen of relativism; rather, they simply represent a 
different range of options than was the case in modernity. 
13Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, 2. 
14Ibid. While the philosophical ramifications of 
Murphy's postmodern paradigm are far-reaching, the scope 
of this study is to limit our discourse to its implications 
for the rationality for theistic belief. For the application 
of her system in the broader context of theology, see Nancey 
Murphy and George F. R. Ellis, On the Horal Nature of the 
Universe: ~heology, Cosmology, and Ethics (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1996); Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, 
and C. J. Isham, ed., Quantum cosmology and the Laws of 
Nature: scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 2d. ed. 
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993 and 
1996); and Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur 
Peacocke, eds., Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives 
on Divine Action (Vatican City state and Berkeley, Calif.: 
Vatican Observatory and Center for Theology and the Natural 
Sciences, 1995). 
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Thus, while Murphy agrees with other constructionists that the 
modern conceptions of the so-called rational approach to both 
scientific and theistic belief can no lonqer be supported, she 
does not support the retreat to fideism so characteristic of 
those forms of late modern theoloqy. As Griffin points out, 
those features often represented theoloqical statements which 
were not open to a public investiqation of the evidence and 
typically appealed lito criteria of validation other than the 
public criteria used in science and science-based philosophy, 
that is, self-consistency and adequacy to qenerally accessible 
facts. nlS 
In attemptinq to answer the various challenqes of the 
evidentialists, Murphy notes that theoloqians are often 
hesitant to draw close connections between theoloqical and 
scientific theories "for fear that as science proqresses the 
theories current today will be replaced, and the theoloqical 
formulations will then have to be abandoned as well."l6 
Rather than beinq cauqht in the same relativizinq as the 
medieval theoloqians who tied their formulations to 
Aristotelian cosmology, Murphy argues that theistic theorizinq 
(and theistic belief) can escape the quandary of accommodatinq 
to the requireaents for rationality in traditional approaches 
lSGriffin, "Introduction: varieties of Postmodern 
Theology," 2. 
l6Murphy, "Truth, Relativism, and Crossword Puzzles," 
299. 
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to science. The way to do this is by adopting a new concept 
of rationality consistent with recent philosophy of science. 
In Murphy'S analysis, the Middle Ages are often 
characterized as enjoying a coherent worldview. In such a 
worldview there were places for both science and theoloqy. 
But Murphy argues that this characterization of that era is 
probably a myth. She argues instead that the various theories 
offered as satisfying the data (and anomalies) of both science 
and theology (e.g., scriptural descriptions of a seemingly 
flat earth and the emergence of a Copernican theory of the 
solar system) were in every way as incomplete and incoherent 
as in our present time. The real difference between the two 
eras has to do with the dominance of one discipline over 
another. Whereas in the Middle Ages theology dominated the 
first moves of inquiry, the present context is characterized 
by the formative position of the natural sciences. Neither 
methodological starting point is acceptable due to what Murphy 
believes are inherent epistemic problems. Instead, Murphy 
argues for the warrant of a new approach to theorizing across 
the two disciplines. She writes: 
However, a picture of science and theoloqy as different 
regions of the same puzzle should remind us that theology 
cannot be governed exclusively by the demands for 
consistency with science (and other areas of knowledge), 
but is also to be constrained by its own clues--that is, 
by its own proper sorts of data, including the practices 
and experiences of the religious life. 17 
17I bid., 307. 
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This approach proposed by Murphy seeks to offer a position 
whereby theists are neither forced to follow a model of 
rationality consistent with modern (Enliqhtenment) notions of 
scientific theorizinq, nor abandon the responsibility to 
provide rational support for belief in God. So the data for 
theistic theories (or beliefs) will be different (e.q., the 
communal consensus' assumed non-referential and 
non-representational nature of reliqious lanquaqe and 
experience), and such theorizinq will follow a basically 
Lakatosian model of rationality. 
In settinq the staqe for her Lakatosian proposal, 
Murphy draws heavily upon Jeffrey stout's analysis of the way 
in which David Hume's challenqe to theism produced radical 
chanqes in epistemoloqy throuqh the modern period (in 
philosophy, rouqhly, from 1650 to 1950) and the consequences 
of those chanqes on theoloqy and ethics. 18 In his recent 
work on the history of philosophy, author Wallace Matson notes 
that Hume's Dialogues was not meant as an attempt to demolish 
reliqion altoqether, but simply to arque that "the inference 
from the alleqed desiqn in nature to an infinitely wise, 
powerful, and qood Author of nature is invalid."19 stout, 
l8Murphy, Theology, 3. See also, Jeffrey stout, Flight 
from Authority (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1981). 
19See Wallace Matson's New History of Philosophy, vol. 
2 (Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), p. 366. 
Cf. Murphy, Theology, 2. 
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however, directs his readers to two siqnificant turning points 
in epistemology that resulted from Hume's challenge: 
The first was the rejection of the medieval concepts of 
knowledge based upon the study of the authorities and 
deductive reasoning in favor of the modern period's 
foundationalism--that is, the concern with the 
reconstruction of knowledge on self-evident foundations 
(whether intuitionist or empirical). The second (still in 
proqress) is the substitution of a holistic approach for 
that very foundationalist doctrine. 20 
It is Murphy's contention that modern epistemology, which is 
so closely identified with foundationalism, must find its 
replacement in epistemoloqical holism and Lakatos's research 
proqrams of probable reasoning. Murphy's postmodern notion of 
rationality is one which is characterized by at least three 
fundamental features, as indicated above: First, there is the 
rejection of foundational ism in epistemology for a form of 
post-foundational ism similar to Quinian holistic coherentism. 
Second, there is a change from an exclusively representational 
and referential use of language to a much qreater emphasis on 
J. L. Austin's and Ludwig wittgenstein's philosophy of 
language which views language as action, and meaning as use. 
Like Austin and wittgenstein, Murphy does not entirely deny a 
referential element to language, but she does argue that it's 
use is far more limited than previously believed. Murphy 
2~urphy, ~heology in the Age of Scientific 
Reasoning, 3. For good discussions on holistic epistemology 
and its relation to other disciplines, see Richard Rorty, 
Philosophy and the Hirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979); and Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermenuetics and Praxis 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsyvania Press, 1983). 
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contends that the referential element in language has little 
or no value for theorizing in theism. Third, there is the 
replacement of an emphasis on the indivdual as the sole 
arbiter of what is rational (i.e., cartesian certainty) with a 
renewed sense of the importance and irreducibility of 
community. 21 For purposes of our discussion, however, we 
will concentrate on the manner in which Murphy's rejection of 
foundationalist theories results in a model of rationality in 
which our beliefs (including theistic belief) can be tentative 
and provisional at best. 
The Emergence of Tentative Beliefs: A Survey 
of its Historical Roots 
Murphy's application of Lakatosian philosophy of 
science for the justification of cognitive claims in religion 
is a clear attempt to retrieve theistic belief from the grasp 
of fideism and deliver it to the world at large through the 
public criteria of a scientifically credible epistemology. It 
is Lakatos' postmodern model that, according to Murphy, will 
take the debate beyond the realm of scientific realism (which 
she thinks even in its more critical form is an attempt to 
21Murphy, Theology in an Age of Scientific Reasoning, 
13 and 201. See also, Murphy and James Wm. McClendon, Jr., 
"Distinguishing Modern and Postmodern Theologies," Modern 
Theology 5 (Apil 1989): 145-68; J. L. Austin's Philosophical 
Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); and Ludwig 
wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (New York: 
Macmillan, 1953). For an analysis of community and consensus 
knowledge, see Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue, 2d ed. 
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) and 
Robert Bellah at al., Habits of the Heart (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985). 
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salvaqe modern conceptions of the referential and 
representative theory of lanquaqe, as well as correspondence 
in truth) and offer a truly non-foundational model of 
rationality. Scientific realism, for example, holds that 
science proqressively arrives at true, "or approximately true 
theories about the real, theory-independent world 'out there' 
and does so in a rationally justifiable way."22 
The Lakatosian model of rationality that Murphy 
propose is closer to a form of rational nonrealism. Rational 
nonrealism holds that, while science is an objectively 
rational discipline (i.e., we ouqht to accept qood scientific 
theories), it does not necessarily aim at qivinq us true or 
approximate truth in the correspondence sense. Rather, 
science attempts to provide a variety of other epistemic 
functions (e.q., synthesize sense data, predict and control 
phenomena).23 When applied to the rationality of theistic 
belief, for example, concepts such as justification, truth, 
and objectivity convey profoundly different meaninqs. The 
quest for certainty in truth (from a correspondence sense) is 
replaced with deqrees of relativism in knowledqe, but such an 
effort, arques Murphy, need not exist without the means to 
22see, for example, J. P. Moreland, Christianity and 
the Nature of Science (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 
1989), 139. See also, Moreland, Scaling the Secular city 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1987), 186-97. See 
also, Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2d ed. (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984 and 1991). 
23Moreland, Christianity and the Nature of Science, 
140. 
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arbitrate, in a nonarbitrary fashion, between equally coherent 
epistemic options. 24 
Murphy's systea is fueled in part by concerns over 
the epistemic relativism surfacing out of recent abandonments 
of the quest for certainty in evidentialist theories of 
knowledge. In order to avoid the trend toward relativism (and 
in order to continue to offer good evidence and reasons for 
the rational claims of theism), Murphy proposes a model of 
rationality that she believes entirely redefines traditional 
notions of truth and knowledge (i.e., epistemic 
justification). What begins to emerge is a model of 
rationality in which truth and knowledge are viewed at best as 
an adequate solution to the previously unresolved epistemic 
problems so characteristic of theorizing across the conceptual 
disciplines of science and theoloqy. Murphy's answer to this 
is her proposal for theoloqy to adopt the probable reasoning 
theory of Lakatos's scientific research programs. Before we 
give a closer examination of Lakatos's theory, it is worth 
noting what Murphy believes we stand to gain by the acceptance 
of her proposal: First, it is intended to go beyond the 
realism debate in offering a more substantial basis on which 
both theology and science can stand up to philosophical 
24Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity: 
Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion, and Ethics, 
52-62. See also, Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism & 
Fundamentalism: Bow Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set the 
Theological Agenda, 106-9; and her Reasoning & Rhetoric in 
Religion (Valley Forge, Penn.: Trinity Press International, 
1994), 260-67. 
37 
scrutiny; and second, it is said to block the move to 
theological relativism that so often results out of the 
discourse of pluralism and the historical and social 
conditioning of knowledge. 25 
The rationality model of Iare Lakatos' scientific 
reasearch programs follows a course of reasoning similar to a 
number of prominent thinkers in recent philosophy of science 
(e.g., Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend).26 Its historical roots 
can be traced back to the attempts of the logical positivists 
to set forth a criterion of demarcation to distinquish between 
science and metaphysics, and to reconstruct all (scientific) 
knowledge from experience. 27 The verification theory of 
meaning was an attempt by the logical positivists to establish 
a criterion of demarcation between propositions which were 
thought to have meaning and those which did not. A subsequent 
theory of confirmation ultimately resulted as well. The 
logical positivists employed the verification theory of 
25Nancey Murphy, "Truth, Relativism, and Crossword 
Puzzles," Zygon 24, no. 3 (1989): 299. See also, J. Mouton and 
J. C. Pauw, "Foundationalis. and Fundamentalism: A Critique," 
in paradigms and Progress in !'heology, ed. J. Mouton, A. G. 
van Aarde, and W. S. voster (Pretoria, South Africa: Human 
Sciences Research Council, 1988), 176-86. 
26In addition to Murphy's analysis, see Ian Hacking's 
Emergence of Probability (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975). 
27Murphy, !'heology, 52. Cf. Murphy, "Acceptability 
Criteria for Work in Theology and Science," Zygon 22 (1987): 
284. See also, J. P. Moreland's insightful analysis of this 
movement in science in Christianity and the Nature of Science 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1989). 
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meaning as a way of demonstrating that a sentence has no 
meaning unless one could specify its verification procedures. 
In its most rudimentary form, the theory of confirmation was 
meant to show that any statement whose meaning was not 
potentially verifiable on the basis of sense experience was 
meaningless--it was not to be regarded as science. 28 
The most noted response to the verification principle 
was that the principle itself was not verifiable. But there 
were other problems as well. Murphy notes that sense data do 
not provide a very handy starting point for the meaning of 
propositions: they occur only once; they are private, and 
equally problematic, our language has an awkward way of 
referring to them. 29 The major shift away from this line of 
thinking came out of Karl Popper's new theory of demarcation 
(i.e., a modification to the concept of what makes science 
scientific). Popper held that science is characterized by the 
fact that its theories are falsifiable. 30 The theory that 
should be accepted as being the most scientific is the theory 
that is the most highly falsifiable, yet not in fact 
falsified. 31 
28Murphy, ~heology, 52. See also, Arthur C. Danto, 
connections to the World: ~he Basic concepts of Philosophy 
(New York: Harper 5 ROW, 1989), 55. 
29Ibid., 53. 
30I bid. See also, Karl Popper, ~he Logic of scientific 
Discovery (New York: Harper & RoW, 1965). Popper's work was 
originally published in 1935. 
31Murphy, "Acceptability Criteria," 284. 
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Popper's methodology represented a decisive shift from 
the logical positivists. First, the claims of science, rather 
than relying on the principle of verifiability for their 
rational acceptance, would find such acceptance on the basis 
of whether a theory could be falsified (i.e., whether one 
could state in advance what will count as falsifyinq it). 
Second, his theory of demarcation of science was not offered 
as a theory of meaning. The statements that did not count as 
science were not considered as nonsense in the way that was 
true for the loqical positivists. Murphy notes a further 
quality of Popper's theory that had a siqnificant role in the 
shift to probable reasoning: 
A second important change was in the data: Popper's basic 
statements were reports of repeatable experiments or 
observations rather than the philosopher's sense data. 
Such reports are not incorrigible; if called into question 
they can always be tested by attempts to falsify further 
observable consequences drawn from them. Here we see the 
beginning of the end of the loqical positivists' 
foundationalism in that science is no longer seen to rest 
on an indubitable foundation. 32 
We see with Popper, then, the beginnings of what would come to 
be understood as a post-positivistic theory of scientific 
knowledge. Carl Hempel, another scientist within the ranks of 
the neopositivists, sought a deductive connection between 
theory and observation. Statements describing observations 
were to be tested by initial hypotheses and auxiliary 
hypotheses which would ultimately confirm the connection 
between theory and data. The hypothesis (a law or theory), as 
32Murphy, Theology, 54. 
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Murphy notes, "is then tested by the deduction of further 
observable consequences fro. it, which, if borne out by 
experiment or observation, are taken to confirm the 
hypothesis. Likewise, when a consequence is not borne out, 
the theory is disconfirmed.,,33 
Neopositivism was seen to be the system which would 
show that science was subject to cumulative growth and the 
objective testing of all its assertions. But with the advent 
of philosophers of science such as Paul Feyerabend and Thomas 
Kuhn, the neopositivist notion of progress in science was 
challenged. Both Feyerabend and Kuhn pointed out that science 
does not follow the simple process that Popper projected. 34 
As Murphy correctly points out, Kuhn's major contribution was 
"to show the dependence of theory choice in science on factors 
other than observation and loqic."35 Kuhn argued that, 
rather than the succesive accumUlation of knowledge, the 
history of science could be seen as a succession of paradigms. 
While the term clearly carries much broader conceptual notions 
for understanding a number of theories and data, "paradigm" is 
33I bid., 55. 
34See Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: New 
Left Books, 1975); and Thomas Kuhn, The structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1970). 
35Murphy, Theology, 56. See also, Kuhn, The Structure 
of scientific Revolutions, 92-110; and Kuhn's "Objectivity, 
Value Judgment, and Theory Choice," in The Essential Tension 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 
320-39. 
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often used synonymously with the idea of a theory and refers 
to the accepted examples of problem solutions in a qiven 
field. Each paradiqm has its own set of laws, theories, 
applications, and instrumentation that are employed to 
accommodate the solutions to puzzles particular to that qiven 
paradiqm. Those who work within a qiven paradiqm are said to 
share the same view of science and the same rules and 
standards for scientific practice. In Popper's view of 
science, falsification was proposed as a method that would 
replace verificationism. But the standard criticism aqainst 
Popper's view was that the discordant data used to falsify a 
theory were seldom seen to do just that. Accepted theories 
were rarely replaced in the absence of an alternative theory. 
Science typically viewed the discordant data as falsifyinq the 
auxiliary assumptions used to support the primary theory.36 
These auxiliary assumptions were subsequently subjected to 
modification without affectinq the accepted theory. 
Kuhn's point was to arque that science progresses by 
radical shifts between paradiqms. It is the paradiqm as a 
whole--with all its standard rules, puzzles, solutions, and 
associated theories--that scientists accept at any qiven time. 
The data and observations up for review are always interpreted 
in terms of a qiven paradiqmatic worldview. Kuhn asserted 
that there are no theory-independant data; all data are 
36For a qood analysis and interaction with Kuhn's 
oriqinal thesis, see Ian Barbour, Myth, Models and paradigms 
(New York and London: Harper & RoW, 1974), 93-124. 
42 
interpreted in light of a given paradigm. Furthermore, since 
these paradigms control how one interprets data, as well as 
the standards and rules that are used in experimenting with 
the data, Kuhn argued that rival paradigms are 
incommensurable. The critical factor in Kuhn's reasoning 
comes at the point in which he asserts that there are no 
independent data that provide scientists with the ability to 
arbitrate between competing paradigms. It is to this notion 
of science that Lakatos was responding. In Murphy's analysis, 
Lakatos's view of scientific rationality is one in which it is 
necessary to specify the criterion for choice between 
competing research programs. 37 In Kuhn's view, a paradigm 
is chosen for any number of reasons. The typical choice of a 
paradigm is based on its problem-solving ability. One 
paradigm may be better equipped to solve the anomalies that 
led its competitor into crisis. Other reasons for paradigm 
choice could be based on simplicity or accuracy of empirical 
fit. What is essential to understand from the Lakatosian 
perspective is that, unlike the methods suggested by Popper 
and Hempel, once a paradigm is accepted, its basic laws and 
theories are not subjected to testing by falsification or by 
further hypotheses; they are simply assumed and used for 
solving the various problems encountered by the paradigm. 
Kuhn's thesis has a direct impact on Lakatos's 
scientific research programs in that Kuhn's ideas represent, 
37Murphy, Theology, 59. 
43 
as Murphy states it, "the total replacement of foundationalism 
with a holistic view of science."38 To accept a paradigm is 
to accept, for a variety of reasons, all at once the complete 
and unquestioned worldview of that paradigm. only when its 
problem-solving ability appears to be outweighed by a qrowing 
number of anomalies is the paradiqm open for replacement. The 
upshot of Kuhn's analysis is that the reasons behind 
revolutions in science (i.e., radical paradiqm shifts) have 
little or nothing to do with a normative method of chanqe. 39 
There is no identifiable method of rationality that accounts 
for revolutions in science (i.e., there seems to be no way of 
accounting for why one chooses one theory over another, given 
the normal practice of science). One of the central tenets of 
Kuhn's analysis of scientific revolutions is that the 
scientific community could not speak in terms of the kinds of 
theories that ought to be accepted; rather it could speak only 
in terms of those theories which have ultimately surfaced 
through the history of science as being the champions of a 
particular problem-solving quest. What is now necessary to 
bring post-positivism into full bloom is a system which 
38I bid., 57. 
39This is the same criticism Murphy states of stephen 
Toulmin's analysis of the history of science. Although he is 
able to describe why various changes took place in science 
(similar to Kuhn's thesis), he is not able to propose a 
normative methodoloqy for science. See Toulmin's Foresight and 
Understanding (New York: Harper & Row, 1961). Murphy's point 
is to demonstrate that Lakatos takes the necessary steps in 
such a direction (Theology, 56-58). 
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purports to account for the rational features that underlie 
the construction and acceptance of scientific theories. 
Murphy proposes that this is found in the work of Imre 
Lakatos. 
Modern verses Postmodern Conceptions 
of Rationa~ity 
Murphy proposes that rational theorizing in theology 
take on a new collaborative effort with science, one that 
concerns itself with the extent to which an epistemology 
adequate for science should approximate an epistemology 
suitable for reliqious epistemoloqy.40 At the center of 
this discussion is Murphy's contention that philosophers of 
reliqion can (and should) employ a system of rationality which 
offers the kind of evidence that could count as the data for a 
scientific theoloqy.41 Inherent in this method is the 
conviction that any form of foundationalism must be replaced 
by a system of epistemological holism. 42 This holism is 
based in part on the notion that no clear distinctions can be 
drawn between the basic and nonbasic beliefs so characteristic 
40See, for example, Nancey Murphy, "Philosophical 
Resources for Postmodern Evanqelical Theology," Christian 
Scholar's Review 26, no. 2 (1996): 184-205. 
41Murphy, 'l'heology, xii. 
42This, as we will see, involves her three-part system 
of (a) the rejection of all forms of foundationalism; (b) the 
rejection of referentialism in lanquaqe; and (c) the 
SUbstitution of community in place of individual atomism in 
theistic theorizinq. It also involves her notion of 
tentativeness, fallibilism, or probable reasoninq, including 
her notion that truth is what is insurpassable. 
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of foundationalism. 43 There are no beliefs Corset of 
beliefs) that have a privileged epistemic status (or 
self-justifying starting points) that is rationally coercive 
on all reasonably attentive people. 
The Problem With Foundationalism 
Murphy's Lakatosian model of rationality for 
theistic belief is a model which denies the adequacy of 
foundationalist theories of knowledge. Murphy arques that 
both empirical and rational attempts at locating foundational 
categories of beliefs to serve as justificaton for the rest of 
knowledge have failed. She states that there is a sort of 
Murphy's Law working against the foundational 
epistemologist: 44 
Whenever one finds suitably indubitable beliefs to serve 
as a foundation, they will always turn out to be useless 
for justifying any interesting claims; beliefs that are 
useful for justifying other claims will always turn out 
not to be indubitable, and in fact will be found to be 
dependent upon the structure they are intended to justify.45 
We can see this playing itself out by taking a brief look at 
the inner logic of empiricist foundational ism. The modern 
empiricists tended to recognize that ordinary reports about 
what one perceives are corrigible. So the way to recover 
certitude in synthetic claims was to make claims about one's 
43I bid., 194. 
44In its most fundamental form, Murphy's Law states 
that "whatever can go wrong will." 
45Murphy, Beyond Liberalism & FUndamentalism, 90. 
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perceptions themselves. The ~ediate mental objects of 
perception became one's "sense-data," and this was what served 
as the true foundation for empirical knowledge. It's not so 
much that one "sees a brown doq," but rather, it's that one 
"seems to be seeing a brown doq." What was incorrigible was 
the claim of one's sense-data, because it was thought that 
there was no imaginable way in which they could be overridden 
or corrected. Sense-data were thought to be indubitable. 46 
The problem with this, argues Murphy, was that the 
gain in certitude of the foundation was offset by the problem 
of how to use appearance-statements to justify c1aims about a 
real, objective world. The deliverances of certainty along 
these lines were too harsh, and as a result, there was a shift 
(especially among philosophers of science, such a Karl Popper) 
to focus attention on ordinary scientific facts. The upshot 
of this was that Popper and others recognized "both that the 
facts themselves could be called into question and that the 
structure of scientific theory restinq on these 'piles' was 
only probable."47 Empiricist foundationalism reached its 
end, argues Murphy, when it became a generally accepted notion 
within the philosophy of science that scientific facts are 
theory-laden. And further, it is not just scientific facts 
that are dependent upon theoretical interpretation, as Kuhn 
46I bid., 90. 
47I bid., 91. See also, Karl Popper, The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper, 1965); trans. Popper 
et ale of Logik dar Forschung (Vienna, 1935). 
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argued, but it is also true with respect to the construction 
of the experimental apparatus used to make our observations of 
the world (e.g., the construction of an electron microscope 
and interpretation of the images it produces).48 
The quest for rationalist foundations, says Murphy, 
does no better in offering us certitude about our beliefs. 
with respect to Descartes' so-called foundational beliefs 
(i.e., his "clear and distinct ideas"), what turns out to be 
indubitable in one intellectual context is rather questionable 
in another. Murphy thinks, as she arqued in the case of 
empiricist foundations, there is a tradeoff between utility 
for justifying important claims and indubitability. So when 
Descartes arqued (e.g., in the premise to his arqument for the 
existence of God) that there is at least as much reality in 
the efficient and total cause as in the effect, Murphy points 
out that it is not only difficult to understand what this 
means but there is also no way of knowing that it must be 
true. His questionable premise does not offer us certitude, 
even if it is useful in his arqument for the existence of God. 
On the other hand, Descartes' cogito ergo sum (HI think, 
therefore I am") does have foundational certitude, but without 
proof of God's existence (and the quarantee it provides for 
the veracity of sense experience), there is no way to arque 
48I bid. See also, N. R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery 
(cambridge: Cambridqe University Press, 1958). Cf., Thomas 
Kuhn's, The structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
48 
from Descartes' inner thoughts to the existence of an external 
world. 49 
other efforts at certitude suffer from the same kinds 
of difficulties. Immanuel Kant's nsynthetic a priori 
knowledgen may have been useful in giving us a distinction 
between empirical knowledge and some other kind of knowledge 
not dependent upon experience, but there has been no consensus 
about how to define this other kind of knowledge. 
Philosophers recognize as unsuccessful the attempts that have 
been made to arque that formal systems, such as logic or 
mathematics are examples of synthetic a priori knowledge; the 
deductive consequences of such systems, while necessarily 
true, are not necessarily true of anything in the world. That 
is, when we attempt to apply them to reality (e.g., using a 
system of geometry for navigation in space), the calculations 
are not always reliable or certain. 50 
For reasons like these and others, Murphy arques that 
we should abandon the foundationalist structure of the 
justification of beliefs (including theistic belief) and 
replace it with a new model that will more adequately 
represent the way we come to have rational beliefs. Murphy 
thinks that theistic theorizing along foundationalist lines 
parallels problems of the saae kind of theorizing in science 
and philosophy. She claims, for example, that when 
49Murphy, Beyond Liberalism & Fundamentalism, 92. 
SOIbid. 
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conservative theists "were forced to admit that the biblical 
texts contained contradictions, a common move was to argue 
that only the oriqinal autoqraphs were inerrant."51 She 
further writes: 
This claim is incorriqible (since all of these are lost) 
but the incorriqiblity comes at the cost of needinq to 
ground theoloqy on somethinq inaccessible to contemporary 
theologians; the lost autographs are inerrant but useless. 
This parallels the empiricists' move to (inaccessible) 
sense-data in the observer's mind. And parallel to the 
recognition of the theory-ladenness of scientific data is 
the recoqnition of the theory-ladenness of biblical 
interpretations--the hermeneutic circle. 52 
Furthermore, the problem of incorriqibility of theistic belief 
on the basis of ordinary religious experience is that we have 
no consensus in terms of what this inner experience is. If 
theists attempt to correct this problem by paralleling Popper 
and the other neo-positivists (i.e., to recognize ordinary but 
fallible experience as the foundation), we have yet another 
problem parallel to that of the ordinary theory-ladenness of 
scientific data. Different religious communities will tend to 
choose their criteria accordinq to their previously accepted 
theories. 53 
A Nonfoundational Holism 
Murphy's answer to the problems of foundationalism is 
found in part in w. V. o. Quine's holistic theory of 
51I bid., 93. 
52Ibid. 
53I bid., 93-4. 
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knowledge. 54 The holistic theory differs from 
foundationalism in at least two respects: First, there is no 
requirement for intrisically indubitable (unrevisable) 
beliefs. On a holistic account, there is no sharp distinction 
among types of beliefs (i.e., there are no self-justifying 
basic beliefs upon which all other non-basic beliefs depend). 
Beliefs differ only in terms of degrees, that is, how far 
removed a belief is from the boundary of experience. Second, 
in contrast to foundational ism (in which the direction of 
rational assent is one that only moves up from the 
foundational basic beliefs), holism has no preferred direction 
of reasoning. The reasoning picture of holism is one in which 
there are many different kinds of connections among beliefs in 
the web. There are those of strict logical implication, but 
there are also weaker probabilistic arguments. Some arguments 
move forward to further conclusions, while other arguments may 
move "backward" to presuppositions. 
According to Murphy, the holistic approach allows one 
to take into account the notion that "the data (scientific 
facts, interpretations of texts, or whatever) are 
theory-laden, partially dependent on theoretical 
knowledge. "55 This is different from some of the 
54see , for example, Willard V. o. Quine, "Two Dogmas 
of Empiricism," Philosophical Review 40 (1951): 20-43; and 
Willard Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, 2d ed. 
(New York: Random House, 1978). 
5SMurphy, Beyond Liberalism & Fundamentalism, 94. 
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neo-positivists' notions that all of our data are 
theory-dependent. This kind of distinction goes a long way 
in showing the difference in justification between 
foundationalist and holistic accounts of knowledge. In 
holism, each belief is supported by its connection to other 
beliefs in the web and, ultimately, to the whole. This means, 
according to Murphy, that -justification consists in showing 
that problematic beliefs are closely tied to beliefs that we 
have no good reason to call into question. So the coherence 
of the web is crucial for justification. n56 
The implication for justification is that when 
inconsistencies arise (i.e., conflicts within the web of our 
beliefs or with anomalies in our experience) there are many 
ways to revise our theories or beliefs in order to restore 
consistency. Murphy admits that our choices at this point 
will be somewhat pragmatic, since the objective is to mend the 
web with as little disturbance to the whole as possible. But 
there is a sense in which the cognizer thinks that some 
beliefs, such as the laws of logic are held immune from 
revision, nexcept under the most extreme pressure from the 
experiential boundary, since, with their central location, to 
change them would necessitate changes throughout the web. n57 
56Ibid. 
57Ibid. 
52 
This, of course, seems to be the crux of the matter, 
since Murphy seems to realize that the criteria one uses on a 
holistic account to restore consistency in the web are 
pragmatic. As we will see in chapter five, the model of 
rationality we will propose as a more adequate approach will 
suggest that a moderate (or fallibilist) foundationalism, 
together with a criterion for justification which accounts for 
an appropriate amount of the right kind, amount, and quality 
of evidence, is sufficient for adjudicating rationally among 
competing theories or beliefs. 
To be sure, there are problems even within holism. 
For example, notes Murphy, "we can imagine, alongside our own 
web, a variety of competing webs, and the question then arises 
how to chose among them." S8 How do we avoid relativism at 
this point? She argues that Quine is not too concerned with 
the potential problem of relativism, since, on his model, the 
web of beliefs takes account of the whole of knowledge. This 
means that it is always possible in theory to gradually alter 
the whole, but it is impossible to imagine replacing the 
entire web at once. But Quine's version of holism, argues 
Murphy, was conceptualized in a context where it was thought 
that we have a fairly circumscibed view of what counts as 
knowledge. As Kuhn has argued, basic conceptions of science, 
logic, and our everyday knowledge of the sensible world, have 
been challeged by a proliferation of radically different 
S8rbid., 98. 
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paradigms (conceptual theories) that are evaluated and 
replaced as a whole. And furthermore, the theoretical 
elements of a paradigm help determine what will count as facts 
(i.e., there are no theory-neutral data).59 
The Lakatosian Methodology: 
specifying the criterion 
Lakatos' methodology, as Murphy indicates, was in 
direct response to the problem of relativism in the systems of 
Quine, Kuhn, and popper. 60 The concern was to provide a 
criterion for rational choice that qets us beyond Kuhn's 
notion that paradigms involve their own standards of success. 
Kuhn arqued that whatever standards are universal to science 
(consistency, empirical fit, fruitfulness) are "insufficient 
to determine the choice amonq competinq paradiqms."61 And 
while Popper's proqram of falsification was thouqht to be 
essentially correct in Lakatos' thinkinq, he did want to 
temper Popper's program with Kuhn's insiqhts of the 
59I bid., 99. 
6~urphy, "Acceptability criteria," 284. 
61Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, 52. 
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theory-Iadeness of paradiqms.62 Lakatos argued that, 
despite the notion that there are no theory-independent data 
and that standards for qood scientific research are 
paradiqm-dependent, one can judqe rationally between competinq 
paradiqms. It is Murphy's contention that Lakatos provided 
science with a rational structure by specifyinq a criterion of 
choice between competinq research programs. This means that 
research programs will always involve a set of theories and a 
body of data. Accordinq to Murphy's description of Lakatos's 
methodology, a research program is structured by the followinq 
features: 
1. it includes a set of theories and a body of data; 
2. one theory, the "hard core," is central to the proqram; 
3. conjoined to the core is a set of auxiliary hypotheses 
that toqether add enouqh information to allow the data to 
be related to the theory; 
4. types of auxiliary hypotheses are (a) theories of 
observation or of instrumentation and (b) lower-level 
theories that apply to the core theory in different kinds 
of cases; and further, 
5. the auxiliary hypotheses form a "protective belt around 
the hard core since they are desiqned to be modified when 
potentially falsifyinq data are found. 63 
62Murphy, "Acceptability Criteria," 285. See also, 
Murphy'S Theology, 59; and Karl Popper, "Falsification and the 
Methodology of Scientific Research Proqrammes," in The 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical 
Papers, Volume 1, ed. John Worall and Greqory currie, 
(Cambridge: Cambridqe University Press, 1978), 8-101. 
63Murphy, Theology, 59. Cf. "Acceptability Criteria," 
285. See also, Imre Lakatos, Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge, ed. Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), 91-196. 
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As Murphy explains it, then, a research program (Lakatos' term 
for paradiqms) is a "temporally extended series of complex 
theories whose core remains the same while auxiliary 
hypotheses are successfully modified, replaced, or amplified 
in order to account for problematic observations ... 64 
Lakatos's contribution was to show that the history of 
science is not the succession of paradigms of the Kuhnian 
model, but one of competing research programs. Briefly put, 
some of these programs are described by Lakatos as 
"progressive" and others as "degenerating."65 Degenerating 
research programs are those in which the core theory is 
salvaged by ad hoc modifications of the protective belt. 
Lakatos indicates that we seem to have some notion of what 
these ad hoc modifications are, but it is difficult to propose 
criteria which could rule them out. 
Murphy notes that the heart of Lakatos's methodology 
is found in the procedures recognized as being scientifically 
acceptable. She further states that a research program is 
said to be progressive when the following conditions are met: 
(1) each new version of the theory (i.e., the core theory 
along with its auxiliary hypotheses) preserves the unrefuted 
content of the previous research programs with which it 
competes; (2) each new theory has excess empirical content 
over its predecessor; that is, it is able to predict some 
64Murphy, Theology, 59. 
65Murphy, AnglO-American Postmodernity, 52. 
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novel, hitherto unexpected facts; and (3) some of these 
predicted facts are in fact corroborated. 66 Since the goal 
of Lakatos's methodology is both to provide a rational 
criterion for choice between competing paradiqms and to 
demonstrate the progressive nature of science, he states that 
when the first and second conditions are met, a theory is said 
to be theoretically progressive. When all three of the 
conditions are met, the theory is considered to be empirica~~y 
progressive. It follows from this that a theory is 
degenerating if it solves some of the initial anomalies of the 
previous paradigm, but does not allow for prediction and 
discovery of any novel facts. 67 So the choices we make are 
among two or more competing series of theories, and the one 
judged most rational is the one most progressive. 
An additional feature of Lakatos's methodology is 
found in his distinction between mature and immature science. 
The research program of a mature science includes both a 
negative and a positive heuristic, both of which are necessary 
for the future development of the program. These distinctions 
are considered by Murphy to be significant advances over the 
Kuhnian conception of theory choice in science. For Kuhn, the 
only avantage of immature science was its pre-paradigmatic 
nature. The goal in this setting was to focus on adopting a 
paradigm in order to get on with serious research. For 
6~urphy, Theo~ogy, 59. 
67Ibid., 59-60. 
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Lakatos, however, both mature and immature science are 
characterized by a negative heuristic. This negative 
heuristic is related to the auxiliary hypotheses and simply 
represents the methodological rules by which they protect the 
hard core from falsification; that is, the falsification is 
directed against the auxiliary hypotheses for which suitable 
modifications can be made. This t.plies that there is a bard 
core set of beliefs or theories of which either one could be 
unaware, could assume without question, or could be treated as 
if they are irrefutable. 68 
The positive heuristic is also connected to the 
auxiliary hypotheses, only in this instance the auxiliary 
hypotheses are developed according to a preconceived plan. 
Lakatos describes the positive heuristic as "a partially 
articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to change, 
develop the 'refutable variants' of the research-programme, 
how to modify, sophisticate, the 'refutable' protective 
belt. 1169 The positive heuristic may face further 
modifications and variations, but it does not take place in 
the random and unplanned fashion thought to be the case with 
respect to the auxiliary hypotheses of immature science. The 
essential function of the positive heuristic is the 
68J • Wentzel van Huyssteen, Essays in 
Postfoundationalist Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 
1997), 81. 
69Lakatos, "Falsification," 50. See also, Murphy, 
Theology, 60. 
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strengthening of the protective belt (the auxiliary 
hypotheses) that shields the hard core theory from 
falsification. 
The value of Lakatos's theory of scientific research 
programs, according to Murphy, is that it provides a 
methodology that is applicable to theorizing in theism. It is 
a way in which theistic claims to rationality can be in 
keeping with the standards of rationality for science. That 
is, in Lakatos's analysis, we have science at any point in 
which "there is a series of theories whose empirical content 
(sometimes) increases as the auxiliary hypotheses are modified 
to avoid falsification."70 FUrthermore, mature theories are 
those in which the content-increasing modifications take place 
according to a preconceived plan. So there is said to be an 
objective reason for choosing one program over another "when 
the former has a more progressive record than its rival--that 
is, a greater demonstrated ability to anticipate novel 
facts." 7l 
Murphy thinks that Lakatos's criterion helps answer 
the problem of relativism in two ways: First, Lakatos claims 
that research programs (conceptual theories) need to be 
evaluated in terms of how they change over time. The data 
offered in support of a theory (or belief) do not provide us 
with enough information for choice if they are only considered 
70Murphy, Theology, 60. 
7lI bid., 60-60. 
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at some temporal cross-section of a theory's history. 
Empirical progress is an intrisically historical approach. 
Murphy thinks that this temporal dimension of Lakatos' program 
is absolutely essential for any model of rationality that 
begins with a holistic account of justification of individual 
beliefs and then goes on to answer how one justifies an entire 
web of beliefs (one's theory or paradigm).72 
Second, in Lakatos's methodology, each research 
program involves a series of a temporal succession of 
theories, and each has a relatively slight modification over 
its predecessor. If the program is progressive, then each new 
theory is better than its predecessor (i.e., it has more 
empirical content than the previous theory, apart from some ad 
hoc hypotheses to account for it). Some of this excess 
content is ultimately corroborated (i.e., it accounts for 
novel facts), and this is what amounts to the criterion for 
rational choice among competing theories and beliefs. In 
terms of its application to theistic theories or beliefs, one 
must not only have access to the range of religious experience 
but one must also be able to formulate criteria for correctly 
identifying valid and reliable knowledge claims for theism. 
For example, one of the more pressing problems in the search 
for suitable data is to "finds ways to distinguish data that 
72Murphy, Anglo-American postmodernity, 53. 
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have a bearing on the nature of God and those that bear only 
on the psychology or history of religion."73 
Crucial to this program for Murphy is the thoroughly 
postmodern idea of communal discernment as the most typical of 
religious practices. While it is difficult to see how her 
system succeeds in avoiding referentiality in language and 
correspondence in truth, Murphy argues that suitable data for 
theistic theories or claims are "constructed" out of what is 
thought to be a consensus on the activity of God in observable 
events in the life of the church. Other crucial data for 
theology could include scriptural texts, historical facts, 
sociological and anthropological data, and possibly facts from 
the natural sciences. 74 So it is the event of communal 
consensus in which the useful data for theology resides. The 
construction of claims about God's activity in the human life 
on the basis of communal consensus (i.e., discernment) is what 
Murphy refers to as a Christian epistemic practice (i.e., the 
justified data of theology). Still other criteria for what 
counts as the data of the experience of communal consensus 
includes the following: (1) agreement with the apostolic 
witness, (2) evidence of a Christ-like character (i.e., 
freedom from sin, fruits of the Spirit, etc.), and (3) 
consensus of the community based on prayerful discussion. 
73van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist 
Theology, 82. 
74Murphy, Theology, 130. 
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When such criteria are .et, it can be recognized with 
reasonable certainty that such activities represent authentic 
works of the Spirit, and so theology can proceed to claim it 
as data for theological research programs. 
But it is an appeal to these kind of data that 
represents one of the .ore powerful challenqes for Murphy's 
proposal. As van Huyssteen points out, -if her qoal is to 
meet the challenqe of probable reasoninq, then not only her 
Lakatosian methodoloqy, but also the data that feed into it, 
must conform to scientific epistemic practices. lt7S If the 
purpose is to offer a rational alternative to foundationalist 
forms of the rational justification of beliefs, then it is 
precisely an appeal to these kind of data that is in doubt. 
These choices would seem to represent prior commitments on her 
part (similar to foundationally basic belief), since it is 
difficult to state her criteria for choice. It seems that it 
would be difficult to show that claims about God's activity in 
the human life (i.e., the data for theoloqy) on the basis of 
such discernments constitutes the criteria for rational 
choice. How could one rationally argue that such choices 
conform to Lakatosian criteria for rational choice, rather 
than the kinds of prior commitments that Murphy claims are so 
characteristic of foundationalist evidentialism? On this 
basis, there is no reason why the propositions of scripture, 
7SVan Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist 
Theology, 83. 
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apostolic witness, and the authority of Christ should be 
considered criteria for judgment, since Murphy has not 
provided good reasons why such criteria constitute the data 
for a Lakatosian methodology. 
It would appear, then, that these criteria have their 
epistemic foundation in a deeper and prior commitment. But it 
would seem that this is not at all commensurable with Murphy's 
attempt at probable reasoning and at a holistic, 
nonfoundational epistemology.76 Since her criteria for the 
data of theology appears to rely on prior commitments (i.e., 
the authority of Scripture, the Spirit, etc.), theological 
methodology turns out to be very different from the sciences. 
This would imply that Murphy's system does not avoid the kind 
of prior commitments identified with the foundationalist 
systems of rationality she hopes to rep1ace. The final 
element to consider in the search for rational criteria, then, 
has to do with the matter of truth. This will help determine 
the role of community consensus in locating valid data for 
rational theistic claims. 
Holism and Truth 
Murphy argues that both the correspondence and 
coherence thories of truth do not do justice to the truth 
76I bid., 83-84. 
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claims made in science and theology.77 Murphy rejects the 
correspondence theory in favor of what she defines as a 
MacIntyrean unsurpassability theory. Drawinq on Alasdair 
MacIntyre's recent work in ethics and epistemology, Murphy 
argues that her meaning for truth is one of unsurpassability, 
a standpoint which suqqests that whatever is true will never 
be shown to be inadequate in its central contentions. 7S For 
MacIntyre (whose notions of truth are applied to moral 
traditions), a person's intelliqence is embodied and enqaqed 
in the world; it cannot stand objectively removed from a 
person's subjective preferences. 79 This beinq the case, 
human judqments are 'true' only in a secondary sense. Murphy 
writes of MacIntyre's view: 
Havinq an adequate qrasp of reality means beinq able to 
say how thinqs are rather than how they seem to be from 
some particular, partial, and limited standpoint; adequacy 
is known by contrast with inadequacy. Enquiry aims at 
77Nancey Murphy, "Truth, Relativism, and Crossword 
Puzzles," Zygon 24, no. 3 (1989): 299. See also, J. Mouton and 
J. C. Pauw, " Foundational ism and Fundamentalism: A Critique," 
in Paradigms and Progress in Theology, ed. J. Mouton, A. G. 
van Aarde, and W. S. Voster (Pretoria, South Africa: Human 
Sciences Research Council, 1988), 176-186. 
7SSee Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity: 
Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion, and Ethics 
(Boulder, Colo.: westview Press, 1997), 125. Cf., Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, 
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); and Idem, "Moral 
Relativism, Truth, and Justification," in Noral Truth and 
Moral Tradition: Essays in Bonor of Peter Geach and Elizabeth 
Anscombe, ed. Luke Gormally (Blackrock, Ireland: Four Courts 
Press, 1994), 6-24. 
79MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 385. See also, Murphy, 
Anglo-American Postmodernity, 123. 
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transcendinq distortions and limitations; truth is teleos 
of inquiry. 80 
This gives the impression that MacIntyre's view is a sort of 
realism, but what he means by "an intellect adequate to grasp 
reality" is the suggestion that there are a variety of 
dimensions of one's life that are said to conform to what is 
real. Truth is an intimate relation between knowing and 
engaging in social practices. 
On MacIntyre's account, we can know which theory is 
true (ontologically) through the awareness of whether one's 
account of reality conforms to existing traditions and social 
practices that (a) either solve problems that their 
predecessors could not solve (including an explanation for why 
those previous systems could not solve certain difficulties), 
or (b) show that one's tradition has the resources for 
overcoming its own intellectual crises, while other existing 
rival theories continue to meet with persistent and 
intractable problems relative to their particular cases. 8l 
This approach, as we will see, also gives insight to the 
epistemological problem of the justification of a belief or 
theory on evidence. 
In relying in part on MacIntyre's views, Murphy wants 
to emphasize the nature of truth in terms of the role it plays 
8~urphy, Anglo-American Postmoderni ty, 123. 
8lI bid., 124. Murphy states that the process under (a) 
is what MacIntyre refers to as diachronic justification and 
the process under (b) is understood as synchronic 
justification. 
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in pointinq out the radical discrepancies (particularly as it 
is understood in the correspondence view) between our older 
beliefs about thinqs in the world and the world as it is now 
understood to be. It is not difficult to see the Lakatosian 
influence on her acceptance of MacIntyre's account. MacIntyre 
argues that it is a cognizer's recoqnition of a lack of 
correspondence between what the mind previously judqed and 
believed, and reality as it is now perceived, which makes 
those earlier judgments and beliefs false. Truth for one's 
present mind-set (and the judgments which are its expression) 
is to claim that this kind of inadequacy (or discrepancy) will 
never appear in any possible future situation, reqardless of 
what developments in rational inquiry may occur. 82 A 
tradition, then, is true only if it proves to be a better 
alternative than its live competitors for solvinq problems 
relevant to that tradition. One may even qo as far as to say 
that it solves "the problems of rivals that cannot be solved 
usinq the rival's own resources and, furthermore, is able to 
explain why thinqs must have appeared as they did to its 
predecessors and contemporary rivals from their more limited 
or defective perspectives."8l 
Murphy qoes on to distinguish between MacIntyre's 
accounts of the meaninq of truth (i.e, an adequate qrasp of 
82Maclntyre, "Moral Relativism," 356-358; as quoted in 
Murphy, Anglo-American Postemodernity, 124. 
83Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, 125. 
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reality) and of the criteria for vindicatinq truth claims. 
While she is apprehensive of MacIntyre's notion of meaning, 
she looks more favorably on his arguments for the criteria for 
truth. Murphy argues that an ontoloqical conception of truth 
as correspondence is inadequate for a nonfoundational model of 
rationality. 84 She differs with MacIntyre's meaninq of 
truth as adequatio intellectus ad rem (i.e., havinq an 
adequate qrasp of reality), insistinq that it fails on the 
qrounds that "excerpted from the corpus of his work, it is 
sure to be misunderstood; it may be • • • translated into a 
modern correspondence theory with an associated modern 
realism ... 85 Murphy further explains: 
However, I believe his account of the criteria for 
vindicatinq the truth of claims of traditions or rival 
standpoints can be readily appropriated and applied to the 
problem of adjudicatinq between rival theoloqical or 
reliqious traditions. I propose, then, that when we claim 
for a reliqious standpoint that it is true, we mean to say 
that in its central contentions it will never be shown to 
be inadequate in any future situation no matter what 
developments in rational enquiry may occur. • • • The 
criterion for makinq such a bold claim is survival of the 
sort of dialectical questioninq of the standpoint in 
relation to its rivals that MacIntyre has so eloquently 
descr ibed. 86 
84Ibid., 118. Like most epistemic systems concerned 
with the possibility of makinq truth claims for theism, Murphy 
attempts a distinction between a definition of what it means 
to say that a thinq is true (alonq with what she believes is 
consistent with a nonfoundational model of rationality) and 
criteria for judqinq whether a qiven claim is in fact true. 
85Ibid., 125. 
86I bid. 
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Thus, the meaning of truth is that of unsurpassability, and 
her criteria for determininq whether a particular theory is in 
fact unsurpassable is its ability to stand aqainst its rivals 
in terms of its problem-solvinq task. Murphy, in makinq these 
distinctions, believes she has provided an adequate theory of 
truth in which to employ MacIntyre's account of the criteria 
for vindicatinq the truth claims of traditions. 
Murphy confidently admits that MacIntyre's criterion 
for adjudicatinq between rival traditions does little to 
satisfy those who are committed to the corresponence theory of 
truth. But she qoes on to urqe us that with some additional 
steps to MacIntyre's account, the correspondence theory may be 
rejected in favor of her idea of unsurpassability. And while 
her comments are directed specifically toward the matter of 
adjudicatinq between rival scientific, philosophical, and 
theological traditions, I believe her essential remarks 
concerning MacIntyre's criteria for vindicating the truth 
claims of rival traditions has application to the rationality 
of theistic beliefs and the claims to truth that so naturally 
surface out of theorizinq in general. 87 
Briefly put, if we qrant for the sake of the arqument 
that the correspondence view qives us an account of the 
meaning of truth, then our next concern, arques Murphy, has to 
87See Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativism, and 
Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 128; and 
David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2d ed. (Chicaqo: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 40-41. 
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do with the criteria for truth. Simple assertions about 
observable states of affairs might satisfy us with saying that 
a statement in some way pictures or represents the way things 
are. For example, liThe cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat 
to which we refer is indeed on (not under or beside) the mat 
to which we refer. But Murphy argues that such notions are 
inadequate when we ask for criteria for truth claims regarding 
entire traditions. This is where she believes MacIntyre's 
account of the criteria proves useful. She writes: 
For here we are not concerned with individual sentences in 
a context where language and epistemology can be taken for 
granted. Rather, we are concerned with the whole system 
of concepts, epistemological and metaphysical theories, 
and even "local" theories of truth! 
But this concern on Murphy's part appears to confuse the 
ontological question of the meaning of truth with the 
epistemological matter of determining whether a given theory, 
tradition, or statement is true. One cannot automatically 
rule out a correspondence notion of truth simply because it is 
difficult to determine epistemologically whether or not 
certain conditions have indeed been satisfied. SS Murphy 
seems to imply that the ontological conditions that make our 
common assertions of empirical matters true somehow change 
when we go on to justify or verify the truthfulness of entire 
traditions. But she has provided no good reasons for 
concluding as such. 
S8Feinberq, "Truth," 4-5. 
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Murphy responds to this challeqe by statinq that, if 
what MacIntyre .. ADS by what she calls truth as 
unsurpassability is some form of correspondence, then we have 
no qrounds for "assuming that passinq MacIntyre's tests 
ensures that a tradition's beliefs and concepts adequately 
correspond to reality or correspond better than the rejected 
rivals."a9 The primary reason for this is because there is 
no definitional connection between such justification (i.e, a 
theory's ability to solve problems and stand aqainst its 
rivals) and correspondence. Nor can one appeal to a weaker 
experiential connection, since this would imply some sort of 
direct insiqht into the nature of reality. Our tendency in 
such a case would be to compare reality itself with our 
preconceived ways of looking at it and talkinq about it. 90 
She writes: 
The criterion (unsurpassed so far) provides the best 
possible evidence for truth (will remain unsurpassed), and 
furthermore, the criterion bas a reasonable (conceptual) 
connection with the meaninq of truth. The criterion 
falls short of a necessary and sufficient condition for 
truth--trutb claims are fallible, as are all other claims. 
However, this is just what we should bave expected; it 
should not be possible to have a biqher deqree of 
~~~!~~~il reqarding the truth of'S is true' than of S 
What is critical from Murphy's point of view is that her 
MacIntyrean approach ensures that, should we conclude at some 
a9Murphy, 127. 
90I bid. 
91Ibid., 128. 
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future date that we had been mistaken about a truth claim, it 
will be the result of havinq developed better concepts or 
theories (assuming that the previous systems were inadequate 
for solving their anomalies), not the result of a 
correspondence comparison of any sort between the old 
conceptions and "reality" itself. 92 
Murphy argues that in the best of cases, "one can 
claim only that a qiven tradition at a qiven staqe of its 
development is the best so far."93 But how does this sit 
with those who are used to making absolute claims to truth and 
would arque that Murphy's position is in fact relativistic? 
Murphy arques that the objection can be reasonably met by 
pointinq out that absolutism and relativism do not have to be 
viewed as dichotomous positions. They may be better viewed as 
limits on a range of possible positions regarding the 
decidability of truth claims. Our only real option is "to 
consider theorists' relative positions on the scale of 
possiblities in between."94 
Assessment of Murphy's Hodel 
of Rationality 
It may be arqued that the positive features of 
Murphy's proqram are not unique to the postmodern paradiqm 
(i.e., such features are clearly present in foundationalist 
92 I bid. 
93I bid. 
94I bid. 
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models other than classical foundational ism) , and as such, 
they may represent still useful features for a rational 
epistemology for theistic belief. In one sense, it may be 
argued that she has not entirely jettisoned the epistemic 
features of modernity. (1) Murphy clearly does not accept 
extreme forms of relativism in truth; (2) her position is a 
conscious effort to avoid fideis. by arguinq that theistic 
theories and beliefs should be based on an objectively 
rational discipline; and (3) it calls for the justification of 
truth-claims accordinq to the qoinq standards of rationality 
in contemporary philosophy of science. 
One major response to evidentialism has to do with the 
rediscovery of the role of reliqious experience in theoloqical 
reflection. The break from Enliqhtenment standards of 
evidential ism has caused some to increasingly depend on the 
concept of reliqious experience. But as van Huyssteen points 
out, the greatest challenge for the nonfoundationalist, 
however, is how to retrieve reliqious experience as a valid 
methodological starting point for theoloqical reflection. 95 
Such efforts seek to construct an imaginative approach to 
theological reflection that begins with ordinary human 
experience. 
It may be legitimately arqued that Murphy's model of 
rationality does in fact espouse a certain degree of epistemic 
95wentzel van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundatjona~ist 
Theology, 74. 
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relativism. Although she intractably denies that her position 
warrants this conclusion, such relativism comes as a logical 
outgrowth of the nonfoundationalism she attempts to employ in 
suggesting that theoloqy follow Lakatos' scientific model of 
rationality. Murphy writes: 
It must be noted, however, that the theological 
methodology proposed here, while providing a counter 
to total relativism, offers no absolutist view of 
rationality, even within our (loosely) empiricist 
worldview. There is no instant rationality in science 
or theoloqy.96 
Theorizing in theism flows from an anti-authoritarian and 
postfoundational epistemic program. The data of such a 
paradigm for theology illustrate its "counter to total 
relativism" by selecting from the manifold of religious 
experience those elements which claim to yield some form of 
knowledge of God. 97 
Although Murphy attempts a ncnfoundational theology by 
seeing religious experience as the primary data for 
theological research programs, her model of rationality lacks 
a well-developed theory of experience. Murphy is able to say 
that experience provides some ground for theological belief 
and its rationality (c.f., William Alston),9S but she is not 
96Nancey Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific 
Reasoning (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 
207. 
97Van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist 
Theology, 82. 
985ee , for example, William Alston, "The Autonomy of 
Religious Experience," International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 31., nos. 2-3 (1992): 67-87; idem, Percieving God: 
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able to say precisely in what manner this must take shape. We 
have only some subjective conviction that God is acting in our 
lives, but no "objective" way of establishing this conviction, 
or for justifying the claim. Since the data of experience 
(whether scientific or religious) always inevitably involve 
interpretation, Murphy has no objective way of establishing 
the epistemic reliability of communal discernments and of 
justifying one's conceptual frameworks. 
Furthermore, as Van Huyssteen indicates, it would seem 
that one can hardly compare the replicable process of 
Christian discernment or community consensus with the 
disciplined control of the scientific experimental context. 
In fact, Van Huyssteen's form of relativism would appear to 
argue against Murphy's approach, contending that such a 
process, at best, demonstrates that both scientific and 
theological facts are theory-laden, that they function within 
the context of traditioned experience (a la Kuhn), and that 
"degrees of objectivity" exist and are always cu1turally 
bound. 99 Such an epistemology works against a concept of 
objectivity in theorizing which argues that, whi1e our 
conceptual frameworks do influence our interpretation of the 
The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, New York and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1991); and idem, "Religious 
Experience as a Ground of Religious Belief," in Religious 
Experience and Religious Belief: Essays in the Epistemology of 
Religion, ed. Joseph Runzo and Craig K. Ihara (Lanham, Md.: 
University Pres of America), 31-51. 
99Van Huyssteen, 85. 
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data, we are not so theory-laden as to never qet beyond our 
conceptual frameworks to see the data objectively. 
Murphy admits that, while Christian discernment and 
communal consensus may meet all the standard requirements of 
scientific data, they will not be of the same quality 
(reliability, replicability) as those of the natural sciences. 
And since qood reasoning is said by Murphy only to riqhtfully 
surface out of a Lakatosian methodology of probable reasoninq 
within the data of hard core theories, unless the truth-claims 
of theoloqy can be shown to adhere exactly to Lakatos' hard 
core theory, one can not even be sure that that the data of 
theoloqy are even probable. 100 But as Van Huyssteen has 
suqqested, theological programs, in contrast to Murphy's 
thesis, have been shown not to function at all like scientific 
research programs. Lakatos' criteria of relative empirical 
progress could hardly be used to adjudicate between competinq 
theoloqical theories. Murphy never ultimately justifies her 
thesis that the most empirically progressive theological 
programs provide knowledqe of God and his revelation to the 
world. 101 
Murphy's admonitions aside, it would seem that, while 
clearly fashionable from the postmodern context, her theory of 
truth leaves us with serious reservations for the possibility 
of any kind of truth claim. In the first place, her 
lO~urphy, Theology, 173. 
lOlVan Huyssteen, 86. 
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epistemological procedures for the verification of truth 
claims or traditions (the criteria) may be consistent with her 
meaning of truth, but if the meaning of truth is understood as 
unsurpassability, how could one ever state when such a 
condition has been satisried? What, exactly, does 
unsurpassability look like? And furthermore, from the 
question of procedures for verification, it does not seem that 
we could ever be in a position to know (with any reasonable 
degree of certainty) that a given tradition or truth claim is 
unsurpassable in the way that Murphy suggests. 
Secondly, on her definition, a theoretical system or 
simple truth claim is always passable in that claims to truth 
are always fallible. In this sense, it is difficult even to 
know that one is moving in the direction of unsurpassability. 
If claims to truth are always fallible, as Murphy suggests, 
then we end up with a view of truth in which truth is a matter 
of what is pragmatic or useful for solving problems from one's 
perspective. This assumes, of course, that we never really 
get beyond our cultural, linguistic, and conceptual biases, 
and if this is the case (and there is no good reason to thii~ 
that it is), then in what sense can we speak of truth in terms 
of a condition that remains unsurpassed? 
Murphy's position raises the further question of what 
it means to say that a claim is fallible. If what makes a 
truth claim fallible (i.e., possibly shown to be false at some 
later point) is that it fails to satisfy some condition other 
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than one of correspondence (i.e., one's proposition or theory 
about a certain state of affairs does not in fact describe 
conditions in the world), then in what sense is it fallible 
and able to be surpassed? To simply say that it does not 
adequately solve problems is a vague answer, since, apart from 
a correspondence notion, it would seem that what counts as a 
problem (and why it should count) aaounts to little aore than 
a personal construct designed to satisfy one's pragmatic 
conceptions of what theories (or truth claims) should or 
should not do. 
The point to be made here is that Murphy mistakenly 
employs epistemological procedures (one of being unsurpassed 
so far) in order to determine the ontological condition of 
truth as unsurpassability. This can be readily seen in her 
notion that 'truth' is the condition of a claim that is 
unsurpassable in its "central contentions." While she 
attempts to identify what the central contentions of a truth 
claim or tradition might be, once again, if it is not 
understood from a correspondence sense, it is difficult to 
state what conditions a claim that is unsurpassable must 
satisfy. For Murphy, the answer to this question is that such 
a claim must be open to being falsified at some future point. 
But this amounts to an epistemological matter rather than a 
definition for the ontological status of truth. 
Equally problematic is the question of the kind and 
degree of evidence that would be required to show that a claim 
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or tradition is in fact unsurpassable. Since Murphy's 
ontoloqical notion of truth (i.e., what truth is) ultimately 
ends up relyinq on her idea of the criteria and procedures for 
determininq truth (i.e., how we know when a particular claim 
or tradition is in fact true), it would seem that one could 
never be in a position to know that enouqh evidence has been 
produced to say that a qiven system satisfies the condition 
of unsurpassability. It seems obvious that no person (or 
community) is in a position to have exhaustive knowledqe of 
the relevant data, or to know which data are relevant for 
determininq whether a qiven system is in fact unsurpassable. 
Murphys's idea of truth is inextricably connected to her 
criteria for epistemic verification. Thus, in the final 
analysis, her ontoloqical condition for truth ultimately 
reduces to an epistemological criterion in keepinq with her 
postmodern theory that truth is more a matter of what it takes 
to solve theoretical anomalies than an ontoloqical reality to 
which we have theory-independent access (and can know in most 
cases that we do in fact adequately access it). It must be 
stated that Murphy's requirement for certainty in the quest 
for truth is misplaced. As we will see on our proposed model 
of rationality in chapter five, the matter of the truth and 
certainty of a claim has to do with the kind, quality, and 
deqree of evidence one has for a qiven belief. This is to be 
distinquished from the kind of unobtainable certainty that 
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Murphy warns is so indicative of most foundationalist systems 
of evidentialism. 
Van Huyssteen argues that Murphy's holistic 
epistemology implies more than simple communal discernment and 
communal consensus for contemporary theoloqical reflection. 
There are foundationalist elements. While Murphy appears to 
disarm all forms of foundationalism in her central argument, 
her designation of the presupposed existence of God as the 
"hard core" for a theological research proqram (A la Lakatos) 
and the added contention that this hard core will always 
typically contain reference to God, raises the hermeneutical 
problem of the metaphorical and epistemic function of 
religious language. In addition, her attempt at a distinction 
between "hard core beliefs" and others that can be regarded as 
auxiliary hypotheses in the context of a holistic postmodern 
theology seems to suggest some degree of prior commitment to 
certain beliefs or theories having a privileged status. The 
"hard core beliefs" of her Lakatosian model may, in fact, lead 
to a subtle form of foundationalism. And this goes against 
her attempt at a form of rational nonrealism. 102 
Murphy's holistic approach of current postmodern and 
postfoundational thought, argues Van Huyssteen, can be revised 
to make credible tentative claims through the epistemic access 
we have through the metaphoric nature of human language. 
Murphy, however, sees any attempt to define a relation between 
l02 I bid., 88. 
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language and the world as a modern approach, rather than a 
postmodern position where words like "real" or "exists" are 
restricted to the meaning they obtain from being used within 
certain linguistic frameworks. In Van Huyssteen's approach to 
critical realism (an approach that Murphy rejects as 
attempting to salvage correspondence in truth and 
referentialism in language), the epistemic purpose of 
metaphorical language is not to transcend the world of human 
experience, but rather to set limits to the range and scope of 
our theological and scientific language. As such, Van 
Huyssteen argues that a weak form of critical realism (i.e., 
one that takes seriously the realist assumptions of the 
Christian faith) claims that onels subjective encounter of the 
world is of the same order as one's re-creation of the world 
in language. He argues that language is never seen as a 
derivative of an "objective" world and so does not find truth 
in a correspondence with such a world. This, or course, does 
not deny the existence of an extralinguistic world, but it is 
an epistemic affirmation that this reality is mostly 
encountered in language. I03 
As Van Huyssteen further points out, it is possible 
that Murphy's inclusion of God as the hard core of a 
theological research program reveals the kind of prior 
commitments if theistic claims are to reflect the criteria for 
rational choice exhibited in scientific theories or claims. 
l03I bid. 
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In the extreme form of Murphy's view, argues van Huyssteen, 
religious beliefs may require no explanatory support and can 
in the end be seen as just part of a groundless language-game. 
But when theological beliefs, however, "become a species of 
belief whose truth is 'discovered' only by means of criteria 
internal to the language-game itself, this leads not only to a 
relativistic understanding of justification, truth, and 
language, but to an epistemological relativism which would be 
fatal for the cognitive claims of theological 
statements. "104 
In the final analysis, it may be helpful to see that 
Murphy's concept of justification (i.e., the criteria for 
rational choice among theories and beliefs) relates closely to 
her theory of truth and other notions. Rather than 
justification being a reason-based conception (as we will 
argue on our model of rationality), it ends up being a 
two-step process that may confuse methodological starting 
points and basic statements of concepts. First, from an 
ideological (postmodern) perspective, Murphy begins with a set 
of ideas about truth, knowledge, and justification (i.e., 
community consensus) that are simply concepts (i.e., in the 
way of prior commitments). Second, from a methodological 
starting point (where she believes she is being postmodern in 
her use of MacIntyre's notion of truth and Lakatos' scientific 
104I bid., 89. 
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model of rationality), it may be that she actually ends up 
with foundational commitments that do not reflect a truly 
non-foundational and postmodern methodology. So while many of 
her presuppositions of content are postmodern in nature (i.e., 
they state points of view that deny modern notions of truth, 
knowledge, and language), she continues to uphold a method 
ology (or rational approach) that is not thoroughly divested 
of starting points in prior commitments, and as Van Huyssteen 
contends, comes suspiciously close to a subtle form of 
foundationalism. 10S 
Murphy's arguments against foundational ism, for 
example, may have more to do with the practical notion that no 
set of ideas has a privileqed epistemic status. But Van 
Huyssteen has shown that much of her methodology does not qet 
beyond certian foundationalist assumptions. This does not 
necessarily show that Murphy's conception of rationality is 
wrong, but it does suggest that she accepts certain 
postfoundational ideas without offering a truly 
post-foundational methodology for arrivinq at those ideas. 
This would further suqgest that her system may not be a truly 
postfoundational epistemology. Perhaps one response to this 
is, given Murphy's arguments, one need not rule out in advance 
the possibility of a rationality model that follows some form 
of foundational ism. Furthermore, an adequate model of 
lOSWentzel van Huyssteen, Postfoundationalist Theology 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998), 
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rationality should be able to offer a methodoloqical startinq 
point from which one can leqitimately extract a set of ideas 
consistent with it. As Moreland has pointed out aqainst 
Murphy's kind of approach, for example, "scientists do not 
always hold their beliefs tentatively, especially durinq 
periods of what Kuhn called normal science.,,106 What is 
needed, then, is a model of rationality in which the criteria 
for rational belief do not depend on the kind of subjective 
factors in Murphy's proposed Lakatosian model. As Paul 
Feyerabend has indicated, the proposed historicist-holism of 
Lakatos's approach does not provide objective criteria for 
knowinq when it is fair to eliminate a less proqressive 
research proqram, since even proqrams which are proqressive 
overall are sometimes known to be deqenerate for a time. l07 
10~oreland, Christianity and the Nature of Science, 
32. 
107See Paul Feyerabend, "Consolations for the 
Specialist," in criticisms and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. 
Imre Lakatos and Alan Musqrave (Cambridqe: Cambridqe 
University Press, 1970), 197-230. 
CHAPTER THREE 
PROPER BASICALITY 
A MODEST RATIONALISM 
One of the more intriquinq, innovative and 
controversial contributions to the rationality of reliqious 
belief is found in the Reformed (or calvinist) epistemoloqy of 
Alvin Plantinqa. 1 Plantinqa champions an approach to the 
rationality of reliqious belief in which he contends that one 
is entirely rational and within one's epistemic riqhts in 
holdinq to the belief that God exists even thouqh that belief 
is not based on prior evidence. Crucial to understandinq 
Plantinqa's epistemoloqy is the realization that his approach 
IThe basic features of Plantinqa's epistemoloqy are 
set forth in a series of articles articulatinq and restatinq 
the Reformed system in the lanquaqe of contemporary 
philosophy. See, for example, "Is Belief in God Rational?" in 
Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre 
Dame Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979); "The 
Reformed Objection to Natural Theoloqy," Christian Scholar's 
Review 11, no. 3 (1982); "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" 
Nous 15, no.l (March 1981); and "On Reformed Epistemoloqy," 
The Reformed Journal 32, no. 1 (1982). Perhaps his most widely 
read article is "Reason and Belief in God," in Faith and 
Rationality, ed. Alvin Plantinqa and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
(Notre Dame Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). For a 
similar position see Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Can 8elief in God 
be Rational If It Has No Foundations?" in Faith and 
Rationality, ed. Alvin Plantinqa and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
(Notre Dame Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); and 
idem, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, 2d ed. (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishinq Co., 1984). 
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to rationality applies to only ona belief, namely, the belief 
that God exists. This is particularly significant, given that 
Plantinga's model of rationality allows for the use of 
evidence (in the form of arquments and experience) on a wide 
range of other religious beliefs, other than the belief that 
God exists. Having stated this, however, it will be arqued 
that certain features in Planting.'s system do represent a 
significant and necessary move away from Murphy's conceptions 
of rationality, and ultimately bring us closer to what will be 
proposed in chapter five as a more adequate model of 
rationality for one's beliefs (philosophical, theistic, or 
otherwise) based on a moderate form of foundational ism in 
epistemoloqy. We will see, for example, that Plantinga's 
system retains a foundationalist structure to the 
justification of religious belief. And while his 
justification for belief in God is ultimately a 
non-evidentialist appeal to certain conditions (including an 
implicit notion of truth as some form of correspondence) in 
the construction of beliefs in qeneral, his insights on the 
criteria for distinquishinq basic from non-basic beliefs in 
classical foundationalism are useful to the moderate form of 
foundationalism critical to the model of rationality that will 
be suggested in chapter five. 
Rejecting the stronger forms of rationality which 
contend that belief in God is irrational when it is held in 
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the absence of qood arguments or eVidence,2 Plantinqa 
concludes that the theist is rationally justified in believinq 
in God without havinq to provide evidential arguments or 
reasons for that belief. Tbe result of Plantinqa's work is a 
theory for theistic belief (i.e., belief that God exists) 
which seeks to offer a mediatinq position between the inherent 
difficulties of evidentialism (i.e., constantly proportioninq 
belief to the evidence) and the seeminqly frail coqnitive 
deliverances of fideism (i.e., that belief in God is based on 
faith alone, in the absence of, or contrary to reason).3 
On Plantinqa's mode1 of rationality, one is considered 
rational if one holds those beliefs which naturally arise in 
certain conditions, and if one holds other beliefs that stem 
from such basic beliefs. Beliefs that naturally arise in 
certain circumstances or conditions are considered properly 
basic beliefs. Rejectinq the classical foundationalist notion 
that one's basic beliefs (foundational) and non-basic beliefs 
2For example, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn, revised ed. (New York: Willey Book 
Co., 1943); and David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Briqqe (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1902). See also, Antony Flew, The presumption of 
Atheism (London: PembertonPublishinq Co., 1976), 22. 
3For a qood analysis of the notion that Plantinqa's 
epistemoloqy, notwithstanding his own objections to the 
contrary, represents a form of philosophical fideism, see 
William J. Abraham, An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Religion (Enqlewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 87-97. 
See also, Louis P. pojman, "The Contemporary Debate on Faith 
and Reason: Fideism and Rationality," in Religious Belief and 
the will (London and New York: Routledqe & Keqan Paul, 1986), 
129-39. 
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(inferential beliefs) can be justified only if one provides 
sufficient evidence for them (i.e., in terms of certainty), 
Plantinga argues that a person is within his epistemic rights 
(i.e., is warranted, justified, and rational) in holding 
properly basic beliefs without an appeal to evidence in the 
form of arguments, proofs, or other propositions that one is 
rational in believing. 4 
On this model, then, one is not required to meet 
evidentialist requirements of sufficient evidence (as defined 
in chapter one) for one's properly basic beliefs to be 
rational. Rather, one's justification for a properly basic 
belief can be an appeal to the right conditions and 
circumstances in which those beliefs are formed. And for some 
people, argues Plantinga, belief in God can be a belief that 
does in fact satisfy those conditions and is consequently 
rational to hold. Plantinga refers to this as the grounds of 
a belief, rather than the evidence for a belief. Such 
grounds, however, constitute the reasons for one's beliefs. 
The basis for accepting one's beliefs as properly basic is the 
4Nicholas wolterstroff, another Reformed 
epistemologist who advocates many of the same tenets as 
Plantinga does, writes that the type of evidentialism that he 
and Plantinga are countering is an approach in which it is 
rational to believe a proposition (scientific, theistic, or 
otherwise) only if that proposition is believed on the basis 
of others of one's beliefs that constitute good evidence for 
it. See, for example, Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Migration of 
the Theistic Arguments: From Natural Theology to Evidentialist 
Apologetics," in Rationality, Religious Belie~, and Horal 
commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy o~ Religion, ed. 
Robert Audi and Wlliam J. Wainwright (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), 38-9, n. 2. 
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prima facie assumption that one's cognitive (noetic) faculties 
are functioning properly in environments suitably designed for 
those faculties to function as they were intended. 
Belief in God as Properly Basic 
The central tenet of Plantinga's thinking is his claim 
that a person's belief in God can be a properly basic belief 
(i.e., that one is within one's epistemic rights to hold a 
belief without an appeal to arquments or evidence).S By 
belief in God Plantinga means "belief that God exists, 
distinquishing this notion from aspect of God's character or 
attributes (e.g., to trust God in some way).6 Furthermore, 
Plantinga's system is directed in part against theists (e.g., 
natural theologians) who aqree with the evidentialist 
assumption that theistic belief is rational for a person only 
if that person has sufficient evidence or arquments or reasons 
for that belief. Both non-theists and theists, it is arqued, 
self-consciously attempt to use premises that all rational 
beings are obliged to accept.' Plantinga, however, proposes 
a theory of knowledge, belief, and rationality that rejects 
Seewey J. Hoitenga, Faith and Reason from Plato to 
Plantinga (Albany: state University of New York Press, 1991), 
176. Hoitenga further notes that Plantinga's notion of belief 
in God as a properly basic belief is the central feature in 
his thinking that reflects the influence of Reformed 
theological thought. 
6Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 18. 
'Clark, 4. Cf., Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Properly 
Basic," 41. 
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the evidentialist objector's first principle that it is 
irrational to maintain belief in God without the support of 
evidence or argument. As we will see, Plantinqa's position 
requires a complete rethinkinq of the very concept of 
rationality. It further arques that there are "qrounds" for 
belief in God, althouqh not in the sense that would be 
acceptable either for the evidentialist objector or 
necessarily for the natural theoloqian. 8 
Rationality and Classical Foundationalism 
critical to Plantinqa's model of rationality is his 
argument that individuals reqularly hold a wide ranqe of 
everyday beliefs which they have never attempted to support 
with evidence or arguments. Such beliefs are properly basic 
for them. They are rational in holdinq those beliefs without 
evidence, and they are probably riqht about their beliefs. 
Furthermore, arques Plantinqa, one can be rational in holdinq 
other beliefs that stem from one's properly basic beliefs. 
This follows an essentially foundationalist structure, and if 
Plantinqa can successfully make the case that some people come 
8Alvin Plantinqa, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" 
Nous 15 (1981): 41. Plantinqa suqqests, for example, Brand 
Blanshard, Reason and Belief (London: Allen ~ Unwin, 1974); 
w. K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in Lectures and 
Essays, ed. Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pollock, 2d ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1886); Antony Flew, ~he Presumption of 
Atheism (New York: Harper ~ Row Publishers, 1976); Bertrand 
Russell, "Why I am Not a Christian," in Why I am Not a 
Christian, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1957); and Michael Scrivin, Primary Philosophy (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1966). 
89 
to hold belief in God as a properly basic belief (and are 
rational in doing so), then the evidentialist requirements of 
sufficient evidence do not apply to them. In order to make 
this point, Plantinga questions the way in which 
evidentialists within a classical foundationalist epistemology 
typically attempt to make the distinction between basic and 
non-basic beliefs on the basis of evidence. He does this 
first by introducing the idea of a noetic structure: 
A person's noetic structure is the set of propositions he 
believes together with certain episteaic relations that 
hold among him and these propositions. Thus some of his 
beliefs may be based on other things he believes; it may 
be that there are a pair of propositions A and B such that 
he believes A on the basis o~ B.9 
But a proper understanding of noetic structures, argues 
Plantinga, must go beyond the simple distinction between basic 
and non-basic beliefs. lO There are three ways of 
classifying the contents of our noetic structure if one is to 
have an accurate account of rationality in classical 
foundationalism: first, a person's noetic structure typically 
includes a specification of which of his beliefs are basic and 
which are non-basic. This, to be sure, is not always easily 
identifiable. Plantinga admits that it is abstractly possible 
that none of one's beliefs are basic (e.g., a person might 
hold just three beliefs, A, B, and C, and believe each of them 
on the basis of the other two). While this might appear 
9P l antinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural 
Theology," 191. 
lOIbid. 
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irrational or unlikely, that is not to say that it couldn't be 
done. ll Likewise, it's also possible that all of one's 
beliefs are basic (e.q., a person may hold many propositions, 
but believe none of them on the basis of any others).l2 
Secondly, a noetic structure will include an index of degree 
of belief. A person may hold some beliefs more firmly than 
others. For example, I hold the belief that 1 + 2 = 3 more 
firmly than I believe that there are polar bears in Alaska. 
Thirdly, an account of a person's noetic structure will also 
include somethinq like an index of depth of regression. Some 
beliefs are on the periphery of one's noetic structure, that 
is, they are not crucial or necessary to one's belief 
structure; one's noetic structure would not collapse if such 
beliefs were found to be wronq. I may, for example, accept 
certain beliefs, and may even hold them firmly (e.q., there 
are some larqe boulders on the top of the Grand Teton), but if 
I were to qive them up, the essential makeup of my noetic 
structure would remain the same. l3 
llI bid., 192. 
l2 I bid. 
13I bid., 192. See also, Louis P. Pojman, "The 
Contemporary Debate on Faith and Reason: Fideism and 
Rationality," 131. Pojman notes that in Plantinqa's system, 
the beliefs within one's noetic structure are not all the same 
in terms of their roles or level of importance. Some beliefs 
are more central to our doxastic system than others, so that 
the falsification of some beliefs will have a more critical 
effect on one's rational system than the falsification of 
others. 
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The concept and analysis of noetic structures serves 
at least two critical functions in the development of 
Plantinga's model of rationality: (1) it provides a lucid 
awareness of the primary characteristics and going standards 
of rationality that comprise a traditionally evidentialistic 
program of epistemology; and (2) it provides the necessary 
features of rationality that Plantinga salvages en route to 
his own model of rationality.14 But Plantinga's primary 
concern at this point is whether the classical foundationalist 
has made a good case for how he knows that a given proposition 
is self-evident and belongs to the category of basic 
beliefs. 1S The classical foundationalist will insist that a 
basic belief can't properly be accepted on the basis of any 
other belief. And as Plantinga remarks, "in a rational noetic 
structure, A will be accepted on the basis of B only if B 
supports A, or is a member of a set of beliefs that together 
support A."16 
Plantinga's model of rationality rejects the approach 
of both natural theologians and atheists who tend to rely on 
classical foundational ism as a means of establishing the 
rationality of belief through arguments, proof, and 
14P l antinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural 
Theology, " 191. See also, Gary Gutting, Religious Belief and 
Religious Skepticism (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1982), 80. 
1SP l antinga, "Is Belief in God Rational?" 21. 
16Pl antinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural 
Theology," 193. 
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evidence. l7 The epistemic notions that underlie these 
objections are put forth by Plantinga in the following terms: 
The reformers mean to say, fundamentally, that belief in 
God can properly be taken as basic. That is, a person is 
entirely within his epistemic rights, entirely rational, 
in believing in God, even if he has no argument for this 
belief and does not believe it on the basis of any other 
beliefs he holds. l8 
Plantinga argues that the classical foundationalist criteria 
for proper basicality (i.e., a proposition is either 
self-evident, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses) are 
not necessary conditions for proper basicality. This does not 
mean, however, that asserting the proper basicality of belief 
in God means that such a belief is either qroundless or 
irrational. Instead, belief in God is "warranted" by virtue 
of its being basic to one's noetic structure (i.e., it is 
produced under the right circumstances or proper conditions). 
Foundationalist theories in general (e.g., the 
epistemological theory found in Aquinas, Descartes, Locke and 
others) teache that our beliefs may be divided into two 
categories: (1) beliefs that depend on other beliefs (i.e., 
inferential or non-basic beliefs) and (2) beliefs that do not 
depend on other beliefs and which therefore can be called 
basic or foundational. Respected epistemologist, John L. 
Pollock, provides the following characteristics of 
foundational ism: 
17I bid., 187. Plantinga defines natural theology as 
the attempt to prove or demonstrate the existence of God. 
18I bid., 191. 
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Foundations theories • • • take a limited class of 
"epistemologically basic" beliefs to have a privileqed 
epistemic status. It is supposed that basic be1iefs 
do not stand in need of justification--they are 
"self-justifyinq." Nonbasic beliefs, on the other hand, 
are all supposed to be justified by appea1 to basic 
beliefs. Thus the basic beliefs provide a foundation for 
epistemic justification. 19 
Non-basic beliefs are justified by the epistemic re1ation they 
hold to basic beliefs; that is, in order for a non-basic 
belief to be rational, it must be inferred from or rendered 
probable by a basic belief. 
Evidential ism 
In classical foundational ism, the beliefs of one's 
noetic structure are justified only when considered properly 
basic as a result of fulfillinq certain non-inferential 
criteria, or when they are based on other beliefs which are 
ultimately inferred from properly basic beliefs found at the 
bottom of a tree-like construction of beliefs. Plantinqa 
expresses classical foundational ism in the fo1lowinq terms: 
A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and 
only if p is either self-evident to S or incorriqible for 
s or evident to the senses for S.20 
But as Plantinqa qoes on to say, classical foundational ism 
typically takes theistic belief as beinq routinely excluded 
from the foundation, since it is thouqht to lack the certainty 
that is usually associated with other types of foundational 
19John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge 
(Savage, Md.: Rowman 5 Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1986), 
26. 
20P l antinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 59. 
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beliefs. Plantinga puts this in terms of the close connection 
between evidence and classical foundational ism: 
Aquinas and the evidentialist objector concur, then, in 
holding that belief in God is rationally acceptable only 
if there is evidence for it--only if, that is, it is 
probable with respect to some body of propositions that 
constitutes the evidence. • • • This is a picture or total 
way of looking at faith, knowledge, justified belief, 
rationality, and allied topics. 2r 
If theistic belief is not basic then it must be rendered or 
demonstrated probable by beliefs that are properly basic. The 
argument, then, is theistic belief (as opposed to a basic 
belief) requires evidence, proof, or argument if it is thought 
to be rational. 22 
Plantinqa is responding to a particular brand of 
classical foundational ism articulated in the nineteenth 
century evidentialist epistemology of W. K. Clifford. Taking 
the evidentialist notion of rationality which preceded him 
(e.g., Locke and Hume) to even greater lengths, Clifford adds 
an ethical component to, as Plantinga states it, lithe idea 
that the strength of one's belief ought always to be 
21I bid., 47-48. 
22See , for example, John M. Frame's analysis of 
Plantinga's position in ~be Doctrine of the Knowledge of God 
(Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 
1987), 386. While classical foundationalism requires 
evidentialism, Frame's point may be to show that in 
Plantinga's model of rationality, the converse is also true, 
that, at least from a historical perspective, evidentialism 
tends to presuppose some form of foundational ism. From a 
conceptual point of view, however, evidential ism can also 
follow a coherentist or a reliabilist system as well. 
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proportional to the strength of the evidence for that 
belief. ,,23 Clifford argues that one is not rational in 
holdinq a belief that bas been accepted on insufficient 
evidence. 24 FUrthermore, we have an ethical duty not to 
accept a belief in the absence of qood evidence: 
That duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from 
pestilence, which may shortly master our own body and then 
spread to the rest of the town. • • • To sum up: it is 
wronq always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe 
anythinq upon insufficient evidence. 25 
With respect to theistic belief, then, every person possesses 
a set of propositions (one's noetic structure) such that a 
person's belief in God is rational if and only if it is 
evident with respect to those beliefs. Such an assemblaqe of 
beliefs is divided into basic and non-basic beliefs. There 
are various loqical and epistemic relations that bold amonq 
the two cateqories of beliefs in one's noetic structure, and 
all non-basic beliefs are said to be properly inferred from 
basic beliefs. 
The Collapse of Classical Foundationalism 
As stated above, a crucial feature of Plantinqa's 
model of rationality is the notion that we have wide ranqe of 
everyday beliefs (e.q., beliefs of memory, observation, 
23P l antinqa, "Reason and Belief in God," 24. 
24w. K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in Lectures 
and Essays, ed. Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pollock, 2d. ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1886), 343. 
25 I bid., 344 and 346. 
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testimony, etc.) for which we have not aarshalled evidence. 
We are rational in holdinq them, and it is hiqhly probable 
that we are riqht in holdinq them. If this is the case (and 
it usually is), then why is it so difficult to consider the 
possibility that one can be rational if one comes to hold 
belief in God in the same way? Such a belief, accordinq to 
Plantinqa, would qualify as properly basic belief, and as 
such, it would also be amonq the foundations of one's noetic 
structure. 26 Plantinqa first responds to this notion from 
the classical foundationalist perspective: 
The answer, on the part of the classical foundationalist, 
was that even if this belief is ~rue, it does not have the 
characteristics a proposition must have to deserve a place 
in the foundations. There is no room in the foundations 
for a proposition that can be rationally accepted only on 
the basis of other propositions. The only properly basic 
propositions are those that are self-evident or 
incorriqible or evident to the senses. Since the 
proposition that God exists is none of the above, it is 
not properly basic for anyone; that is, no well-formed, 
rational noetic structure contains this proposition in its 
foundations. 27 
But it is precisely the classical foundationalist form of 
evidential ism that is rejected by Plantinqa and other Reformed 
epistemoloqists. And as Wolterstorff arques, for example, it 
is impossible to derive all human knowledqe from classical 
foundationalist notions of basic belief. That is, one cannot 
find enouqh basic propositions to make up the foundation and 
26P l antinqa, "Reason and Belief in God," 59. 
27 I bid. 
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then go on from there to derive the sum-total of one's 
knowledge. 28 
It is through a closer look at the principle of 
classical foundational ism that Plantinga is able to determine 
whether belief in God is indeed properly basic and should be 
included within the foundations of one's noetic structure. 
This principle, argues Plantinga, contains two claims: 
first, a proposition is properly basic if it is 
self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses, 
and, second, a proposition is properly basic only if it 
meets this condition. 29 
While we might concede the first claim, it is Plantinga's 
contention that the second claim reduces many of our beliefs 
to the level of the irrational. It does so because, with 
respect to propositions that are self-evident and 
incorrigible, most of the beliefs that, as Plantinqa puts it, 
"form the stock in trade of ordinary everyday life are not 
probable. 30 
Plantinga points out that many of our everyday 
beliefs, for example, beliefs of memory (e.g., the belief that 
28Wolterstorff's critique of classical foundationalism 
can be found in his, Reason within the Bounds of Reigion, 2d, 
ed. (Grand Rapids. Mich.: W. B. Eerdaans Publishinq Co., 1976 
and 1984), 28-62. See also, Wolterstorff's "Can Belief in God 
Be Rational If It Has No Foundations?" in Faith and 
Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, 135-86; and John M. 
Frame's analysis of Wolterstorff's epistemology in his The 
Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Phillipsburg, N.J.: 
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1987), 382-400. 
29P l antinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 59. 
30I bid. 
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I had breakfast this morninq), perceptual beliefs (e.q., the 
belief that I am presently sittinq in front of my computer), 
and beliefs in other minds (e.q., the belief that my wife is 
not merely some sophisticated humanoid form, but a person 
possessinq a mind similar in essence to my own) cannot 
plausibly be shown to be derivable from self-evident or 
incorriqible propositions. Plantinqa writes: 
But many propositions that do not meet these conditions 
are properly basic for me. I believe, for example, that I 
had lunch this noon. I do not believe this proposition on 
the basis of other propositions; I take it as basic; it is 
in the foundations of my noetic structure. Furthermore, I 
am entirely rational in so takinq it, even thouqh this 
proposition is neither self-evident nor evident to the 
senses nor incorriqible for me. 31 
Further, arques Plantinqa, the qrounds for classical 
foundationalism's criteria for proper basicality is itself 
self-referentially flawed. The reason for excludinq reliqious 
beliefs from the foundation (i.e., proper basicality) cannot 
itself be justified on a foundational basis. 
The foundationalist criteria for proper basicality 
cannot itself be justified on a foundational basis; it is 
neither a basic proposition, nor is it plausibly derivable 
from basic propositions. Quite simply, arques Plantinqa, 
the criterion is neither self-evident or evident to the senses 
or incorriqible. Nor does it seem that one will be able to 
provide qood arquments for it (deductive, inductive, 
probabilistic or whatever) whose premises are self-evident or 
31 b'd I 1 ., 60. 
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evident to the senses or incorrigible and whose conclusion is 
the very criterion of proper basicality. So one can not be 
rational in accepting it. 32 
The classical foundationalist approach to the 
justification of beliefs, then, is a self-defeating position, 
since the theory cannot justify its key criteria for proper 
basicality. This being the case, then, the evidentialist 
objection lacks force. As such, there is no reason why belief 
in God should not itself be properly basic, that is, included 
in the foundation of our noetic structure. It is argued by 
Plantinga that such a position places us within our epistemic 
rights to hold belief in God without any evidence or reasons 
along the lines of traditional evidentialism. 
Reformed Foundationalism 
Plantinga makes the strong contention that the 
difference between classical foundational ism and the form of 
weak foundationalism for which he argues has much to do with 
the different conceptions of reason which appear to govern the 
thinking patterns of the theist and the non-theist. For 
Plantinga, this is the conviction that the two groups disagree 
32 I bid., 60-61. Plantinga's assessment is similar to 
the argument that has often been employed against the logical 
positivists' verification principle (i.e., that the principle 
itself is essentially neither a proposition that is true by 
definition, nor empirically verifiable). Cf., John M. Frame, 
The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, 387, n. 19. 
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as to what are the deliverances of reason. 33 Since the 
rationality for theistic belief is not derived from classical 
foundationalism's unworkable criteria for proper basicality 
(and indeed neither are many other beliefs that we take as 
basic), Plantinga claims that it is "entirely acceptable, 
desirable, right, proper, and rational to accept belief in God 
(i.e., belief that God exists) without any argument or 
evidence whatever."34 Theistic belief in God, according to 
Plantinga, is no less a deliverance of reason than we find to 
be the case with perceptual truths, self-evident truths and 
truths of memory. 
Plantinga's claim that theistic belief in God is 
properly basic represents what Hoitenga calls the heart of 
Reformed foundationalism. 35 The very nature of the claim is 
what distinguishes Plantinga's position from a long and lofty 
epistemic tradition. Foundationalism, as Plantinga observes, 
has been the epistemic staple among such fabled philosophical 
minds as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, 
and the contemporary epistemologist, Roderick Chisholm. 36 
33Pl antinga, Reason and Belief in God," 90. Plantinqa 
provides an excellent autobiographical sketch of his 
philsophical studies under William Harry Jellema of Calvin 
College in his "Self-Profile," in ~vin Plantinga, ed. J. E. 
Tomberlin and P. Van Inwagen (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reide1, 
1985), 3-36. 
34Pl antinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 39. 
35Hoitenga, 180. 
36Pl antinga, "Is Belief in God Rational?" 13. 
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But as Hoitenga remarks, Auqustine is conspicuously absent 
from Plantinga's list, since (unlike a traditional 
foundationalist) Auqustine teaches that belief in God is an 
immediate deliverance of reason. 37 Thus, while Plantinga 
views some form of foundationalism as a normative thesis about 
the nature of rational noetic structures, he ultimately 
embraces a form of weak foundationalism which essentially 
involves two claims: 
Suppose we say that weak foundational ism is the view that 
(1) every rational noetic structure has a foundation, and 
(2) in a rational noetic structure, non-basic belief is 
proportional in strength to support from the foundations. 
When I say that Reformed thinkers have meant to reject 
foundational ism , I do not mean to say that they intended 
to reject weak foundationalism. On the contrary; the 
thought of many of them tends to support or endorse weak 
foundationalism. 38 
But the distinction between the two versions, as indicated 
earlier, is found in the criteria set forth for proper 
basicality. The assumption on the part of some is that, once 
a cognizer accepts a weak form of foundationalism, strong 
37Hointenga, 180. 
38Al v in Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural 
Theology," 193. See also, Gary Gutting, Religious Belief and 
Religious Skepticism (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1982), 80-1. Gutting seems to take Plantinga's 
weak foundational ism as being a favorable position amonq those 
who tend to hold some form of anti-foundationalism. (e.g., 
Sellars and Quine). Plantinga's weak foundationalism might be 
misconstrued as a form of coherent ism , a view which requires 
the justification of every belief in a rational noetic 
structure by its coherence with the totality of the 
structure's beliefs. Plantinga's version of weak 
foundationalism, however, only requires a non-evidential 
justification (or grounding) of its properly basic beliefs, 
and as such, cannot be regarded as a fora of coherentism. This 
will be treated more fully at a later point. 
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foundationalism seems a necessary further step, since without 
criteria for what may be taken as basic there could be 
rational noetic structures that took almost any absurd set of 
beliefs as basic. 39 But, as we will further see, it is this 
kind of thinking that betrays the very notion of rationality 
that Plantinga so adamantly rejects. For it is precisely the 
criteria for proper basicality set forth in the strong 
versions of foundationalism that Plantinga, as a Reformed 
epistemologist, finds objectionable and problematic. 
The Problem oL a criterion Lor Proper Basicality: 
The Great Pumpkin Objection 
Plantinga's program for the rationality of religious 
belief draws heavily upon the Reformed tradition in its 
attempt to demonstrate that theistic belief clearly falls 
outside the unworkable criteria for proper basicality in 
classical foundationalism. 40 Plantinga's contention is that 
the evidentialist objection to theistic belief can be voiced 
only in the context of an unworkable criterion for basic 
belief as it is originally set forth in classical 
foundational ism. Even attempts by evidentialist objectors to 
modify the classical foundationalist criteria for basic 
39Gary Gutting, Religious BelieL and Religious 
Skepticism, 81. Gutting argues that it is precisely this 
version of weak foundational ism (and its correlative dismissal 
of classical foundationalism) that tends to fuel the arguments 
of many contemporary antifoundationalists. 
40See, for example, Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of 
God, trans. and ed. William Hendriksen (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1951), 41-80. 
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belief, argues Plantinga, do not give us a workable criterion. 
For example, some think that the criterion is salvaged if, 
along with the notion of a belief being self-evident, evident 
to the senses, or incorrigible for a person, the belief in 
question is also accepted as basic by nearly everyone. 41 
But Plantinga says of this modified version of the criteria: 
Not nearly everyone takes (the belief] as basic; I do not, 
for example. Nor is it self-evident, incorrigible, or 
evident to the senses. So unless we can find an argument 
for it from propositions that meet the conditions it lays 
down, we shall, if we believe it, be believing a 
proposition that is probably either false or such that we 
ought not believe it. Therefore we ought not believe it, 
at least until someone produces such an argument for 
it. 42 
So an appeal to agreement (i.e., that a belief can be basic if 
it is accepted by nearly everyone), then, cannot successfully 
modify classical foundationalism's criteria for proper 
basicality, since it is not clear that everyone takes even the 
modified criteria as basic. Rather, what is needed, in 
Plantinga's estimation, are epistemic notions that go beyond 
classical criteria for the rationality and justification of 
our beliefs. 
In a highly criticized move (appearinq to many as an 
uncomfortably close form of relativism),43 Plantinga 
41Pl antinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 62. 
42 Ibid. 
43Pl antinqa has received a good deal of criticism on 
this matter. See, for exaaple, C. Stephen Evans, "Kierkeqaard 
and Plantinga on Belief in God: Subjectivity as the Ground of 
Properly Basic Religious Beliefs," Faith and Philosophy 5, 
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attempts to answer the problem of arriving at criteria for 
proper basicality by suggesting an inductive approach to 
religious experience. Louis P. Pojman has observed that 
Plantinga's view of proper basicality is subject to the 
criticism that it opens the door to all sorts of irrationality 
in the foundations of our noetic structure. But the reason 
why belief in the Great Pumpkin cannot be considered properly 
basic, argues Plantinga is that (in keeping with Reformed 
epistemologists agreement with Calvin) "God has implanted in 
us a natural tendency to see his hand in the world around us; 
the same cannot be said for the Great Pumpkin, there being no 
Great Pumpkin and no natural tendency to accept belief about 
the Great Pumpkin. n44 
The point is that Plantinga does not believe we can 
arrive at deductive criteria for what count as the basic 
beliefs of one's noetic structure Which, as Gutting remarks, 
allows for belief in God but exc~udes belief in the Great 
Pumpkin and other absurdities. 45 Since Plantinga believes 
no. 1 (1988): 25-39; Joseph Runzo, "World-Views and the 
Epistemic Foundations of Theism,· Religious Studies 25 (March 
1989): 31-51; Richard Grigg, "Theism and Proper basicality: A 
Response to Plantinga," International Journal ror Philosophy 
or Religion 14 (1983): 123-27; J. Wesley Robbins, "Is Belief 
in God Properly Basic?" International Journal ror the 
Philosophy or Religion 14 (1983): 241-48; and Richard Askew, 
liOn Fideism and Alvin Plantinga,· Philosophy or Religion 23 
(1988): 3-16. 
44Louis P. Pojman, Religious Belier and the Will, 
132-33. Cf., Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God,n 78. 
45Gutting, Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism, 
82. 
105 
that establishinq criteria for proper basicality alonq 
evidentialist lines is both difficult and unnecessary, he 
contends that theistic belief is properly basic and therefore 
rational by virtue of its beinq grounded in the proper 
conditions. An absurdity such as belief in the Great Pumpkin, 
on the other hand, is groundless and consequently lackinq the 
necessary conditions for proper basicality. 
Now similar thinqs may be said about belief in God. When 
the Reformers claim that this belief is properly basic, 
they do not mean to say, of course, that there are no 
justifyinq circumstances for it, or that it is in that 
sense qroundless or qratuitous. 6 
So we see justification for a properly basic belief in 
Plantinqa's model of rationality as restinq on certain 
conditions other than a coqnizer's other beliefs. One can 
point to the qrounds for theistic belief, arques Plantinqa, in 
much the same way we can point to the qrounds of our memory 
beliefs, our beliefs in physical objects, and our beliefs in 
other persons. 
Hoitenqa has stated that the arqument for the 
resemblance between the qrounds for theistic belief and the 
grounds for other properly basic beliefs involves the matter 
of whether theistic belief is "similar to other properly basic 
beliefs that fall outside the criterion of classical 
foundationalis., and the objection that belief in God is too 
46P l antinqa, "Reason and Belief in God," 80. 
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close for comfort to irrational beliefs like belief in the 
Great Pumpkin."C' 
But it is precisely the grounds for properly basic 
beliefs (whether theistic or otherwise) that Plantinqa thinks 
constitute their justification and consequently provides a 
link, as Hoitenqa notes, "between the idea of properly basic 
beliefs and a theory of knovledqe as justified true 
belief. nCs The evidentialist who relies on the classical 
foundationalist criteria for proper basicality, therefore, 
cannot deny the justification (and thereby the proper 
basicality) of theistic belief simply because the theist 
appeals to the grounds for justification rather than the 
criterion for justification. Plantinqa contends: 
Must one have such a criterion before one can sensibly 
make any judqments--positive or neqative--about proper 
basicality? Surely not. Suppose I don't know of a 
satisfactory SUbstitute for the criteria proposed by 
classical foundational ism; I am nevertheless entirely 
within my riqhts in holdinq that certain propositions are 
not properly basic in certain conditions.~9 
Plantinqa's conclusion, then, is that the criteria set forth 
by modern foundationalists for wbat counts as a necessary and 
sufficient condition for proper basicality does not follow 
from obviously self-evident premises by obviously acceptable 
4'Hoitenqa, 186. 
4SI bid. 
49P l antinqa, "The Reformed Objection to Natural 
Theology," 196. 
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arguments. 50 And it is precisely this point that paves the 
way for Plantinqa to argue that theistic belief is qrounded 
(and thereby justified) on conditions other than the evidence 
from other beliefs. In some ways his position is similar to 
William Alston's arqument that rational belief in theism is 
similar to rational belief in physical objects. In other 
words, argues Alston, we have certain kinds of experiences 
(call them reliqious) that tend to confirm theistic belief, 
and this is no less rational than it is for one to believe in 
physical objects on the basis of sense perception. 51 
While there may not be any clear criteria for 
distinguishinq between unacceptable and acceptable candidates 
for proper basicality, Plantinqa believes his suqqestion of a 
broadly inductive methodoloqy serves to establish the required 
moorings that work against extreme forms of relativism: 
We must assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such 
that the former are obviously properly basic in the 
latter, and examples of beliefs and conditions such that 
the former are obviously not properly basic in the latter. 
We must then frame hypotheses as to the necessary and 
SOIbid., 197. 
SlWilliam P. Alston, "Christian Experience and 
Christian Belief," in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief 
in God (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
1983), 103-34. Alston comments, for example, "I take as my 
starting point the conviction that somehow what qoes on in the 
experience of leadinq the Christian life provides some qrounds 
for Christian belief, makes some contribution to the 
rationality of Christian belief •••• I am not suqgestinq 
that this is the whole qround or that it can do the whole job" 
(103) • 
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sufficient conditions of proper basicality and test these 
hypotheses by reference to those examples. 52 
Plantinga is clearly aware that, as Pojman expresses it, "each 
community will assemble a different set of examples of beliefs 
and accompanying conditons, so that there is no reason to 
assume that everyone will agree on the examples."53 The 
point that Plantinga wants to make is that theists will likely 
consider theistic belief to be entirely proper and rational, 
most likely not on the basis of other propositions they hold, 
but simply because it is basic for them and properly so (given 
the conditions or circumstances in which they arise). The 
fact that other non-theists may disagree with theistic 
criteria for proper basicality (based on inductive factors) is 
inconsequential to Plantinga. He argues that theists are 
responsible only to their own set of examples. 54 The 
criteria for proper basicality, then, are in Plantinga's 
estimation "reached from below rather than above; they should 
not be presented ex cathedra, but argued to and tested by a 
relevant set of examples."55 
52P l antinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 76. 
53Pojman, Religious Belief and the Will, 133. 
54P l antinga, "Reason and Belief in God,· 77. 
55Ibid. Cf., Gutting, Religious Belief and Religious 
Skepticism, 83. Gutting remarks: "In sum, then, Plantinqa's 
defense of the claim that 'God exists' may be properly basic 
for the Christian is as follows: there are no obviously 
correct criteria for proper basicality; therefore, we must 
develop such criteria inductively on the basis of obvious 
examples (clear cases) of properly basic propositions. For the 
Christian (at least one whose belief in God does not rest on 
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Conditions and Basic Belief in God: 
The Grounds for Theistic Belief 
Plantinqa has arqued up to this point that one can be 
rational in believinq in God (as a properly basic belief) even 
if one does not hold that belief on the basis of evidence. 
Furthermore, one can maintain properly basic belief in God 
even thouqh one cannot provide criteria for what counts as 
evidence for or aqainst a belief's truth. But while one does 
not have to supply evidentialist requirements of sufficient 
evidence in order to be rational in holdinq a properly basic 
belief, Plantinqa contends that such beliefs are rational only 
when formed under conditions that confer justification on the 
one who accepts them as basic. 56 Plantinqa means by qrounds 
or conditions, the non-evidential reasons or circumstances 
that qive rise to a properly basic belief. Thus, a properly 
basic belief in Plantinqa's estimation, is not necessarily one 
that is infallible or even incorriqible. The justification 
accorded to the basic beliefs in one's noetic structure is 
only a prima facie or defeasible justification. One is 
rationally justified in qivinq up a basic belief (includinq 
belief in God) if one finds some qood reasons for 
inferences from other propositions) 'God exists' is one of 
those examples." 
56Pl antinqa, "Reason and Belief in God," 82. 
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disbelieving. There well may be good reasons for disbelieving 
properly basic beliefs. 57 
But as Plantinga further remarks, while one is not 
rationally required to accept theistic belief exclusively on 
the basis of arquments and evidence, it does not follow that 
arguments are irrelevant to the proper basicality of theistic 
belief. Nor does it follow that arquments based on other 
propositions a coqnizer holds as basic could not show theistic 
belief to be false. One who accepts theistic belief as basic 
can still be open to the possibility of giving up that belief 
if one is offered arquments from other propositions one 
already holds as true. 
But it is also rational to consider the possibility 
that an arqument against the proper basicality of theistic 
belief may in fact show that there is a problem somewhere else 
in onels noetic structure. 58 So with respect to the 
rationality of theistic belief, one is not committed in 
advance to hold it in the teeth of any evidence or arqument 
that could count against it. One can then accept belief in 
God as basic without accepting it dogmatically; that is, the 
proper basicality of theistic belief need not be embraced in 
such a way that ignores any contrary evidence or argument. 59 
57See Hoitenga, Faith and reason from Plato to 
Plantinga, 187. See also, Plantinga, "On Reformed 
Epistemology," The Reformed Journal 32 (January 1982): 14. 
58P l antinga, Reason and Belief in God," 82-83. 
59I bid., 83. 
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The reason for this is because of what Plantinqa refers to as 
the "justification-conferrinq conditions· of properly basic 
beliefs. Plantinqa's contention is that such 
justification-conferrinq conditions can provide only prima 
facie rather than all-thinqs-considered, or ultima racie 
justification: 
My beinq appeared to treely qives me a prima facie riqht 
to take as basic the proposition I see a tree. But of 
course this riqht can be overridden; X miqht know, for 
example, that X suffer from the dreaded dendroloqical 
disorder, whose victims are appeared to treely only when 
there are no trees present. Xf X do know that, then X am 
not within my riqhts in takinq as basic the proposition I 
see a tree when X am appeared to treely.60 
The purpose of Plantinqa's distinction is to indicate the 
intended rational deliverances associated with these two forms 
of justification. Prima facie justification, arques 
Plantinqa, places one in a rational structure in which one is 
within one's epistemic rights in acceptinq a proposition. 
Ultima facie justification, on the other hand, provides the 
truth-conferring conditions in which it is rational for one to 
accept a proposition in a manner equated with knowledge. 61 
This beinq the case, then, it is necessary to see that 
the terms grounds and evidence express entirely different 
60Xbid. 
61Xbid., 84. Plantinqa states that a condition that 
overrides a coqnizer's prima racie justification for p is a 
defeating condition or dereater for p for that coqnizer. Also, 
defeaters are initially prima facie defeaters, qiven the 
possibility that the defeater can always be defeated. See 
also, John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories or Knowledge, 
37-39. 
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epistemic notions in Plantinqa's thinkinq. While one may 
claim justification for a belief on the basis of either 
grounds or evidence, one does so, as Hoitenqa points out, in 
substantially different ways: 
The difference is that evidence consists of beliefs on the 
basis of which other, nonbasic beliefs are held (and 
thereby justified), whereas grounds are not beliefs at 
all, but conditions or circumstances that occasion 
properly basic beliefs, and thereby justify thea without 
being formulated as beliefs. 62 
If one hopes to provide justification for a belief alonq 
evidential lines, then, one does so on the basis of one's 
doxastic state; that is, as John Pollock states, "the 
justifiability of a belief is a function exclusively of what 
beliefs one holds."63 Pollock writes: 
It seems that in deciding what to believe, we cannot take 
account of anythinq except insofar as we have beliefs 
about it. Consequently, nothing can enter into the 
determination of epistemic justification except our 
beliefs. Thus all an epistemological theory can do is 
tell us how our overall doxastic state determines which of 
our beliefs can be justified. 64 
Doxastic theories, as Pollock notes, are exhausted by two 
mutually exclusive subcateqories, foundations theories and 
coherence theories. 65 
To provide justification for a belief in terms of 
evidence, then, is to agree that both one's non-basic and 
62Hoitenga, 189. 
63pollock, 19. 
64I bid. 
65 I bid. 
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basic beliefs require evidence. But Plantinga's model of weak 
foundationalism differs from stronger versions in that, while 
non-basic beliefs are justified on the basis of their relation 
to the basic beliefs of one's noetic structure, basic beliefs 
receive their justification on the basis of the qrounds that 
give rise to the belief in question. Hoitenga expresses this 
epistemic relation in the following manner: 
To have grounds for a belief • • • is to hold it in such a 
way that there are conditions in which it arises and that 
justify it, even though the believer may typical1y be 
unaware at the moment of what those conditions are. Being 
unaware of them, one does not formulate beliefs about them 
on the basis of which he holds the belief, which is 
precisely what makes that belief a basic belief. One may, 
of course, be able to point to some of the qrounds for 
one's basic beliefs if asked, but that is a different 
matter. 66 
So, then, to have evidence for a belief is to be consciously 
aware of the other beliefs one holds in support of that 
belief. In contrast, to have grounds for a belief is to hold 
that belief as a result of the conditions in which the belief 
arises, whether or not one is consciously aware of those 
conditions at the time that they give rise to the belief in 
question. 
Plantinqa arques that when we consider perceptual 
beliefs, memory beliefs, and beliefs ascribing mental states 
to other persons (e.g., "I see a tree"; "I had breakfast this 
morning"; and "That person is in pain"), we have beliefs that 
66Hoitenga, 188. 
114 
are typically taken as basic; but such beliefs, Plantinga 
suggests, are far from groundless. 67 Plantinga writes: 
Upon having experience of a certain sort, I believe I am 
perceiving a tree. In the typical case I do not hold this 
belief on the basis of other beliefs; it is nonetheless 
not groundless. My having that characteristic sort of 
experience--to use Professor Chisholm's language, my being 
appeared treely to--plays a crucial role in the formation 
of that belief. It also plays a crucial role in its 
justification. 68 
Justification for a belief on the basis of grounds, then, does 
not involve an appeal to other beliefs but some characteristic 
experience that accounts for the conditions in which the 
belief arises. As will become more clear, it is the 
experience itself (of which one may be quite unaware) that, as 
Hoitenga observes, "constitues the ground of the basic belief 
by contrast with one's (consciously) having or giving evidence 
for it."69 And as Plantinga further remarks, "being 
appropriately appeared to • • • is not sufficient for 
justification; some further condition--a condition hard to 
state in detail--is clearly necessary."70 
67P l antinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 78-79. 
68I bid., 79. In the case of ascribing mental states to 
other persons, for example, Plantinga states that if one sees 
someone displaying typical pain behavior, then that is good 
reason to think that person is in pain. But one does not take 
the displayed behavior as evidence for that belief. One does 
not infer that belief on the basis of other beliefs one holds. 
But one's perceiving the pain behavior forms the ground of 
one's justification for the belief in question. 
69Hoi tenga, 188. 
70P l antinga, "Reason and belief in God," 80. 
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A belief, then, is properly basic, justified and 
rational only in certain conditions that can account for its 
justification and the ground of the belief itself. 7l We, 
therefore, arques Plantinga, may apply the same concept to 
theistic belief. One reason for this is found in Plantinga's 
appeal to Calvin's idea that God daily discloses and reveals 
to us innumerable conditions that create in us the disposition 
to take theistic belief as properly basic. 72 Plantinga goes 
on to contend that, indeed, there may be many circumstances 
(i.e., religious experiences) that one might count as grounds 
for the proper basicality of theistic belief: 
There are therefore many conditions and circumstances that 
call forth belief in God: quilt, gratitude, danger, a 
sense of God's presence, a sense that he speaks, 
perception of various parts of the universe. A complete 
job would explore the phenomenol99Y of all these 
conditions and of more besides. 73 
Plantinqa, however, is quick to point out that in actuality 
one comes to accept the simple belief that God exists more 
specifically as a result of a number of other basic types of 
propositions that are formed through these conditions and 
circumstances. Such beliefs as: "God is speaking to me"; "God 
has created all this"; "God disapproves of what I have done"; 
71I bid. 
72Ibid. See, for example, John Calvin, Institutes or 
the Christian Religion, vol. 20, Library of Christian 
Classics, ed. by John T. McNeill and trans. and indexed by 
Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 
1960), 43-44. 
73Ibid., 81. 
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"God forqives me"; and "God is to be thanked and praised," 
arques Plantinqa, are all propositions that are only properly 
basic in the riqht circumstances. The conclusion in 
Plantinqa's thinkinq, then, is that since these propositions 
are properly basic, they each self-evidently entail that God 
exists. 
Plantinqa's conception of the grounds of religious 
belief, then, is largely contingent upon his idea of the 
nature of religious experience. What constitutes rational and 
justified theistic belief is the qrounds in which the belief 
arises; the qrounds themselves must take place under proper 
conditions. These proper conditions are, as Plantinqa has 
already indicated, conditions in which the details are 
difficult to state. To gain an indication of what these 
conditions might be, it is necessary to briefly turn our 
attention to the basic features of Plantinga's more complete 
theory of justification set forth in his notion of the proper 
function of our coqnitive faculties and the warrant for 
theistic belief. 74 
74see C. stephen Evans, "Kierkegaard and Plantinqa on 
Belief in God: Subjectivity as the Ground of Properly Basic 
Religious Beliefs," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers 35, no. 3 (1994): 34. See 
also, William Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian 
Belief," in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, 
ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, 
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983): 103-134; idem, 
"The Autonomy of Religious Experience," International Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion 31, no. 2-3 (1992): 67-87; idem, 
"Religious Experience and Religious Belief," Nous 16 (March 
1982): 3-12; and idem, "Plantinga's Epistemology of Reliqious 
Belief," in Alvin Plantinga, Profiles, vol. 5, ed. James E. 
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The Warrant ror Theistic Belier 
If one is not required to marshall evidence in order 
to be rational in holdinq a properly basic belief, what must 
be the case if one is not to be arbitrary or irrational in 
determininq what riqhtfully belonqs in the foundation of one's 
noetic structure? Plantinqa has argued that a person is not 
required to supply evidence for one's properly basic beliefs, 
since we regularly form such beliefs without it, and we are 
considered rational and probably right in doinq so. His 
arguments for warrant, proper function, and design plan, then, 
are all part of a model of rationality which attempts to argue 
that the rationality for one's properly basic beliefs still 
involves the matter of justification (or the non-evidentialist 
notion of warrant), even if that justification is 
non-evidential in nature. That is, one can have reasons for 
why one is considered rational in holdinq a properly basic 
belief, but those reasons are not required to conform to 
evidentialist notions of sufficient evidence. Sufficient 
evidence, accordinq to evidentialist standards, is typically 
an appeal to arquments and one's other beliefs. The point of 
warrant, proper function, and design plan, accordinq to 
Plantinqa, is that they are non-evidential in nature. Thus, 
if it can be shown that one can have a model of rationality in 
which the justification of one's properly basic beliefs do not 
Tomberlin and Peter van Inwaqen (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel 
Publishinq Company, 1985): 289-311. 
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require evidential reasons, then Plantinga is one step closer 
to making his case. 
Furthermore, Plantinqa realizes that his criteria for 
being rational do not quarantee that one is right. But if it 
can be shown that one's properly basic beliefs are formed 
under the proper conditions, then being rational about one's 
properly basic beliefs does not require that one verify one's 
beliefs as true along evidentialist lines of verification. 
What is required for rationality, according to Plantinga, is 
that a cognizer's reasons for holding a properly basic belief 
(e.g., belief in God) are consistent with the circumstances 
which warrant that belief. 7S On Plantinga's model of 
rationality, there is a high probability that one is right 
about one's beliefs without the need to verify them as true. 
Thus, the warrant (and consequent rationality) for a properly 
basic belief exhibits certain characteristics that set it 
apart from the form of rationality typically allied with the 
evidentialist notions of the criteria for proper basicality in 
classical foundationalism. 
7SHoitenga, 189. Hoitenga has arqued that Plantinga 
at this point is attempting to satisfy Plato's account of 
justified true belief in the Theaetetus (i.e., that knowledge 
is more than direct acquaintance with an object, or accepting 
a proposition on testimony, as are suggested in the approaches 
to knowledge in Plato's Republic and the Meno, respectively). 
However, rather than following a classical foundationalist 
(and internalist) model for justification, Plantinga will 
suggest an externalist model of warrant as a more rational and 
acceptable system of justified true belief. See also, William 
Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," Monist 68, 
no. 1 (January 1985): 58. 
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As we have seen, Plantinga makes a distinction between 
evidence for a belief (i.e., the reasons a cognizer offers for 
a given belief in terms of other beliefs or arguments he 
accepts, and of which he is typically aware) and grounds for a 
belief (i.e., the conditions that make a belief warranted and 
rational, even if the cognizer is not aware of those 
conditions at any given time). Giving evidence for a belief 
consists of the cognizer's conscious access to the other 
beliefs in onels noetic structure that are used in support of 
a given belief. This type of evidentialist approach to the 
rational justification of one's beliefs is typically allied 
with an internalistic account of the epistemic relation among 
beliefs in one's noetic structure (i.e., the notion that onels 
beliefs and perceptual states are states to which the cognizer 
has direct access and of which he is aware at some level).76 
The grounds for a basic belief, on the other hand, take on an 
externalistic justification (i.e., more than just the internal 
76see , for example, John Pollock, Contemporary 
Theories of Knowledge, 22. A good example of an internalist 
approach to theistic belief can be found in the natural 
theology of William Paley (1743-1805). In Paley's argument for 
the design of the universe (the teleological argument), Paley 
formulates beliefs about the orderliness of the universe (e.g, 
the analogy that the universes I complex design presumes a 
divine intelligence in much the same manner as a watch's 
complex design presumes a finite intelligence) and infers the 
existence of God from these beliefs. For a brief introduction 
to Paley's argument, see John H. Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 
4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990), 
23-26. For a more extended treatment, see Robert E. D. Clark, 
The Universe--Plan or Accident? (Philadelphia: Muhlenburg 
Press, 1961). See also, Norman L. Geisler and Winfried 
Corduan, Philosophy of Religion, 2d. ed. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Baker Book House, 1988). 
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states of a cognizer enter into the justi~ication of 
beliefs).77 But what remains problematic for Plantinga and 
epistemological theories in general is that, as Plantinga 
laments, "It is widely agreed that belief, while necessary for 
knowledge, is not sufficient for it.,,78 What else is 
required? Whatever this further element may be, arques 
Plantinga, "it is either epistemic justification or something 
intimately connected with it."79 
Another characteristic of Plantinga's theory of 
knowledge as justified true belief is, as previously stated, 
found in his distinction between prima facie and ultima facie 
(or "all-things-considered") justification. Plantinga's 
example of the "dreaded dendroloqical disorder" mentioned 
above, serves as ultima facie evidence which may override his 
prima facie evidence that "being appeared to treely" gives him 
the right to take as basic the proposition I see a tree. 80 
77pollock, 23; and Hoitenga, 190. See also, John 
Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1939). Hoitenga suggests that Baillie's understanding of 
our knowledge of God through the order of nature as a mediated 
immediacy (e.g., an experience of observing the starry heavens 
above mediates my immediate awareness of God) is a good 
example of Plantinga's notion of grounds. 
78Al v in Plantinga, "Justification and Theism," Faith 
and Philosophy 4, no. 4 (October 1987): 404. 
79I bid. 
80Hoitenga, 190. Plantinga goes on to argue, however, 
that properly basic beliefs are regarded as having more 
epistemic warrant (i.e., non-evidential justification) for 
belief since a cognizer holds such beliefs on the basis of the 
circumstances or conditions which give rise to them, rather 
than on the basis of arguments or evidence. See, for example, 
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On a prima facie level, then, there is nothing 
intrinsic about properly basic beliefs that keep them from 
being false, and on this basis, they cannot be equated with 
knowledge. It is only on the basis of "all-things-considered" 
(or ultima facie) evidence that a properly basic belief can 
constitute knowledge. This is further illustrated in 
Plantinga's distinction between weak and strong forms of 
justification. Plantinga once again bears this out in the 
example of being appeared to treely: 
Being appeared to treely may confer on me, not merely the 
prima facie right to believe that there is a tree present, 
but the more impressive epistemic condition of being such 
that if the belief in question is true, then I know it. 
Call that condition strong justification. Being thus 
appeared to may perhaps also lay obligations on me; 
perhaps in those conditions I am not merely within my 
rights in believing that there is a tree present; perhaps 
I have a prima facie obligation to do so.81 
Hoitenga believes that Plantinga's remarks at this point are 
indicative of his attempt to establish a theory of knowledge 
as justified true belief, even though an initial glance at 
Plantinga's notion of the grounds for proper basicality may 
seem to make justification superfluous to his theory. In 
addition to the grounds that confer on someone the right to 
believe there is a tree present, for example, there are also 
the further conditions of knowledge that the belief is true 
and that there is an obligation for the cognizer to believe 
Alvin Plantinga, "The Foundations of Theism: A Reply," Faith 
and Philosophy 3 (1986): 304-6. 
81Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 85. 
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it. 82 Apart from Plantinga's qualified notion of warrant 
(and the externalism in which it is based), the grounds that 
constitute a properly basic belief do not provide a sufficient 
reason for taking such a belief as knowledge. That such 
beliefs may ultimately constitute knowledge is a matter 
altogether different from a theory that can explain the 
circumstances which legitimate it as knowledge. 
Plantinga's model of rationality at this point appears 
to follow, as Louis Pojman remarks, "a version of naturalized 
epistemology, which, if it succeeds, solves most of the 
puzzles of a theory of knowledge, and so wins out as the most 
comprehensive (though admittedly still incomplete) system 
available. "83 In its most basic form, naturalized 
epistemology is directed against all forms of epistemology 
that focus on the normative notion of justification. Inspired 
by the philosophy of W. V. o. Quine, naturalized epistemology 
argues that classical foundationalism's quest for certainty is 
82Hoitenga, 191. 
83Louis Pojman, What Can We Know?: An Introduction to 
the Theory of Knowledge (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1995), 
149. The most complete statement of Plantinga's theory can be 
found in the first two volumes of his projected three-volume 
work on epistemology: Warrant: The CUrrent Debate (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993) and Warrant and Proper FUnction 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Earlier versions of 
the material contained in these volumes can be found in his 
article "Positive Epistemic status and Proper Function," in 
Philosophical Perspectives 2. Epistemology, ed. James E. 
Tomberlin (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Pubishing Company, 
1988), 1-50. Additional versions of the material are found in 
"Justification and Theism," Faith and Philosophy 4, no. 4 
(1987): 403-26; and "Epistemic Justification," Nous 20 (1986): 
3-18. 
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a fundamentally flawed method that has failed in its attempts 
to qround our clai .. to knowledge. 84 Quine contends that we 
must give up traditional a priori epistemology (i.e., setting 
forth conceptual criteria for knowledge and then applying them 
to science) and embrace instead a form of empirical or 
cognitive psychology. Such a cognitive process reduces 
epistemology to simply a descriptive examination of the 
relation between the small amounts of sensory stimUlation 
which constitute our empirical observations and the vast 
measure of conceptual conclusions we draw from them. We do 
not have epistemic access to the world as it is in itself; we 
have only the reports of our sensory evidence from which we 
form a behavorist naturalism through prediction and 
verification. 8S 
Plantinga's theory of proper function, then, is an 
externalist account of naturalized epistemology (i.e., an 
account of knowledge in which a coqnizer is rational in 
holding a belief in terms of the conditions or circumstances 
which warrant that belief). Whatever is specifically meant by 
84see , for example, W. v. o. Quine, "Epistemology 
Naturalized," in The Theory of Knowledge, ed. Louis Pojman 
(Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1993), 322. 
85pojman, What Can We Know? 170-171. Cf., W. v. o. 
Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," 325. Pojman notes three 
central theses to Quine's epistemology: (1) The attempt to 
ground knowledge through a priori criteria has failed; (2) 
skepticism's program to undermine classical epistemology 
becomes a pseudoproblem in naturalized epistemology; and (3) 
epistemology (and true belief) is subsumed under the aeqis of 
science, which is itself merely an extension of common sense 
and based on the method of verification (171). 
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the property of warrant, Plantinqa states that when it is 
combined with true belief (and settinq aside Gettier 
problems), it results in knowledqe. 
Plantinqa admits at the outset that there are many 
cases in which our beliefs, thouqh true, cannot have warrant. 
One reason for this is that many true beliefs are formed in 
the context of some sort of malfunction of the coqnitive 
faculties. A belief is warranted only in conditions or 
circumstances in which one's coqnitive faculties are 
functioninq according to a design plan in an environment for 
which it was intended. 86 In addition, Plantinqa's theory of 
proper function is set in contrast with internalist, 
coherentist, and reliabilist theories of warrant, all of 
which, as William Hasker remarks, "he criticizes on the 
qrounds that they would ascribe warrant to certain beliefs 
which we can readily see, intuitively, to be unwarranted."87 
86Plantinqa, warrant and Proper Function, 32-40. 
Plantinqa qualifies this notion of warrant by statinq that 
it requires setting aside the epistemic problems oriqinally 
brouqht to our attention in Edmund Gettier's famous article, 
"Is Justified True Belief Knowledqe?" Analysis 23, no. 6 
(1963): 121-3. Gettier's main contention is that we often hold 
many beliefs that turn out to be true entirely by accident, 
and in such cases, it seeas difficult to accept these beliefs 
as constituting knowledge. Plantinga's point is to show that 
Gettier problems actually afflict internalist epistemoloqies 
to a far qreater extent than they afflict externalist 
epistemoloqies. 
87William Hasker, "Proper Function, Reliabilism, and 
Reliqious Knowledge: A Critique of Plantinga's Epistemoloqy," 
in Christian perspectives on Religious Knowledge, ed. C. 
stephen Evans and Merold Westphal (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1993), 66. 
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William Hasker's summary of Plantinga's theory is particularly 
helpful: 
A belief is warranted if it is produced by our epistemic 
faculties when they are functioning properly--that is, in 
accordance with their design plan--in an appropriate 
epistemic environment. Thus, the notion of "functioning 
properly" is understood in terms of "design plan," where 
the latter idea may be initially understood on analogy 
with the design of a manufactured object such as a camera 
or a computer. For a theist such as Plantinga, the idea 
of a design plan can be taken quite straightforwardly to 
refer to the way in which God, in creating human beings, 
intended for their cognitive faculties to function. 88 
In setting forth the features of this system, Plantinga is 
attacking what he considers to be unworkable theories of 
epistemic dutifulness, coherence, and reliablity.89 A brief 
examination of the main features of Plantinga's notion of 
proper function, then, should provide the final step for 
obtaining a sufficient insight into his argument for the 
rationality of theistic belief. 
Plantinga argues that warrant associated with 
internalist notions of justification is conceived in terms of 
epistemic duty fulfillment or deontological internalism. 90 
Such deontoloqical notions of justification typically involve 
classical and modern forms of foundational ism, but they will 
88I bid., 66-67. 
89P l antinga, "Justification and Theism," 403. 
90Pl antinga, Warrant: The current Debate, 11-25 and 
162. Cf., idem "Positive Episteaic Practice and Proper 
Function, " 2-12. 
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also include versions of coherentism as well. 91 On the 
externalist side of things, Plantinga is claiming to go beyond 
reliabilism which, while being a close approximation to the 
true theory, is ultimately unable to deliver warrant due to 
problems of generality and defeating counterexamples. 92 
In the dispute over the proper analysis of the concept 
of epistemic justification, Roderick Chisholm states that both 
internalists and externalists are agreed that the issue of 
justification is one that "distinguishes knowledge from true 
belief that is not knowledge."93 As indicated earlier, 
Plantinga is responding to internalist epistemologies which 
hold that justification of one's beliefs entails accessibility 
to the reasons for those beliefs. 94 Plantinga argues that 
91Pl antinga, warrant: 'l'he CUrrent Debate, 162. See 
also, Roderick Chisholm, 'l'he Foundations of Knowing 
(Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1982) 
and 'l'heory of Knowledge, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1989). In his article, "Positive Epistemic 
status and Proper Function," 3, Plantinga notes that there is 
more than one important internalist tradition, but according 
to the dominant tradition (as represented in the previously 
cited volumes by Chisholm), it is the Cartesian tradition of 
positive epistemic status that is essentially connected with 
the fulfillment of epistemic duty and the satisfaction of our 
noetic obligation. When we think of justification for positive 
epistemic status, it is this Cartesian traditon which 
epistemizes true belief in terms of duty fulfillment. See, for 
example, Richard Foley, 'l'he 'l'heory of Epistemic Rationality 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). Plantinga also 
includes among internalist traditions, John Pollock's 
"Epistemic Norms," Synthesis 71 (April 1987): 61-95 and 
Pollock's contemporary 'l'heories of Knowledge, 123-79. 
92P l antinga, Warrant: 'l'he CUrrent Debate, 182-210. 
93Chisholm, 'l'heory of Knowledge, 75. 
94Plantinga, Warrant: 'l'he CUrrent Debate, 5. 
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all forms of internal ism fail on the grounds that the 
accessibility requirement is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for positive epistemic status, nor is 
positive epistemic status merely a matter of one's ability to 
fulfill one's epistemic duty or obligation. 9S Evidence 
alone is not a sufficient condition for warrant (or positive 
epistemic status) because we might imagine a context in which 
a person has evidence for a particular belief while 
experiencing a malfunctioning of his or her coqnitive 
faculties, resulting in a lack of warrant for belief (e.g., 
the famous cartesian demon or brain-in-the-vat scenarios).96 
In an example closer to home, Plantinga tells of a 
incident his father had in meeting a man in a Grand Rapids 
psychiatric hospital who complained that he wasn't getting the 
credit he deserved for inventing a new form of human 
reproduction, "rotational reproduction," as the man called it. 
This novel method of reproduction eliminates the need for sex. 
Instead, you simply suspend a woman from the ceiling with a 
95The main stock of Plantinga's Warrant: The CUrrent 
Debate is given to the inherent difficulties of the various 
forms of internalism in providing the justifying connection 
between true beliefs and knowledge. The basic import behind 
his criticisms is to show that positive epistemic status is 
not simply a matter of aptness for fulfillment of one's 
epistemic duty or obligation, nor is having accessbility to 
the reasons for one's beliefs a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for positive epistemic status. The few examples 
provided below should be adequate to illustrate Plantinga's 
problems with internalist epistemoloqies. See, for example, 
Plantinqa's, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function,· 
12. 
96Pl antinqa, Warrant: The CUrrent Debate, 15-29. 
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rope and rotate her at a hiqh rate of speed. Tbe result of 
the rotational process is a larqe number of children, enouqh 
to populate a city the size of Chicaqo. That, said the man, 
is in fact precisely how the city of Chicaqo was populated, 
and he was simply lookinq for the recognition he was due for 
this important discovery.97 
Plantinqa uses this case to show that there are many 
times when havinq evidence does not imply warrant. Even if 
the man's beliefs fit his evidence (perhaps he remembers 
reading about rotational reproduction in a Chicaqo paper and 
recalling that the writer neqlected to qive him credit for 
having invented it), it is clear they have little or no 
warrant. His beliefs, arques Plantinqa, do not have "the 
property • • • of which is sufficient, together with true 
belief, for warrant. n98 So the problem lies not with a 
failure of fit between the man's beliefs and what he finds 
internally available to him: the problem is that his coqnitive 
faculties are not functioninq properly; he is insane. 99 
Plantinqa's rejection of internalist notions of 
justification (i.e., the volitional normativity of epistemic 
deontology) is what leads him to embrace some form of 
externalism. If external conditions yield the correct 
97Alvin Plantinqa, "Why We Need Proper Function," Nous 
27, no. 1 (1993): 68-9. 
98Ibid. 
99Ibid. 
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results, then one is warranted in holdinq the belief in 
question and has knowledqe. Pollock remarks of this approach: 
The reliability of a coqnitive process is a continqent 
matter. For example, a coqnitive process on which we 
place qreat reliance is color vision. Color vision is 
reasonably reliable in the normal environment of 
earth-bound human beinqs. But if we lived in an 
environment in which the colors of our llqht sources 
varied erratically, color vision would be unreliable. 
The reliabiity of a coqnitive process cannot be assessed 
a priori. It depends upon continqent matters of fact. 
Thus reliabilism makes epistemic justification turn on 
continqent matters of fact. Coqnitive essentialism is 
false on this view. lOO 
It is Chisholm's contention, however, that externalist systems 
can be made to work only if they are supplemented by internal 
justification concepts. If such is the case, then Plantinqa 
has not yet established that internal concepts must be 
replaced by external ones. lOl 
Plantinqa arques that reliablism (a form of 
externalism) is closest to his own theory, but like 
internallism and coherentism, it must ultimately be rejected 
on the qrounds that it would ascribe warrant to beliefs that 
are clearly lackinq in warrant. A belief has warrant in 
reliabilism to the extent that it is the product of reliable 
belief-forminq processes. 102 There is no warrant where the 
external conditions are not present, and this is the case 
lOOpollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 23. 
lOlChisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 77. 
l02Hasker, "Proper Function, Reliabilism, and 
Reliqious Knowledqe," 69-70. See also, Chisholm, Theory of 
Knowledge, 77-81. 
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regardless of how hard we attempt to fulfill our epistemic 
duty. But beliefs having little or no warrant can be formed 
by reliable belief-forming processes. One reason for this is 
that reliabilism cannot solve the problem of generality in 
which belief-forming processes can be either too specific or 
too generic. 
Despite reliabilism's ability to bypass many of the 
problems associated with internalism, and despite the fact 
that it explains the features of justified belief in the light 
of natural processes determined by or reduced to psychological 
or physicalist characteristics, it has difficulties explaining 
exactly what is to count as a reliable process. 103 In its 
broadest sense, a reliable process is a series of activities 
that results in one's acquiring or retaining that belief. 104 
But there are problems with this approach. 
For one thing, it is difficult to know what percentage 
of true beliefs the process must be able to produce in order 
to be considered reliable. For example, one could not be 
considered justified the first time one comes to have a true 
belief as the result of a reliable process, since a successful 
track record has not yet been established. lOS In addition, 
the problem of generality leads to difficulties in determining 
what is a natural process. At any point in which I form a 
l03Pojman, What Can We Know? 132. 
l04Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 78. 
lOSPojman, What Can We Know? 132. 
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belief, there are many different process types that are 
contributing to that belief. The process activities that lead 
to my current belief that it is cloudy today are brought about 
by such factors as the perceptual process, the visual process, 
processes that occur on Thursday, processes that lead to true 
beliefs, etc. To what extent such factors represent natural 
processes is difficult to state. 
Design and Proper Function 
Plantinga's arqument for the rationality of theistic 
belief, as we have seen, gains its force from externalist 
epistemic practices that go beyond the difficulties of 
internalism, coherence, and reliabilism. Plantinga describes 
his externalism in the following terms: 
Design plan and proper function are interdefinable 
notions: a thing (organism, organ, system, artifact) is 
functioning properly when it functions in accord with its 
design plan, and the design plan of a thing is a 
specification of the way in which a thing functions when 
it is functioning properly. • • • The first condition for 
a belief's having warrant, as I see it, is that it be 
produced by faculties functioning properly. But this is 
by no means sufficient. A second condition is that the 
cognitive environment in which the belief is produced must 
be the one or like the one for which it was designed. 106 
So even if one's epistemic faculties are functioninq properly 
(i.e., in accord with its design plan), if one should suddenly 
be transported to a wholly different and alien coqnitive 
environment, one's beliefs may have litte or no warrant. 
Thus, for Plantinga, a belief is warranted (including a 
l06P l antinga, warrant: ~he CUrrent Debate, 213-14. 
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properly basic theistic belief) only if the cognitive 
faculties involved in its production are functioning properly 
according to a desiqn plan and environment aimed at the 
production of true beliefs. 
Pojman indicates that Plantinga's requirement of an 
appropriate coqnitive environment allows him to circumvent 
Gettier-type counterexamples. The cognitive mechanism 
desiqned to pick out middle-sized objects, notes Pojman, was 
not meant to pick out facade barns at a distance. 107 Proper 
function according to a desiqn plan is said by Plantinga to 
follow certain parameters: 
In exploring the notion of desiqn plan, therefore, we must 
keep close to the front of our minds the way things go in 
these central and paradiqm cases. We must therefore bear 
in mind the way in which a radio, say, or a rope, or an 
airplane, or some other kind of artifact can be said to 
function properly, and what the connection in those cases 
is with a desiqn plan. lOS 
Design and proper function, Plantinga observes, "is not a 
description of how things work under just those circumstances 
(as in the paradigm cases) the desiqner plans for or takes 
into account; it includes a much broader set of 
circumstances. nl09 What this essentially involves is how a 
thing will work so long as it retains its approximate present 
structure in circumstances operating in conjunction with the 
natural laws that do in fact obtain. Plantinga defends his 
l07pojman, What Can We Know? 154. 
lOSPlantinga, Warrant and Proper FUnction, 21-22. 
l09 I bid., 23. 
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version of the design plan against such anomalies and places 
it instead in the context of the proper cognitive environment. 
Proper function, then, is necessary for warranted 
belief, but as Plantinga argues, it is not sufficient. There 
are possible situations in which our cognitive faculties are 
functioning according to a design plan, yet still result in 
beliefs with little or no warrant. Plantinga explains this in 
terms of a visit to the distant planet of Alpha Centauri: 
Conditions there are much like they are on earth; indeed 
some of the inhabitants of the planet are (physiologically 
speaking) surprisingly similar to human beings. 
Conditions there are propitious for human life; still 
there are subtle epistemic differences. Cats (or their 
Alpha Centaur ian counterparts) are invisible to human 
beings; but they emit a sort of radiation unknown on 
earth, a radiation which works directly on the appropriate 
portion of a human brain, causing its owner to form the 
belief that a dog is barking nearby. An Alpha Centaur ian 
cat slinks by; you form the belief that a dog is barking 
nearby. There is nothing the matter with your noetic 
faculties, but the belief in question has very little 
positive epistemic status for you. • • • The problem is 
that your cognitive faculties and the environment in which 
you find yourself are not properly attuned. The problem 
is not with you cognitive faculties; they are in good 
working order; the problem is with the environment. 110 
Plantinga's point is that our human cognitive faculties are 
not designed to function properly under every conceivable kind 
of circumstances. Thus in order for our cognitive faculties 
to function properly, they require an appropriate cognitive 
environment in which they were designed to function. 
But even these requirements, while necessary for 
warrant, are still not sufficient. There are still instances 
llOPlantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper 
Function," 33. 
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when our beliefs are not warranted, even though our cognitive 
faculties are functioning properly in an appropriate 
environment. Some beliefs, argues Plantinga, have purely 
pragmatic value despite the evidence: 
Someone may remember a painful experience as less painful 
than it really was, as is sometimes said to be the case 
with childbirth. You may continue to believe in your 
friend's honesty long after evidence and objective 
judgment would have dictated a reluctant chanqe of mind. 
I may believe that I will recover from a dread disease 
much more strongly than the statistics justify. In these 
cases, the relevant faculties may be functioninq properly, 
functioning just as they ought to, but nevertheless not in 
a way that leads to truth, to the formation of true 
beliefs. But then how can I say that a belief has 
positive epistemic status if it is produced by one's 
faculties functioning properly?lll 
In these kinds of cases, there are obvious benefits in holding 
beliefs that are inconsistent with the available evidence. 
Plantinga seems to indicate that this is factored into our 
design plan, and in the appropriate cirumstances, we tend to 
form beliefs that are deficient in warrant. 112 positive 
epistemic status, then, requires an additional element in 
order to be sufficient for warrant. Plantinga contends that, 
to have warrant, a belief must be formed out of conditions in 
which the "segment of the design plan is aimed at producing 
true beliefs."lll 
I11Plantinga, "positive Epistemic Status and Proper 
Function," 39. 
112Hasker, "Proper Function, Reliabilism, and 
Religious Knowledge," 69. 
lll I bid. See, for example, Plantinga, warrant: The 
CUrrent Debate, 214. Plantinga writes, "Another way to put it: 
the belief has warrant only if the segment of the design plan 
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There is also the further stipulation that the design 
plan of our cognitive faculties must be a good one. Not all 
design plans are the same, argues Plantinga: 
An angel might design my faculties, aiming at producing a 
rational creature whose beliefs were for the most part 
true. If this angel is one of Hume's lazy or incompetent 
or immature angels, however, then the fact that my beliefs 
are produced by faculties functioning properly • • • in 
the environment for which they were designed, and 
according to a design plan aimed at truth--that fact will 
not be sufficient for warrant. It is also necessary that 
the design in question be a good design: that is, that 
there be a substantial objective probability that a belief 
of that sort produced under those conditions is true. We 
might call this the presupposition of reliability; it is 
the condition of warrant the reliabilist seizes upon. 114 
This will include with it the element of the degree of 
warrant. Plantinga argues that the degree of warrant a belief 
has for a person is just the degree to which that person is 
inclined to accept the belief in question, provided that the 
belief is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly 
in an appropriate epistemic environment and that the relevant 
segment of the design plan is aimed at the production of true 
beliefs. 11S 
governing its production is aimed at truth, at the production 
of true beliefs." 
114P l antinga, Warrant: ~he current Debate, 214. 
11SPlantinga's notion of degrees of probability is a 
modification of Goldman's version of reliabilism. Goldman's 
notion that the justification of a belief is a function of the 
reliability of the process or processes that caused it (where 
reliability is the tendency of a process to produce beliefs 
that are true rather than false), if understood not in terms 
of types of processes, but rather in the specific cognitive 
functions that perceive the process or processes, is no longer 
a theory of reliabilism, argues Plantinga, but rather his 
theory of proper function. See, for example, Plantinga, 
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A further qualification of Plantinqa's system must be 
stated at this point. Plantinqa has referred to the design 
plan as the "specifications, or blueprints" of the organism, 
which has a function or purpose, or, as Plantinga puts it, 
"several functions or purposes, including both proximate and 
more remote purposes." 116 Althouqh it is the design plan 
which causes our cognitive faculties to function properly, as 
Plantinga intimates, it does not necessarily require a 
theistic interpretation. Rather, arques Plantinga, a given 
organism possesses a certain design that is unique to it, and 
evolution may well be the mechanism or process through which 
an organism or faculty has received optimal design. In other 
words, says Plantinqa, it does not commit us to the position 
that human beings have been literally designed by God. 117 
It may be that either a theistic God or evolution (or both) 
designed our cognitive faculties to function properly under 
the appropriate circumstances or in environments favorable to 
them. 118 
warrant: The CUrrent Debate, 209-10; and idem, "Positive 
Epistemic status and Proper Function," 24-31. See also, Alvin 
Goldman, "What is Justified Belief?" in Justification and 
Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, ed. George Pappas 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 10. 
l16Pl antinqa, Warrant and Proper Function, 13. 
l17 I bid. 
l18pojman, What Can We Know? 154-55. Pojman states 
that Plantinqa's system of faculties functioning properly and 
in accord to a desiqn plan incorporates the best of 
reliabilism, but avoids its weaknesses. A cognizer's belief is 
warranted only on the basis of: (~) a properly functioning 
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Plantinga's theory of warrant and proper function is, 
nevertheless, by his own admission, a version of radical 
naturalism. Claiming to follow Quine at a distance, Plantinga 
views his theory as entering in on the discussion of an 
ill-named Naturalistic epistemoloqy, since it is quite 
compatible with supernaturalistic theis.. Plantinga states 
that "the most plausible way to think of warrant, from a 
theistic persepctive, is in terms of naturalistic 
epistemoloqy.lIll9 To be sure, Plantinga entertains the idea 
of whether a nontheist can easily "make use of this notion of 
working properly."120 But his theory is ultimately in line 
with theistic conceptions that our noetic faculties were 
designed by a theistic God who is himself "an intellectual or 
intellecting being who possesses the maximal degree of 
knowledge. l2l 
Plantinga's point, in Pojman's words, is that up to 
the recent discussion, "the central thesis that knowledge 
entails warrant and warrant entails proper function, which in 
turn entails a design plan has been allowed to exist in a 
cognitive faculty; (2) a cognitive environment that is fitting 
for this kind of cognitive faculty; (3) the segment (module) 
of the design plan governing the production of the belief is 
aimed at the production of true beliefs; and (4) there is a 
high statistical probability that beliefs produced in this way 
will be true. 
ll9Pl antinga, Warrant and Proper FUnction, 46. 
l20Pl antinga, "Justification and Theism," 411. 
l2l I bid., 405. 
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metaphysically naturalist worldview.-122 In the final 
sections of his warrant and Proper FUnction, Plantinqa argues 
that metaphysical naturalism ultimately lacks a coherent 
notion of proper function in its evolutionary account of the 
accidental development of conscious and rational beinqs. If 
this is the case, then, metaphysical naturalism cannot claim 
warrant for its beliefs. 123 In the final analysis, argues 
Plantinqa, if evolution is true and our cognitive faculties 
are merely a product of chance and necessity, then, it may 
account for the fact that we have belief-forminq mechanisms 
that result in beiefs produced in order to maximize survival, 
but not necessarily truth. 124 
Plantinqa's critique of classical foundationalism's 
criteria for basic belief, then, brinqs us closer to the 
structure of justification essential to our proposed model of 
rationality. Since no one is obliqated to meet the classical 
foundationalist criteria for basic beliefs, one is rational in 
holdinq belief in God as a properly basic belief, apart from 
the requirement to supply evidence and arguments. Plantinqa 
has attempted to answer the problem of classical 
foundationalism on two levels: first, there is the replacement 
of the classical foundationalist notion of justification 
122Pojman, What Can We Know? 156. 
123P l antinqa, Warrant and Proper FUnction, 199-201; 
211-15. 
124I bid., 216-237. 
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(i.e., all non-basic beliefs are justified on the basis of 
propositional evidence from arguments and other basic beliefs) 
with an inductive appeal to the circumstances or conditions in 
which it is rational to hold theistic belief (i.e., one's 
cognitive faculties performing according to their designed 
purpose in environments suitably designed for those 
faculties); and second, there is the sense in which 
Plantinga's model assumes that a cognizer does in fact have 
regular access to proper design and proper function. It 
seems, therefore, that an adequate response to Plantinga's 
model of rationality concerns the question of what criteria 
are being used to arrive at these two critical aspects of his 
system. 
Assessment of Plantinga's 
Nodel of Rationality 
Plantinga argues that the classical foundationalist 
criterion for basic belief is self-referentially incoherent. 
That is, it does not satisfy its own conditions for the 
rationality of basic beliefs. The proposition (i.e., a 
proposition is properly basic for a person only if that 
proposition is self-evident, or incorrigible or evident to 
that person's senses) is not self-evident, incorrigible, or 
evident to the senses, though it may be rationally acceptable 
to some. 125 So while this no longer obligates us to the 
125see , for example, Paul Helm, Faith & Understanding 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 185. 
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requirement for sufficient evidence as defined by 
Enlightenment evidentialism, it does not lead Plantinga to 
reject all forms of foundationalism. The reason is that 
Plantinga thinks our noetic structure does have a 
foundationalist character. 126 Furthermore, the real issue 
behind Plantinga's criticisms have to do with the sorts of 
beliefs that can be properly basic. 127 So, once again, to 
borrow an expression from Roderick Chisholm, this raises the 
problem of the criterion. 128 
Plantinga states that: (1) belief in God is properly 
basic; (2) not every belief is properly basic; and most 
importantly (3) there is no infallible criterion that would be 
acceptable to everyone for determining what kind of beliefs 
qualify as properly basic. The reason why there is no 
infallible criterion, argues Plantinga, is that each group of 
people is responsible for arriving at its own set of criteria 
for properly basic beliefs, and not every group will agree. 
What we see is that Plantinga notes the character of 
particular examples of rational belief (i.e., everyday beliefs 
in which it makes little sense to question the rationality of 
holding them) and argues that no criterion for what counts as 
rational belief is warranted if such everyday beliefs are 
126Xbid. 
127See Stephen T. Davis, God, Reason & Theistic Proofs 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997), 86. 
128see , for example, The Problem of the Criterion 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1973). 
141 
excluded. 129 Furthermore, it is not that we cannot provide 
a justification for our everyday beliefs, it is just that we 
are not required to do so in order to be considered rational. 
The essence of Plantinqa's model of rationality is 
that one can be rational in believing in God even if that 
person does not offer evidence for his belief and cannot 
provide criteria for what counts as evidence for or against a 
that belief's truth. But this raises a further and perhaps 
more significant point. rt seems that an adequate model of 
rationality should be concerned with more than the question of 
when one is rational in holdinq belief in God; it should also 
be concerned with the question of whether one is right in 
holding that belief because it is true. Plantinqa's criteria 
for being rational do not guarantee that one is right, and yet 
it seems that being right is important and should be a factor 
in an overall model of rationality. This takes us beyond the 
mere question of when one is rational in holding a belief (in 
terms of being warranted on the basis of the right conditions) 
and brings us to the matter of whether a more complete system 
of rationality ought to include attempts, if possible, to 
examine one's beliefs on evidence. This seems to be precisely 
what is at issue with respect to our more abstract beliefs 
like belief in God. 
Plantinqa contributes to the discussion of rational 
belief pointing out that we are rational in holdinq many of 
129Hel m, Faith & Understanding, 186. 
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our everyday beliefs as properly basic, even thouqh we have 
never made an evidential case for them. But even if it can be 
arqued that belief in God can be amonq one's set of properly 
basic beliefs, it is difficult to see how this approach can be 
developed into a model of rationality that applies to all 
beliefs. One reason for this is because, as we will see in 
Swinburne's model in chapter four, there are many other 
propositions of reliqion and theology which Plantinqa would 
agree are rationally argued for on the basis of evidential 
reasons. That is, Plantinqa's argument for the proper 
basicality of belief in God does not seem applicable to other 
reliqious beliefs where he would agree on the need for 
deductive and inductive arquments, empirical evidence, and so 
forth in order to make a rational case. In this sense, it is 
difficult to see how Plantinqa's model of rationality would 
differ from a more evidentialist approach (e.q., Swinburne) 
with respect to any other reliqious belief, other than the 
belief that God exists. 
On yet another level, if Plantinqa is riqht about the 
notion that belief in God is a properly basic belief similar 
to many of our everyday beliefs, then perhaps the only riqht 
response is to say that it just seems possible that we can 
take an evidentialist position on any kind of belief, one in 
which we could offer evidential reasons (at some level) for or 
aqainst any of our beliefs if necessary. On the other hand, 
it seems much more difficult a task to show that Plantinqa is 
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simply wrong in saying that belief in God is a properly basic 
belief similar to many of our everyday beliefs. It may be 
suggested that Plantinga seems to make too simple a parallel 
between our everyday properly basic beliefs and belief in God. 
While he is essentially correct in sayinq that we apply the 
same coqnitive apparatus to both cateqories of belief, the 
fact of the matter is that people do not tend to challenqe 
their everyday beliefs in the way that people can come to 
doubt their own belief in God. It could be said that if 
enough people were to challenge their everyday perceptual 
beliefs, beliefs of memory, or other mental states, it seems 
that we would ultimately rise to the occassion and supply 
better evidence for or aqainst holdinq those beliefs. 
Furthermore, while it seems reasonable that one can be 
within one's epistemic rights to hold everyday beliefs on the 
basis of prima facie evidence, it seem a more difficult task 
to show that the same applies to belief in God. As indicated 
earlier, while Plantinga's criteria for rationality do not 
guarantee that one is right (or even require one to attempt to 
verify one's properly basic beliefs as true), it is difficult 
to imagine that being right about one's beliefs does not 
factor in at some point. So prima facie evidence about belief 
in God may be a good place to start if one is to be considered 
rational in holding that belief, but it still seem that a more 
complete model of rationality will go beyond the question of 
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when one is rational in holdinq a belief and attempt to offer 
reasons for why one thinks one's belief is riqht. 
It is also questionable whether Plantinqa's 
distinction between havinq evidence for a belief and havinq 
grounds for a belief eliminates the need to provide an 
acceptable criterion for proper basicality that all rational 
people can aqree on. If the conditions or circumstances 
relative to a person can constitute the qrounds for that 
person's beliefs, it is difficult to see how beliefs (in terms 
of propositions arisinq out of various perceptual and 
religious experiences) would not be formed on the basis of 
such experiences. 130 Such beliefs would constitute evidence 
in the way that we have been usinq the term. Plantinqa thinks 
that this is not likely, since a coqnizer can be entirely 
unaware of a belief that is qrounded on certain conditions. 
Since the coqnizer may be unaware, such qrounds are not 
formulated as beliefs. But even if this is the case, it seems 
that such conditions would at best have only a temporal or 
limited influence. Plantinqa so much as admits this when he 
arques that our prima ~acie beliefs can face at least prima 
facie defeat by counter-evidence. 131 
Another area in which there seems to be a need to 
provide criteria for a rational and properly basic belief has 
130Hel m, 188. 
131see, for example, Plantinqa, "The Foundations of 
Theism: A Reply," in Faith and Philosophy 3 (1986): 298-313. 
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to do with Plantinga's views on proper design and proper 
function. What is it that gives us the epistemic right to 
believe that we have proper function and proper design in the 
first place? Are we not required to use these very same 
faculties to come to the conclusion that the design is 
correct, that the faculties are indeed functioning properly, 
and that the beliefs formed under these conditions are likely 
true? But if this is so, then how does this avoid being an 
extended exercise in question-begging?132 
If Plantinga is to argue that the conditions which 
give rise to true beliefs do so, apart from one's being able 
to determine this by having access to criteria outside of 
those conditions, he would have to assume in advance that 
one's cognitive faculties are in fact functioning as they 
should. Furthermore, he would also be assuming in advance the 
proper design of the environment in which one's faculties are 
said to be functioning properly. That is, he is forced to use 
his available faculties (and rely on the available 
environment) to make the determination that they are in fact 
giving one true access to the world. Plantinga does not seem 
to account for the need to get outside of those conditions to 
judge whether they are in fact functioninq properly. 
Plantinga may go on to argue that such conditions are 
person-variant (i.e., that one need only account for the fact 
1321 am here indebted to John Feinberq's thouqhtful 
analysis of Plantinqa's thinking on this issue. 
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that he has certain beliefs that arise out of those 
conditions), but even if those conditions are person-variant, 
it does not rule out the need to evaluate those conditions 
(and their subsequent beliefs) on the basis of criteria that 
are not person-variant. The point is that, once again, even 
if this allows for prima facie justification of those beliefs 
(and one is hence rational on that account), it seems that 
such rationality is short-lived. It seems more likely that a 
cognizer will eventually come to a point where he will want to 
determine whether such beliefs can be evaluated on the basis 
of evidence that is public and available at some 
person-invariant level. Such criteria seem to be the best 
possible way in which one can have evidence that will not 
simply confirm the psychological states of the cognizer. 
Furthermore, Plantinga states that the conditions 
which give rise to properly basic beliefs should be conditions 
which aim at truth (presumably in some correspondence sense). 
But if this is true, it seems that we have no better way of 
evaluating whether a condition is aimed at the truth, apart 
from attempts to verify on evidence the propositions arising 
from those conditions. It seems reasonable to suggest that 
two people having similar conditions acting upon them (the 
same cognitive functions and suitably designed evironment) can 
have quite different beliefs arise out of those conditions. 
This would seem to suggest that there are other criteria that 
are outside of the cognizer's conditions (e.g., evidence in 
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the form of other beliefs and propositions one holds as true) 
which seem to inform them. Two people havinq qhost-like 
conditions acted upon them can draw different beliefs. One 
may accept the condition as warranting belief in qhosts. The 
other may have such a condition overridden by other beliefs 
(in the form of public criteria) to which he holds, that is, 
other beliefs that seem acceptable as common knowledqe. 
In addition, it seems difficult to draw a parallel 
between conditions that give rise to tree-like beliefs (beinq 
appeared to treely) and conditions that give rise to other 
forms of non-basic beliefs, such as belief in the Great 
Pumpkin. We do not tend to challenqe conditions that qive 
rise to tree-like beliefs. But we quite reqularly question 
conditions which are said to qive rise to our more abstract 
beliefs. It is not just that the conditions do not warrant 
belief in the Great Pumpkin, for example, but it is that the 
public criteria of evidence does not allow for it. 
Person-variant beliefs do not resolve this problem. If 
Plantinga appeals to the prima facie evidence that our 
faculties are generally to be trusted, then he is (1) relyinq 
on some deqree of evidence (e.g., inductive evidence 
generalizations or statistical averaqes); (2) assuminq that 
our faculties are functioning properly to make the judqment in 
the first place; and (3) he is assuming that enough people 
have properly functioning faculties to agree with his 
judqment. It is difficult to know what crieria this satisfies 
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if not an appeal to some level of evidence outside of one's 
psychological state. 
It seems, then, that we can proceed with the caution 
that Plantinga's notion of rationality appears to circumvent 
one of the most critical aspects of rational belief, 
specifically that one must make an evidential case for any 
belief one holds in order to be considered rational in holding 
that belief. But it further seems that perhaps the next 
logical step is to consider whether there are criteria that 
account for reasons and evidence for rational belief that go 
beyond the mere matter of when one is rational in holding a 
belief. For it would also seem that rational criteria which 
aim at the truth of our beliefs are important factors in an 
overall model of rationality, criteria that can be verified on 
the basis of public evidence. Such is the aim of our next 
chapter. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PROBABILITY OF BELIEF ON EVIDENCE 
ctJMtJLATrvE CASE EVIDENTrALISM 
We have argued in chapter three that Plantinga's model 
of rationality is inadequate due to its lack of criteria for 
what counts as a properly basic belief. Furthermore, there 
seems to be a need for a criterion that could provide enough 
evidence to rationally convince a cognizer that the conditions 
that give rise to one's beliefs are conditions that have 
successfully aimed at the truth. Our conclusion was that we 
need a model of rationality which can supply such criteria. 
We now turn to a model of rationality in which we come much 
closer to the criteria for sufficient evidence, even though 
that evidence need not satisfy the criteria of Enlightenment 
evidentialism. 
The Probability or Theistic Belier 
A CUmulative Case 
A common feature among non-theistic thinkers who hold 
to the evidentalist assumption is the notion that there are 
good evidential reasons for denying that there can be a 
rational case for theism. l So while theists attempt to offer 
lsee, for example, J. L. Mackie, The Miracle or Theism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 4-6. 
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coherent arguments and reasons in support of its cognitive 
claims, in the final analysis, evidentialist objectors to 
belief in God argue that it lacks sufficient evidence (either 
of a directly verifiable empirical nature or of a self-evident 
propositional nature in the form of deductive proofs) for its 
rational defence. One current and evidentialist response to 
this objection is the model of rationality found in the 
cumUlative case evidentialis. of Richard Swinburne. 2 
Relying on models of rationality upon which we base 
some of our best scientific theories, Swinburne argues that 
there are evidences for theistic belief that make it more 
probable than not that theism is the best hypothesis for 
explaining the various phenomena of our world. Swinburne's 
thinking is highly influenced by the philosophy of science, 
and as such, his rational theories for theism are consistent 
with his conclusion that "the great theories and predictions 
of modern science concern matters far beyond our 
observation. "3 He writes: 
2The essential features of SWinburne's rational case 
for theism are found in his The Existence of God (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979); and Faith and Reason (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981). Others who argue in a similar fashion 
are Basil Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief 
(London: Macmillan, 1973); George Schlesinger, Religion and 
Scientific Method (Boston: D. Reidel, 1977); and Hugo Meynell, 
The Intelligible Universe: A cosmological Argument (Totowa, 
N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 1982). 
3Richard swinburne, "Intellectual Autobiography," in 
Reason and the Christian Religion: Essays in Honor of Richard 
SWinburne, ed. Alan G. Padgett (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 4. 
151 
What makes scientific theories meaningful is not their 
verifiability, but the fact that they describe their 
entities (atoms) and their properties (velocity, spin) 
with words used so.ewhat stailarly to words used for 
describing ordinary .undane things.· 
Unobservable entities such as atoms, for exa.ple, are commonly 
described through fa.iliar exa.ples of analoqous lanquage 
(e.g., that they are like very small billiard-balls and 
somewhat like waves, only not waves in media 11ke water). The 
observable phenomena and additional background knowledge, 
then, make it highly probable that a given hypothesis (e.g., 
atomic theory) is the best explanatory hypothesis of the 
available evidence. s So, while we may not be in a position 
to observe these entities directly, Swinburne correctly 
asserts that it is reasonable to conclude that we have 
knowledge of them by virtue of the phenomena we actually do 
observe. Theistic theories, then, may work in a similar 
fashion, and as SUCh, it may be legitimate to postulate a 
4I bid., 4-5. 
SIbid. See, for example, Michael Peterson and others, 
Reason & Religious Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 165. Swinburne is not assuming that we have exhaustive 
and indisputable knowledge of natural phenomenea, nor does he 
assume that any specific theory is immune from revision. 
Rather, he believes that our current scientific theories 
(together with their level of confirmation) are adequate for 
explaining the available evidence. Serious revisions of 
accepted theories (in order to account for anomalies) would 
appear ad hoc and likely upset the whole structure of 
science. Swinburne's point is that there are some events 
(e.q., the universe's existence and design) for which we could 
justifiably argue there are no natural explanantions that 
are ultimately satisfying. See also, Richard Swinburne, 
The concept of Miracle (London: Macmillan, 1970), 29-32. 
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theistic hypothesis as the best explanation of the available 
phenomena. 
We may briefly state Swinburne's model of rationality, 
then, in the following terms: In order to be rational in 
holding a belief, one must hold it for what Swinburne calls 
"good epistemological reasons," that is, for reasons one 
thinks are true, given the total available evidence, even if 
that belief cannot be verified as true. Furthermore, to be 
rational about one's belief is to judge that a belief on 
evidence is more probable than not, that is, to think that one 
has good reasons for believing that a belief is more likely 
true than not, given the total evidence. The total available 
evidence is in part a relation among a person's beliefs (i.e., 
reasoning from basic to non-basic beliefs). Total evidence 
consists of the set of propositions (both basic and non-basic) 
to which a person holds, that is, propositions that seem to be 
true and which that person is inclined to believe (but not 
solely on the basis of other propositions that one believes 
(e.g., reports of perception, memory, and other mental states 
that are forced on one by one's experience of the world). 
Prior beliefs (i.e., beliefs a person may hold in 
advance of an investigation of the reasons for holding it) or 
basic beliefs are justified on both doxastic and non-doxastic 
reasons (e.g., other mental states, including hunches and 
intuitions, and other basic propositions of which a cognizer 
is aware). Justification on this model is a reason-based 
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conception, in which a cognizer may appeal to evidence in the 
form of other prior or basic beliefs, other .ental states 
accepted on the basis of one's experience, or one's inductive 
standards (i.e., beliefs based on experience, testimony, 
authority, or even other factors that are not necessarily 
articulated). Justification follows an essentially 
foundationalist structure, in which non-basic beliefs are 
inferred from basic beliefs. 
Basic beliefs are not necessarily incorriqible on 
evidence (althouqh they may become incorriqible for 
psycholoqical reasons). They are held with varyinq deqrees of 
confidence (i.e., the deqree to which one's experiences make 
that belief seem more likely than not). Basic propositions 
formed out of one's experiences and evidence ultimately become 
basic beliefs, unless rendered improbable by one's other basic 
beliefs. Basic beliefs report what a cognizer is initially 
inclined to believe, toqether with the deqree of probability 
or initial confidence one has in them, qiven the available 
evidence. 
On this model, there are deqrees of rationality, 
dependinq on the extent to which one's evidence, arquments, 
and procedures for evaluatinq the evidence suqqest that a 
belief is more likely true than not. One's calculations for a 
belief's likelihood of truth are not very explicit, but one is 
said to have certainty about one's belief in extreme cases of 
the likelihood of truth, that is, when one has in fact 
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verified one's belief as true on evidence. This further 
implies that the less likely a belief is thought to be true on 
evidence, the more one is expected to provide additional 
evidence for that belief if one is thought to be rational in 
holding it (although one is not required to verify that belief 
as true). 
The Probability of Theories and Beliefs 
One of the central features of Swinburne's rational 
defence of theistic belief is his move from deductive to 
inductive forms of arguments. 6 Whereas in a sound deductive 
argument the premises make the conclusion certain, it is not 
the case that all arguments need to be evaluated by such 
deductive standards.' Rather, it is Swinburne's suggestion 
that there can be rational arguments for theistic belief 
without necessarily appealing to deductive standards. 8 
6Swinburne discusses the nature of inductive 
arguments in The Existence of God, ch.1. 
'See Merrie Bergman, James Moor, and Jack Nelson, The 
Logic Book, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 
1990), 10. Deductive arguments are valid if and only if it is 
not possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion 
false (i.e., it is not possible consistently both to assert 
the premise and to deny the conclusion ). Deductive arguments 
are invalid if and only if it is not deductively valid. See 
also, Irving Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 9th 
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994), 206. 
8see , for example, Bergman, Moor, and Nelson, 11. 
Deductively invalid arguments may still be considered good 
arguments if they are evaluated by inductive standards. An 
argument is said to be inductively strong if the premises 
provide strong evidence for the truth of the conclusion. The 
more probable the truth of the conclusion, given the premises, 
the stronger the argument. An inductive argument is weak if 
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stated differently, if the traditional evidence for theism 
(e.g. , the theistic proofs) experiences a series of failures 
due to its reliance on purely deductive arguments, the 
evidence for theism can be inductively re-examined in light of 
its contribution to a culmulative case argument from the 
evidence. 
While deductive arguments (assuming they are valid) 
make formal attempts at being sound (i.e., true) and 
consequently rational, Swinburne realizes that one can easily 
agree to their soundness simply by granting the truthfulness 
of the premises for the sake of the argument. But such a 
reasoning process begs the question. It is not rational to 
argue for the soundness of a valid deductive argument simply 
by assuming the truthfulness of its premises. Swinburne 
intends to offer instead a system of rationality in which one 
has good reasons to think that the evidence offered in support 
of a given conclusion (or theory) makes that conclusion more 
probable than not. 9 
According to a cumulative case evidential argument for 
theism, the hypothesis of theism is said to make better sense 
and only if it is not inductively strong. Cf., Copi and Cohen, 
452-455. As will become clear, Swinburne's arguments for the 
probability of theism, while following the structure of 
inductive arguments in general, nevertheless, invokes a form 
of inductive reasoning in the form of Bayes' Theorem. Our 
discussion will, as much as possible, consider the basic 
features of the theorem and their application to the 
rationality of belief. 
9swinburne, The Existence of God, 7-8. 
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of all the available evidence (e.q., a posteriori arquments 
like the cosmological arquaent for God's existence, the 
pattern of history and the existence of some evidence of 
miracles, the occurrence of reliqious experiences, etc.) than 
does any other alternative. 10 When each piece of evidence 
is examined individually, the evidence is more to be expected 
if God does exists than if he does not. And taken toqether 
Swinburne believes the evidence to suqqest that the existence 
of God is more probable than not. 11 This is essentially the 
way swinburne uses probability to rationally confirm that a 
theory is likely true. 12 Swinburne attempts to show by the 
application of Bayes' Theorem that the probability of theism 
(i.e., prior and posterior probability) in relation to the 
l~itchell, 39-40. See also, Michael C. Banner, The 
Justification of Science and the Rationality of Religious 
Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 68; and Swinburne's, 
The Existence of God, 290. 
llBanner, The Justification of Science and the 
Rationality of Religious Belief, 68. 
12See John S. Feinberq, The Many Faces of Evil (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1979 and 1994), 165. See also, 
Richard Swinburne, "Choosinq Between Confirmation Theories," 
Philosophy of Science 37 (1970): 603; idem, "Confirmability 
and Factual Meaninqfulness," Analysis 33 (1972-3): 71-6; and 
idem, An Introduction to Confirmation Theory (London: Methuen 
Press, 1973). For similar forms of probability arquments, see 
Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Foundations of Probability, 2d ed. 
(London: Routledqe and Keqan Paul, 1962); Carl G. Hempel, 
Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Macmillan, 1965); 
and Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (London: 
Routledqe and Keqan Paul, 1963); and Popper's The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper. ROW, 1965). 
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evidences of the world is greater than one half. 13 A brief 
review of the theorem is all that is necessary to consider the 
degree to which Swinburne's arqument for the probability of 
theories influences his thinking on the nature and rationality 
of beliefs, both theistic and otherwise. 
Swinburne states that the probability of any 
hypothesis is essentially the extent to which one proposition 
(or set of propositions) renders probable another proposition 
(or set of propositions). So the probability of a hypothesis 
h on available evidence e and background knowledge k is a 
function of its prior probability and its explanatory power 
(posterior probability). Bayes' Theorem, put in these terms, 
may be expressed as follows: 
P(h/e.k) = 
p(e/b.X) x P(b/k) 
p(e/k).14 
Given this formulation, Swinburne suggests that our evidence 
can be distributed between e and k (where k may represent mere 
tautological knowledge or some aspect of contingent 
13swinburne, Tbe Existence of God, 278. See also, 
John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989), 104-5. For a helpful introduction to 
the conditional probability of Bayes' theorem, see Patrick J. 
Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic, 6th ed. (Belmont, 
Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997), 539-42. Bayes' 
Theorem is named after the eighteenth-century English 
clergyman Thomas Bayes (1702-1761). The conditional 
probability of a given theory is the probability of that 
theory being the case given certain evidence, and is 
expressed peA given B). 
14Richard Swinburne, Tbe Existence of God, 64-69 and 
281; and Idem, "Does Theism Need a Theodicy?" Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy 18, no. 2 (June 1988): 303. 
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knowledge). P(h/k) is the prior probability of h, that is, 
how likely h is to be true prior to obtaining new evidence e, 
on backqround knowledge alone. P(h/e.k) is the probability of 
h, that is, how likely h is true in light of evidence e and 
backqround knowledge k. P(e/h.k) represents the predictive 
ability of h, that is, the likelihood that e will occur if h 
(along with k) is true. And finally, P(e/k) is the prior 
probability that e is the case solely on the basis of k being 
true. IS Feinberg summarizes Bayes' Theorea in the following 
terms: 
This says that the probabity of a hypothesis, given the 
backqround information and available evidence, equa~s the 
prior probability of the hypothesis times the probability 
that there will be evidence of the sort in the world that 
there is (given the truth of the hypothesis and the 
background information), divided by the probability that 
there will be the sort of evidence we have, given the 
backqround information we know. 16 
Each expression of the theorem receives a numerical value, 
through which one then determines the probability of the 
hypothesis from the results of working the math problem. 
Probabilities range between 0 and 1, and once it is determined 
that a hypothesis has a qreater probability than .5, it is 
said to be confirmed in the sense that it is more likely true 
than not. 17 
ISSwinburne,"Does Theism Need a Theodicy?" 303-4. See 
also, Bringsjord, 128. 
I6Feinberg, Evi~, 163. 
I7Ibid. 
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Not all inductive arguments have the same force with 
respect to the probability of the conclusion. Swinburne 
attempts to focus on inductive arguments for which he believes 
the premises make the conclusion probable, that is, more 
probable than not. He distinguishes between C-inductive 
arguments and P-inductive arguments. We have C-inductive 
arguments when the premises or evidence confirm the conclusion 
of the hypothesis in the sense that the evidence has raised 
the probability of the hypothesis from what it was, or would 
have been, apart from that evidence. We have P-inductive 
arguments when the premises or evidence confirm the conclusion 
of the hypothesis in the sense that the evidence makes the 
hypothesis more likely than not to be true. 1S In other 
words, each of the phenomena (i.e., the evidences) renders a 
theory more probable than it would be without it and results 
in a correct c-inductive (confirmatory) argument for a qiven 
hypothesis (e.q., theism). Of course, the question is whether 
correct C-inductive arguments can be built toqether into a 
correct P-inductive argument showinq that the final 
probability of a theory is qreater than .5 (i.e., that the 
theory is likely true).19 And, as Swinburne admits, it is 
l8see , for example, J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of 
Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 95-96. See 
also, Swinburne, The Existence of God, 7. 
19Hick, 106. See also, Brinqsjord, 128. Brinqsjord 
argues that if each of el' ••• , e~ represent evidence in a 
series of six purportedly qood C-1nductive arguments, then 
where h = 'God exists,' p(h/el , ••• , e6 & k) > .5. 
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harder to tell when we have a qood P-inductive argument than 
when we have a qood C-inductive argument, but the primary 
concern is with relations of non-deductive support between 
certain evidence, in the liqht of a body of beliefs or 
propositions constitutinq backqround knowledqe, and a 
hypothesis or conclusion. 20 
Prior Probability 
Swinburne arques that a successful application of the 
theorem includes an assessment of the prior probability of 
hypotheses on tautoloqical backqround information (i.e., apart 
from considerinq evidence of the sort in the world that there 
is). That is, "a hypothesis is confirmed by certain evidence 
if and only if (apart from or prior to that evidence's beinq 
observed) the addition of the hypothesis to the backqround 
knowledge or belief makes it more probable that the evidence 
would occur than it would be in relation to the backqround 
knowledge or belief alone."21 Swinburne refers to this as 
intrinsic probability. But it is unlikely that the intrinsic 
probability of a theory can be determined only on the basis of 
some tautoloqical evidence. This leads Swinburne to adopt 
specific criteria (e.q., simplicity, scope, and backqround 
knowledge) as a further means of determining the prior 
probability of theories. The more detailed and broader ranqe 
20Swinburne, ~he Existence or God, 278. 
21Mackie, 96. 
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of claims that a hypothesis makes, the lower its intrinsic 
probability. Hypotheses that postulate fewer entities (or 
fewer kinds of entities) bave greater intrinsic 
probability. 22 
When considering the prior probability of a theory 
(e.g., the hypothesis of theism), Swinburne arques that (like 
scientific theories) the criterion of simplicity is crucial. 
It is simplicity, arques Swinburne, which gives an explanatory 
hypothesis (whether scientific or personal) its greatest 
degree of prior probability: 
The existence of God is a very simple hypothesis which 
leads us to expect various very general and more specific 
phenomena which otherwise we would not expect, and for 
that reason is rendered probable by the phenomena. Or 
rather, as with any big scientific theory, each group of 
phenomena add to the probability of the theory; toqether 
they make it significantly more probable than not. Z3 
A simple theory is one which accounts for few laws, each 
connecting few variables. It is a theory which postulates few 
entities, few kinds of entity, few properties, and few kinds 
of property. Simple theories have fewer details to account 
for, and there is less chance to misinterpret the data. 
Swinburne contends that scientists follow the same pattern of 
argument to arque to the existence of unobservable entities as 
causes of observable phenomena. 24 
22I bid., 304-5. See also, Swinburne, The Existence of 
God, 52. 
23swinburne, "Autobiography," 10. See also, Clark, 37. 
24Swinburne, "Autobiography," 5-6. 
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The criterion of simplicity is also essential for 
swinburne to argue his further point that a sc~entific 
explanation of the existence of the universe is too complex to 
account for the phenomena of our world accurately (i.e., it 
works against the criterion of simplicity). Scientific 
explanations, for example, explain phenomena in terms of the 
regularity of laws and some prior state of affairs. 
Phenomenon e is explained in terms of some prior state of 
affairs f (the cause) and some regularity 1 with respect to 
the way objects involved in f and e behave. 25 
Personal explanation, on the other hand, is when the 
occurence of a phenomenon e is explained as brought about by a 
rational agent p doing some action intentionally.26 The 
point is that an explanatory hypothesis is likely to be more 
probable when it invokes fewer entities and fewer kinds of 
entities. Furthermore, such entities should have easily 
describable properties and behave in mathematically simple 
kinds of ways (i.e., a person having certain capacities and 
purposes which do not change erratically) which give rise to 
many phenomena. Swinburne thinks that if we cannot find a 
scientific theory which satisfies the criteria in attempting 
to best explain the phenomena, one should look for a personal 
explanation. 27 When other theories are unable to explain 
2SI bid., 6. 
26Swinburne, The Existence of God, 32. 
27Swinburne, "Autobiography," 7. 
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the phenomena in question, what we postulate should lead us to 
expect (to some degree of probability) what we observe. 28 
Using the criterion of simpicity, then, Swinburne argues that 
the personal explanation of theism ultimately offers the 
greatest degree of simplicity, and thereby, a higher degree of 
prior probability than any of the alternatives. 
A further criterion for determining the prior 
probability of an explantatory hypthesis is a matter of 
background knowledge (i.e., our knowledge of how well a theory 
fits with our general knowledge of how the world works). Do 
the kinds of entities and laws which the theory postulates 
tend to agree with those which we reasonably think are the 
case in other fields? Swinburne suggests, for example, that 
if a theory postulates no unknown entities, then on background 
knowledge, it is more likely to be true than a theory which 
postulates new (or even unobservable) entities. 29 
The final criterion in determining a theory's prior 
probability is that of scope. The narrower a theory's scope, 
the more it adds to the prior probability (and simplicity) of 
a theory. Swinburne suggests that the more objects involved 
or allegedly covered by a theory, the less probable it is. 
For the more a theory asserts, the more it is likely to 
explain the data inaccurately or inadequately. Hypotheses 
28I bid., 6 and 11. 
29Swinburne, ~he Existence of God, 52. 
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which have the best fit with background knowledge and are 
narrowest in scope are the most likely candidates for 
simplicity. Of course, Swinburne's criteria for the prior 
probability of theories do not ipso facto rule out the idea 
that some theories which do not satisfy these conditions are 
in fact more probable than not. Rather, such criteria seem to 
represent what Swinburne sees as the accepted pattern of 
science in determining a theory's prior probabilitYn 
Theories, then, have explanatory power (or probability) in so 
far as they are able to explain the wide range of phenomena, 
particularly when the phenomena are not otherwise to be 
expected apart from the theory. The greater the theory's 
prior probability, the greater the theory's power to explain 
the phenomena, and the more likely it is to be true. 30 
Posterior Probability 
When considering the posterior probability of a 
hypothesis, Swinburne is concerned with just how all the 
available evidence makes a hypothesis probable. In other 
words, given the determination that "all the relevant factual 
evidence is included in e, and k is mere tautological 
evidence, what is the value of P(h/e.k)? We may not be able 
to give it an exact numerical value, but the important issue 
30I bid. 
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is whether p(h/e.k) > p(-h/e.k) and so > 1/2. Do we have a 
good P-inductive arqument to the existence of God?,,31 
Evidences considered in determininq the posterior 
probability of the theistic hypothesis, for example, include 
the existence of the universe; the universe's temporal 
orderliness and design; the existence of humans and animals; 
the fact of conscious beings, particularly human agents of 
limited power and knowledge, and possessing a degree of free 
will in which humans have opportunities to co-operate in 
acquiring knowledge, changing their environment, influencing 
history. other forms of evidence include the occurrence of 
miracles; the fact of morality (which Swinburne thinks does 
not add evidential weight); and the existence of evil, which 
he also regards as having no evidential weight. Religious 
experience, however, is given more weight than the other forms 
of evidence. Swinburne contends that "unless the probability 
of theism on other evidence is very low indeed, the testimony 
of many witnesses to experiences apparently of God suffices to 
make many of those experiences probably veridical. That is, 
the evidence of religious experience is in that case 
sufficient to make theism over all probable. 32 
In theistic terms, then, Swinburne believes that there 
is higher probability for the hypothesis of theism (given 
31I bid., 278. 
32 I bid, 291. See also, Selmer Bringsjord, "Swinburne's 
Argument From Consciousness," International Journal for the 
Philosophy of Religion 19, no. 3 (1986): 127-8. 
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background knowledqe and posterior evidence) than there is for 
the hypothesis based on background knowledqe alone, if and 
only if there is greater probability that the evidence obtains 
given the theistic hypothesis and background knowledge than 
there is for the evidence to obtain (given only background 
knowledge) apart from the theistic hypothesis. 33 
Part of what is at stake here is whether Swinburne's 
model of rationality (in terms of the probability of theories 
and beliefs) goes beyond the suggestion that a theory (whether 
scientific, philosophical, or theistic) is at best in better 
agreement with the known data and offers a more coherent and 
comprehensive explanation of the data (taking future evidence 
into account) than alternative theories available at the time. 
An adequate model of rationality has to account for how it 
will deal with the possibility that future evidence could 
falsify our synthetic beliefs. It should not be difficult to 
see that Swinburne intends to offer a system that, while not 
offering deductive certainty of synthetic claims, does suggest 
that one's beliefs or theories will experience a level of 
probabilty that is not expected to be shown false as a result 
of future evidence. Such evidence is thought to be evidence 
of the appropriate kind and quality that it offers sufficient 
reason for a cognizer to be rationally convinced that it is 
more reasonable than not to believe that theories supported by 
this evidence are more likely true than not. 
33Swinburne, ~he Existence of God, 68-9. 
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Swinburne's approach to the justification of theories 
or beliefs, then, is different from Murphy's notion that all 
of our current theories or beliefs are likely to be replaced 
by future theories thought to better explain the evidence, and 
that the most we can expect of our formulations is that they 
will be tentative and subject to revision. While Swinburne's 
notion of the probability of theories is offered in place of 
unachievable systems of indubitable certainty, it is also 
expected that his model can make more rational sense out of 
the synthetic claims of theism and allow one to reach greater 
levels of certitude through a cumUlative approach to the 
available evidence. 34 The question remains, however, 
whether Swinburne's model of rationality provides the kind or 
quality of evidence that can serve as an adequate replacement 
to the sufficient evidence of Enlightenment evidentialism and 
evidential arguments. 35 
The Nature of Belief 
Our purpose up to this point has been to see how 
Swinburne uses prior and posterior evidence to argue for the 
34See , for example, Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science 
and Religion (New York: Harper' ROW, Publishers, 1966), 
147-148. For a summary of the different uses of confirmation 
theories by Carnap, Popper, and Hempel, see J. P Moreland, 
Christianity and the Nature of Science (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Baker Book House, 1989), 86-92. 
35See , for example, Antony Flew, God and Philosophy 
(London: Hutchinson, 1966), 141. See also, Selmer Bringsjord, 
"swinburne's Argument from Consciousness," 128. 
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overall probability of explanatory theories. By usinq the 
same procedures of determininq the prior and posterior 
evidence for beliefs, Swinburne thinks one can determine the 
probability of a qiven belief and why one is rational in 
holdinq it. It is Swinburne's contention that, while the 
concept of belief is not a completely clear one, we may still 
be in an episteaic position to examine what it aeans to hold 
to the concept of believinq that so-and-so (e.q., that there 
is a God).36 
swinburne argues that the nature of belief (as 
sugqested by public criteria) is the concept of "believinq 
so-and-so more probable (or more likely) than 
such-and-such."37 Belief, like theories, is relative to 
alternatives, and accordinq to Swinburne, the alternative with 
which a proposition is normally contrasted is its neqation. 
He writes: 
The negation of a proposition p is the proposition not-p, 
or "it is not the case that p" •••• Normally to believe 
that p is to believe that p is more probable than 
not-p.38 
36swinburne, Faith and Reason, 3. 
37I bid., 3-4. 
38I bid., 4. See, for example, Banner, ~he 
Justification of Science and the Rationality of Religious 
Be~ief, 101. Banner indicates that SWinburne's notion of 
probablity here is to be distinguished from those instances 
where one acts on the assumption that p. In such a case, it is 
swinburne's contention that we do not have a valid instance of 
belief, since the assumption is held without thinking that p 
is probable to any siqnificant deqree. This amounts to what 
Anthony Kenny describes as the "actinq-as-if" behavior of the 
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Furthermore, Swinburne seems to suqqest that he sees the 
probability of a belief (together with its relation to 
alternatives) in terms of the likelihood of its truth. He 
thinks that one's beinq certain of p is an extreme case of p 
beinq probable, but more importantly in terms of an approach 
to rationality, if one does not believe that p is probable, 
then one cannot believe that p is true. Likewise, if one 
believes that it is more probable that not-p than that p, then 
one cannot be rational in believinq that p.39 In addition, 
it is important to understand that, while the probability of a 
belief does not necessarily rule out epistemic certainty 
(i.e., the qreatest deqree of evidence one can have for either 
analytic or synthetic statements), such certainty is not a 
necessary condition for a belief's probability. 
Belief and Evidence 
Swinburne has argued up to this point that beliefs, 
very much like theories, are defined in terms of probability. 
To believe in the proposition that p is, in essence, to have 
the inclination that p is more probable than not. The notion 
of epistemic justification, then, is understood in term of the 
warrant, reasons, or qrounds that make one justified and 
rational in holdinq a belief. So on Swinburne's account of 
justification, while a person does not have to verify (i.e., 
aqnostic (101-102). See also, Anthony Kenny, ~he God of the 
Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 129. 
39swinburne, Faith and Reason, 4. 
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establish a belief on the basis of the total evidence 
available) a qiven belief as true, a person is rational and 
justified if he thinks the evidence renders it likely to be 
true. Swinburne refers to this as epistemic probability, and 
suqqests that it is relative to evidence. A proposition's 
beinq epistemically probable (i.e., more likely true than not 
true) depends on the evidence-class relative to which the 
probability is 
assessed. 40 
The epistemic probability of a proposition, argues 
Swinburne, is determined alonq lines that are similar to the 
probability of theories. In both cases, it is a question of 
the extent to which the evidence in question supports a 
proposition or theory. But, as Swinburne recoqnizes, 
establishinq the probability of a proposition on evidence is a 
more difficult and arbitrary task than he thinks is true in 
the case of theories: 
The epistemic probability of most ordinary claims cannot 
of course be qiven an exact numerical value; the most that 
one can say about the probability of most ordinary claims 
is that one claim is more probable than some other claim. 
(If one claim is more probable than its neqation, it has a 
probability of more than 1/2. If on the evidence a claim 
is certainly true it has a probability of 1; if it is 
certainly false, it has a probability of 0.)41 
40I bid., 18-19. 
41I bid., 19. 
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It will become clear, however, that the matter of probability 
and certainty with respect to one's propositions involves a 
host of epistemic features. That is, the epistemic 
probability of a person's beliefs, in Swinburne's view, 
concerns the evidence available to a person at the time. 
Swinburne's position amounts to the claim that S believes 
that p "if and only if S believes that the total evidence 
available to him makes p more probable than any alternative; 
that, on the total evidence available to him, p is more 
probable than any alternative. n42 
Part of what functions as the prior probability of a 
belief is what Swinburne refers to as a person's inductive 
standards. He states that when two or more people are 
attempting to judge the probability of a proposition, they 
may differ "not in their evidence, but in their inductive 
standards, that is, in what conclusions they judge to be 
probable on the basis of the evidence. n43 Briefly put, 
inductive standards include some kind of generalization 
principle about the evidence. If all (or most) objects of 
some kind have been observed to have a certain property, then 
it is (very) probable that some other object of that kind will 
have the same property. Of course, people will differ on how 
many observations are needed before a judgment of high 
probability can be made. Most inductive standards are 
42 I bid. 
43swinburne, Faith and Reason, 37. 
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identifiable on the basis of commonly accepted criteria, but 
some people will have inductive standards quite different from 
the rest of us (e.g., the Azande for whom it seems intuitively 
right that a spell can be cast on someone, or a gambler who, 
having just become the father of a baby boy, thinks 
coincidental resemblances of events are important and bets on 
a horse called "Sonny Boy"). Soae inductive standards just 
seem intuitively right. other inductive standards, on the 
other hand, may make it altoqether rational for a person to 
accept a belief, even though that person may be unable to 
state those standards in propositional terms. Furthermore, 
not all inductive standards are grounded in experience (i.e., 
observation of phenomena). One such standard is the testimony 
principle, that other things being equal, if someone tells you 
that p, then probably p. This principle is subsequently 
qualified on the basis of future evidence and onels own 
observations. We tend to give higher probabilities to our own 
observations. In addition, there is the inductive standard of 
authority, that qenerally speaking, we believe what we are 
told on authority." But beliefs based on testimony and 
(when it is possible) beliefs based on authority are typically 
qualified by later attempts to investigation the evidence on 
one's own. 
44I bid., 38-42. 
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Swinburne's point is that a person's inductive 
principles are his beliefs (whether explicit or not) about 
what makes what probable. Inductive principles, to some 
extent, may represent the psycholoqical states and personal 
preferences of the coqnizer. This is important to Swinburne's 
model of rationality and justification, since, like basic 
beliefs, one's inductive standards usually give rise to other 
beliefs that one finds probable by the evidence. 4S 
The relation among a cognizer's beliefs and the degree 
to which such a relation counts as evidence with respect to 
epistemic probability is primarily a doxastic relation (i.e., 
solely on the grounds of other propositions which he 
believes), but it can also involve other non-doxastic states 
as well. 46 Part of a cognizer's evidence, then, consists of 
the set of propositions that are basic for that person. Basic 
propositions are propositions which seem to be true to a 
person and which that person is inclined to believe, but not 
solely on the ground that they are made probable by other 
propositions which he believes. 47 Reports of a 
person's perceptions ("I see a clock") or what a coqnizer 
perceives ("the clock reads 5.10"), or a coqnizer's memories 
("I remember going to London yesterday") or what a cognizer 
remembers (liit rained in London yesterday") are examples of a 
4SI bid., 44. 
46I bid. 
4'Ibid., 20. 
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person's basic propositions. Swinburne points out that a 
person is inclined to hold such basic beliefs simply because 
he is inclined to believe that they are forced upon him by his 
experience of the world. 
Swinburne's notion of basic belief, however, differs 
from that of classical foundational ism, since his idea of a 
basic belief is not necessarily one that requires no further 
justification or is indubitable. He writes: 
In terming all such propositions basic I do not mean to 
imply either that they are known infallibly (i.e., without 
the possibility of error) or that they are known 
incorrigibly (i.e., without the possibility of the subject 
subsequently rationally believing that he has been in 
error about them) or that they are known at all. On the 
contrary, the subject will have different degrees of 
confidence in them (i.e. he ascribes to them different 
degrees of prior probability).48 
Much like what counts as evidence for determining the 
probability of explanatory hypotheses, a person's reasons for 
initially holding some basic propositions with a certain 
degree of confidence is because "his experiences have been 
such that it seems to him to be probable to that degree. 1I49 
A cognizer's evidence, then, consists of the set of basic 
propositions which report what he is initially inclined to 
believe, together with the degree of prior probability or 
initial confidence he has in them. so 
48I bid. 
49I bid. 
SOIbid., 20-1. Swinburne is aware of the manner in 
which his system differs from strong foundationalism. He 
writes, liThe view that a man's system of beliefs must 
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According to Swinburne, then, it is this kind of 
evidence that allows a basic proposition to acquire the status 
of a belief (and ultimately a basic belief) unless it is 
rendered improbable by other basic beliefs to which a person 
holds. 51 Most basic propositions acquire the status of 
beliefs, but some do not. Swinburne writes: 
The greater the prior probability of basic propositions p, 
and the qreater the conditional probability of a further 
proposition q on the basic propositions p (i.e. the 
probability that if p then q), the qreater the resultant 
probability of the further proposition. In so far as the 
subject believes that the prior and conditional 
ultimately be justified by their being made probable by some 
basic set of beliefs which just seem (on qrounds of experience 
or reason) to the man to be so, is usually called 
Foundationalism. The alternative is the view that each of a 
man's beliefs might be justified solely by being made probable 
by some other belief, and so there could be 'an infinite 
regress of justification, or justification in a circle (e.g. 
belief A by belief B, belief B by belief C, and belief C by 
belief A). I do not find it coherent to suppose that each of a 
man's beliefs could be justified only by some other 
belief .... I assume only that in practice for humans things 
are not like this. Human beliefs find their foundation in 
beliefs whose justification is not solely in terms of other 
beliefs. Those called foundationalists often hold that basic 
propositions are incorrigible; as I say, I am not claiming 
that" (20-21, n.3.). 
51William Alston has suggested that swinburne at this 
point may be too relaxed in his standards for rationality. See 
also, William P. Alston, "Swinburne on Faith and Belief," in 
Reason and the Christian Religion: Essays in Honour of Richard 
SWinburne, ed. Alan G. Padgett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), 23, n. 3. Alston thinks (contra Swinburne) that people 
often hold propositions or beliefs, even when rendered 
improbable by one's set of basic beliefs. Alston thinks that 
we are closer to an acceptable definition if Swinburne's 
phrase, "unless other of a man's basic beliefs render it 
improbable" is replaced with "unless the person sees that 
other of his basic beliefs render it improbable." 
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probabilities are great, the more probable he will believe 
the further proposition to be. 52 
So what is notable about Swinburne's criterion for basicality, 
then, is his qualification that the person is not inclined to 
believe the proposition solely on the grounds that it is made 
probable by other propositions the person believes. The 
proposition might be believed, in part, because of its support 
from other beliefs or cognitive states. As such, as Alston 
has pointed out, Swinburne's suggestion that many different 
forms of perceptual beliefs may count as basic should be 
understood as being compatible with the view that those 
beliefs are partly based on other background beliefs, so long 
as there is at least some non-doxastic basis (e.g., 
experience) somewhere in the picture. 53 
While it is clear that Swinburne's examples of basic 
propositions include both doxastic and non-doxastic evidence, 
it is always a question of prior probability as to whether a 
proposition gains the status of belief, and such prior 
probability largely influences the assessment of the overall 
evidence available to a person at any given time. I may, for 
example, have a certain experience in my room one night which 
initially causes me to form the basic proposition that I saw a 
ghost. But my evidence of what I have read and been told 
about the kinds of things that are in the world may ultimately 
52I bid., 20-1. 
53Alston, 23. 
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make such a proposition very unlikely to me. consequently, I 
do not in fact come to believe what seemed to me, on the 
evidence of my senses at the time, to be the case. 54 
HOw, then, does one go about assessing a belief's 
probability with respect to the additional evidence at one's 
disposal? Swinburne admits that there is no austere manner in 
which he believes a person typically considers how certain 
evidence could count for or against the probability of a given 
belief. People do not tend to make very explicit calculations 
in holding their ordinary beliefs: 
Normally for example men do not consider directly whether 
their evidence makes some proposition probable (or rules 
out some would-be basic belief), but only whether their 
other beliefs do this, but this is on the assumption 
(which can be questioned), that those other beliefs are 
rendered probable by evidence. 55 
Swinburne further recognizes that, should a person be 
cognizant of the reasons why his evidence makes a given 
proposition probable, this does not necessarily imply that 
such a person could at the same time state explicitly the 
inductive standards (i.e., standards for how one proposition 
is made probable by another) which are being used. 
In addition to the question of prior probability and 
evidence for a belief, Swinburne contends that there are no 
restrictions on the kinds of propositions which can function 
as basic. Basic propositions may include ordinary reports of 
54swinburne, Faith and Reason, 21. 
55I bid., 21-22. 
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things perceived and remembered, but they may also involve a 
person's hunches and intuitions that are thought to be 
justified (in terms of reasons that the cognizer thinks are 
true) by the experiences to which that person has been 
subjected but cannot justify in terms of propositions. This 
is important to Swinburne's model of rationality, since he 
follows a form of epistemic structure in which we use basic 
propositions to reason to other justified beliefs. 
Furthermore, argues Swinburne, a person may be rational for 
holding a belief in a proposition even if the evidence for it 
changes or is eclipsed over a period of time. 56 This is so 
not by way of one's subjective certainty (i.e., to be strongly 
convinced that a belief is right apart from good evidence), 
but by way of memory (or some other cognitive state) of which 
he is aware. 
Swinburne's claim for what makes one rational in 
holding a belief (i.e., that a man believes p if and only if 
he believes that his total evidence makes p more probable than 
any alternative) does not rule out the possibility of being 
rational for holding to certain beliefs for which a person 
cannot cite public evidence. This is not to say that a 
person's reasons for holding a belief can be arbitrary, or 
that his reasons can exclude any kind of evidence, but rather, 
56Ibid., 22. I may remember, for example, that some 
past investigation of historical evidence or arguments (which 
I no longer can recall in detail) gave me good reason to 
believe that Washington did not chop down the cherry tree. 
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it is that a person may be considered rational at the point in 
which he is convinced that his belief has not been overruled 
by any further evidence. Swinburne thinks that such beliefs 
help to provide a rational framework in which certain kinds of 
beIief can be thought of in terms of the different kinds of 
evidence and degrees of probability by which they are 
supported. 57 This offers further insights into Swinburne's 
model of rationality and his arguments for the various levels 
of rationality upon which rational beliefs are based. On this 
additional qualification, then, his model of rationality 
becomes one in which a belief is rational for a person if that 
person is justified in holding it for epistemological reasons, 
and by epistemolgical reasons he has in mind primarily the 
likelihood (or probability) of the belief being true. 58 
By restricting a person's evidence at this point to 
the set of basic propositions for that person, Swinburne seems 
to betray some form of foundationalist structure to his model 
of rationality. A cognizer, for example, holds to a 
proposition that is rendered more likely than its negation, 
not "by evidence that consists, in whole or in part, of 
57I bid., 23. Cf. Alston, 23. Alston believes that this 
statement by Swinburne is a concession to the notion that 
people are not always so rational as to reject a belief when 
it is rendered improbable by the public evidence. The crux of 
the matter is that if a person has enough confidence in the 
truth of a proposition (whether scientific or theistic), then 
the belief will be held even if the rest of that person's 
beliefs make it improbable. 
58Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 45; Cf., also, Alston, 
29-30. 
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propositions that themselves are believed solely on the basis 
of further evidence, .. S9 but on the basis of evidence that 
seems to have privileged status (i.e., the belief that one's 
basic propositions are likely true) for that person. 
Coherentism in knowledge (i.e., the notion that one 
proposition is supported by evidence from other propositions 
possessing no particularly privileged status) does not seem to 
be an option for Swinburne. William Alston, for example, sees 
swinburne's restriction of evidence to basic propositions as 
reflecting a foundationalist assumption "that the support for 
all non-basic beliefs can ultimately be traced back to basic 
beliefs ... 60 
swinburne admits that there is a sense in which 
privileged status is granted to certain propositions once they 
have become beliefs for a person. He writes: 
Once a proposition (e.g. 'there are no such things as 
ghosts') is admitted into the belief-corpus, it plays its 
part in promoting further beliefs, without the extent of 
its own evidential support very often being brought 
explicitly into question. 61 
Alston understands this commitment by Swinburne to be a form 
of psychological foundationalism, which claims that all 
S9Al s ton, 23. 
60Ibid., 24. 
61swinburne, Faith and Reason, 22. 
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non-basic beliefs are based, directly or indirectly, on basic 
beliefs. 62 Alston states that psycholoqical 
foundationalism, unlike stronger forms of epistemic 
foundationalism, is not so much concerned with the evidence 
one has in support of beliefs that are thought to be 
indubitable; rather, it is simply a commitment that one has 
toward a particular proposition, whether such a commitment is 
based, at least in part, upon other propositional evidence or 
beliefs that a person has, or whether such evidence is based 
solely upon something that seems incorrigible to that person. 
So, psychologically speaking, one's basic beliefs can 
take on an incorrigible quality once one becomes convinced 
that they are true. While there may be a level of certainty 
based on appropiate evidence, there is also the sense in which 
Swinburne seems to admit that one's basic beliefs can be held 
without an appeal to propositional evidence or arguments, and 
they may be held with a sort of psychological incorrigibility. 
This is not to say that one has basic beliefs for no reason 
(in terms of some reason-based conception of justification), 
but that such reasons (e.g., reasons based on authority or 
testimony) seem rather clear and are typically not questioned 
by the one holding them unless evidence to the contrary 
becomes overwhelming. This, as we will see, represents a 
significant shift away from the system of epistemic 
62Al s ton, 24. Cf., also, Robert Audi, "Psychological 
Foundationalism," The Monist 62 (l978): 592-610. 
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foundationalism in which it is argued that in order to be 
jus~ified a non-basic belief must be based ultimately on basic 
beliefs that are thouqht to be sel~-evident, evident to the 
senses, incorriqible or indubitable. 63 
It is Swinburne's contention, then, that his formula 
for the prior probability of ordinary beliefs is equally 
applicable to theistic belief, even should a person admit at 
the outset that the public evidence seems to count aqainst 
that belief. He writes of the person holdinq to theistic 
belief: 
He must claim either that the public evidence has been 
wrongly assessed or that he has private evidence. He may 
claim that while at first sight it looks as if the various 
arguments do not render probable the existence of God, in 
fact their force has not been appreciated by the public or 
that there is public evidence which others have not 
noticed, which does render probable the existence of 
God. 64 
So even an appeal to private evidence (e.q., prophetic 
visions) can be rational if a cognizer is claiming that his 
theistic belief is based on reasons or evidence similar to the 
awareness people have of material objects. But such an 
admission on Swinburne's part does not suqqest that the theist 
(or any person) could rationally believe a proposition if the 
public evidence has clearly rendered it improbable and the 
theist acknowledqes that there is no other form of evidence. 
63Al s ton., 24. This would appear consistent with 
Swinburne's attempts to direct the evidence for theism away 
from deductive arquments to the more probable evidence of 
inductive reasoninq. 
64Swinburne, "Faith and Reason," 23. 
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Belief is Involuntary 
Swinburne states that if his argument is correct up to 
this point, then a person believes that p if and only if he 
believes that the total evidence available to that person 
makes p more probable than any alternative. The implications 
of his system, then, are that a person's beliefs are a 
function of his basic propositions (and the degree of 
confidence placed in them) and his inductive standards (i.e., 
the way that one goes about evaluating the evidence). But 
Swinburne suggests that such a process is not wholly cognitive 
and must include the additional element of certain features 
that are involuntary to the knowing subject. He writes: 
If his beliefs were to be under his voluntary control, 
then either his basic propositions and the degree of his 
confidence in them, or his inductive standards, would have 
to be under his voluntary control. Yet our reason for 
trusting our basic propositions is our conviction that 
they are formed by outside factors independently of our 
will. If I were to control at will my basic propositions 
and the degree of my confidence in them, I would know that 
I would; and hence I would know that whether a proposition 
was among my basic propositions was not determined or even 
influenced by whether what it reported was the case. 65 
Swinburne's remarks at this point seem consistent with his 
attempts to demonstrate a correlation between the inductive 
attitude toward scientific hypotheses and the hypothesis of 
theism. In fact, it is precisely because certain inductive 
standards (i.e., the procedures one uses to determine what 
counts as evidence for a proposition and to what extent) are 
65 I bid., 25. 
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not under the control of my will that they seem to me to be 
intuitively right and I utimately trust that the resultant 
beliefs indicate how things are. Theistic belief, then, must 
conform to no less a rational obligation. The theist cannot 
adopt standards which allow the evidence to count for a belief 
for volitional reasons rather than through a more objective 
(i.e., probable) process; otherwise, argues Swinburne, one 
would know that one had no rational basis for trusting the 
resultant belief and would consequently not really believe 
it. 66 
Furthermore, there is some indication here that 
Swinburne is accounting for objective and subjective 
distinctions in his model of rationality. He alludes to 
certain notions of realism and truth that appear somewhat 
consistent with the established views of scientific realism. 
Realism, for example, expresses the general view that material 
objects exist externally to us and independently of our sense 
experience. 67 And we mean by truth the basic idea of 
correspondence in which, as Micheal Devitt expresses it, "a 
sentence is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts 
(or to reality).,,68 Scientific realism, then, is the basic 
view that good scientific theories are rational (in that such 
66Ibid., 26. 
67see , for example, Encylopedia of Philosophy, 1967 
ed., s.v. "Realism" by R. J. Hirst. 
680evitt, Realism and Truth, 27. 
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theories are true, or at least approximately true, 
descriptions of the world). 
It is, nevertheless, Swinburne's contention that, 
while a person may not be able to chanqe her beliefs at will, 
she is at least in an episteaic position to chanqe them over a 
period of time. We are clearly aware that additional evidence 
may lead to a chanqe of beliefs. Certainly it is not 
difficult to see that a person can cUltivate a belief by 
lookinq selectively for favorable evidence; one could, for 
example, consider the evidential force of certain evidence, 
while delibertly rejectinq other potentially available 
evidence. I may even become convinced that I need to chanqe 
my inductive standards to those more suitable to the evidence. 
But, as Swinburne has indicated, at any point our beliefs are 
dependent on the view of the evidence we have at the time, and 
it is only when the process of chanqinq beliefs is a lonq and 
arduous one that we can be convinced that what the evidence 
supports does not depend on our will, but rather on the 
evidence itself. 69 
Degrees of Rational Belief 
As we have indicated above, Swinburne's notion of 
rational belief is one of epistemic probability. But it is 
also Swinburne's contention that the concept of rationality is 
ambiqious, and the question of how far it is incumbent on a 
69Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 26. 
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person to hold only rational beliefs depends, in larqe part, 
on the different kinds of evidence which are offered in 
support of different beliefs, toqether with the different ways 
in which such evidence is treated. In Swinburne's estimation, 
there are various ways in which evidence relates to a belief 
that make that belief rational (includinq different deqrees of 
rationality).70 His model of rationality is based in part 
on his notion of justification. A person is rational (and 
hence justified) in holdinq a belief if the reasons he 
provides for that belief (i.e., its justification) are reasons 
which he thinks support the likelihood of that belief beinq 
true. 
This is not to say that all of one's evidential 
support (or reasons) for a belief must be propositional 
evidence (e.q., the non-propositional belief that one is 
having an experience of being appeared to treely), but it does 
attempt to limit justification to the matter of providinq 
one's reasons for a belief, so lonq as those reasons describe 
what one thinks likely shows that belief is true. To be sure, 
there are various reasons why a person may hold a belief 
(e.g., it offers peace of mind, or it qives one a sense of 
purpose), but epistemological reasons are the only reasons 
which deal with the matter of rationality and 
justification. 71 
70I bid., 33. 
71swinburne, Faith and Reason, 45. 
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swinburne argues, then, that there are various 
possible levels of rationality or justification which attempt 
to account for the relation between one's reasons for a belief 
and the likelihood of that belief's truthfulness on evidence. 
In doing so, Swinburne is arguing for a model of rationality 
in which a distinction is made between a belief which a person 
has verified as true and a belief for which there are rational 
reasons that support it, even though it may ultimately prove 
false. 72 Thus, as Alston has correctly observed, a close 
examination of Swinburne's description of the different kinds 
of rationality should reveal that "the dominant direction in 
this list is toward greater objectivity and greater critical 
reflective validation." 73 
RationalitYl requires only that probability is 
relative to SiS evidence and inductive standards. A subject, 
for example, must believe that he holds at least to a 
rational1 belief if he is to hold to any kind of rational 
belief, even though that belief may ultimatley fail to be 
rational1 • Swinburne states that "a failure in respect of 
rationalitYl is a failure of internal coherence in a subject's 
system of beliefs, a failure of which the subject is 
72 I bid., 45-54. See also, Alston, "Swinburne on Faith 
and Reason," 30. Swinburne, for example, has in aind the fact 
that the average man of the first century A.D. held a rational 
but false belief that the earth was stationary. 
73Al s ton, "Swinburne of Faith and Reason," 30. 
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unaware. n74 This represents a low level of truth or 
epistemological reasons (i.e., getting at or verifyinq the 
truth). 
RationalitY2' on the other hand, requires the 
additional element that the evidence consists of justified 
beliefs (i.e., reasons he thinks are true and arque for a 
belief's likelihood of truth) and that a person's inductive 
standards be the correct ones. Swinburne arques that in order 
for a person to have a rationa12 belief, that belief must be 
grounded in those initial propositions which his present 
experiences (and memories of his past experiences) justify him 
in holding. Rationa12 beliefs are also based on prior 
propositions which a person is justified in holding for qood 
epistemoloqical reasons and correct inductive standards. But 
rationa12 beliefs can also find initial support in 
epistemological reasons that a person may ultimately come to 
deny. A person, for example, can fail to have a rationa12 
belief if the reasons for holding that belief are based on 
initial propositions which the person is not justified in 
holdinq.75 Of course, it's important to point out that a 
74swinburne, Faith and Reason, 45 and 46. 
75I bid., 46. Swinburne notes, for example, that a 
rationa12 belief could ultimately fail if a person claimed to 
have some type of telepathic experience when no conscious 
experience could justify it, or claimed to have seen a UFO in 
a context in which his sensations could justify him only in 
claiminq that he had seen a light. In addition, a person may 
fail to have a rational, claim if it is based on initial 
propositions about which one is overly-confident. On the other 
hand, one may fail to have a rationa12 claim if it is not 
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person who initially has a rational2 belief does not expect 
that belief to be false. 
R3 , R4 , and Rs differ from the first two in that a 
person interactinq with these kinds of rationality is claimed 
by Swinburne to have enqaqed in a critical examination of the 
evidence (alonq with the inductive standards employed aqainst 
the beliefs in review) and concluded in favor of the belief's 
leqitimacy (i.e., its likely probability of beinq true or 
confirminq the evidence). Swinburne contends that a person 
has a rational3 belief if, in that person's opinion, the 
checkinq of the evidence and standards was adequate. Adequate 
investiqation is one in which the objective is the securinq of 
true beliefs. But a belief can fail to be rational3 if there 
is, as Swinburne expresses it, "a culpable failure, of which 
the person is unaware, to collect enouqh true, representative, 
and relevant evidence of qood quality.n76 But it is only 
irrationality (in the sense of rational3) which Swinburne 
based on initial propositions which a person, qiven one's 
experiences, ouqht to hold. 
76I bid., 50. Swinburne indicates that the rationality 
of a belief should result from adequate investiqation has real 
siqnificance only in instances where a person (qiven a 
rational3 belief) believes it important that he should have a 
correct belief on the matter. For example, my belief that the 
distance between Chicaqo and Detroit is 300 miles may be one 
which does not concern me in any critical way. I may 
determine, then, that a brief look at a map may be sufficient 
for my objective. On the other hand, there are some beliefs 
for which the matter of their truth is important to me (e.q., 
my belief that a device I installed in my computer is the 
riqht device for carryinq out the function for which I believe 
it was desiqned). 
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believes is culpable irrationality, since it results from a 
person's neglecting investigative procedures which that person 
recognizes ought to be pursued. 77 On the other hand, the 
failure to investigate the truth of a proposition may be 
excusable if a person strongly believes that no amount of 
investigation will change its probability on evidence. In 
such a case, it would not be irrational3 for a person not to 
investigate its truth. That is, if a person has good reasons 
(based on that person's view of its prior probability, for 
example) to believe that a further investigation will have no 
effect on showing how likely a proposition is to be true, it 
is rationally excusable that a person not investigate it. 78 
swinburne arques that rationalitY3 and rationalitY4 
center on a person's own outlook with respect to whether or 
not a belief is supported by adequate investigation. One's 
rational4 beliefs go further than rational3 in requiring that 
the checking of a belief be adequate by a person's own 
standards for such investigation. But as Swinburne has noted, 
such a process is not always so easy to perform. A coqnizer 
can easily be blind to the need for an investigation of the 
evidence. A person may also think that an investigation of 
the evidence has been sufficient by his own standards. 79 
77 I bid., 54. 
78I bid., 52. 
79I bid., 53. 
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And as swinburne goes on to suggest, this is why a 
fifth kind of rationality is required. In the final analysis, 
we arrive at the highest level of probability for a belief 
only when we subject a belief to rationals investigation. 
Swinburne thinks rationals beliefs are least dependent on a 
person's subjective beliefs about it. Rationalitys is 
assigned to a belief only when the checking of that belief 
has, in fact, been adequate (i.e., if it has been verified on 
evidence that the belief in question is a true belief).80 A 
rationals belief, then, is one which is based on the 
probability of the evidence for that belief and is least 
dependent on a person's beliefs about it. But the whole point 
of subjecting a belief to a rationals investigation is to 
provide a person with reasons which make that belief not just 
fairly probable, but very probable. 8l This being the case, 
a person holding to a belief with any kind of rationality from 
rationality! to rationalitys is considered rational, even 
though rationals beliefs are said to be more likely true (for 
evidential reasons) than rationall beliefs. 
The Rationality of Religious Beliefs 
Swinburne has argued up to this point that there may 
be differences between (1) the kinds of evidences that people 
have for certain beliefs, (2) the various inductive standards 
80Alston, "Swinburne on Faith and Reason," 30-31. 
8lSwinburne, Faith and Reason, 54. 
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which they employ to hold their beliefs, and (3) the 
distinctive kinds of rationality involved in justifying their 
beliefs. That is, ultimately the rules and procedures that 
one employs for determining the probability (and rationality) 
of theistic belief on evidence should be no different than 
those he uses for other beliefs. 82 But with respect to the 
rationality of religious beliefs, rationalitY3 is the only 
kind of rationality for which Swinburne believes a person can 
be held to task. For that is the only kind of rationality 
which he has argued is genuinely under a person's control. 
Where it may be true that a person cannot help having the 
beliefs that he has at any given moment (i.e., if the belief 
and the reasons why one holds it is a passive matter), he can 
be held to task for not doing something about his beliefs over 
a period of time. For a person can always investigate a 
belief to a more adequate extent, or gather more evidence 
relevant to a given belief, especially the more likely a 
belief is to be challeged in terms of its truth. 83 
The remaining kinds of rational belief apparently, in 
Swinburne's estimation, do not appear to pose the same threat 
against the rationality of theistic belief as do rational3 
beliefs. He writes: 
Irrationality in senses (4) and (5) are [sic] a matter of 
objective discrepancy between the subject's actual 
investigative procedures and either those which he 
82swinburne, Faith and Reason, 55. 
83I bid., 72. 
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normally recognizes or really adequate investigative 
procedures; but in so far as the subject does not 
recoqnize these discrepancies, no blame attaches to his 
conduct. Irrationality in senses (1) and (2) arises from 
a failure to recoqnize certain things at the time in 
question--discrepancies within the class of the subject's 
beliefs in the case of irrationality (1), and unjustified 
evidence and incorrect standards in the case of 
irrationality (2).84 
But as Swinburne contends, a person interacting at these 
levels can hardly be rationally culpable. For either a person 
recognizes such discrepancies at the time or he does not. And 
if, as Swinburne further contends, recoqnizing is coming to 
believe (and belief is initially involuntary), then a person 
is not rationally culpable for what he initially believes (or 
recognizes that he believes), but only for what he ultimately 
fails to investigate with respect to the belief in question. 
To understand more completely Swinburne's application 
of rationality to theistic belief, it is helpful to recall 
briefly the various distinctions he made with respect to the 
different kinds of rationality possible. He writes: 
A man's beliefs are rationall if and only if, given his 
evidence, they are rendered probable on his own inductive 
standards. A man's belief that p is irrational l when he has failed to draw the conclusion, using his general 
inductive beliefs, that his evidence does not make p 
probable. So when we see what a man's evidence and 
inductive standards are, we can conclude with respect to 
his religious beliefs that they do or do not follow from 
his evidence, in accordance with those standards. 8S 
Swinburne's point with respect to rationalitYl' then, is that 
we may find (after considering a person's inductive behaviour) 
84I bid., 54. 
8SI bid., 63. 
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that such a person is using different inductive standards for 
evaluating the evidence for theistic propositions than he does 
elsewhere. Swinburne states that if this is the case, then we 
could conclude that either none of that person's judgements 
about theism are rationall' or that he has one set of 
inductive standards for arguing about mundane matters and 
another set for arguing about theistic concerns, and that 
there is nothing irrational1 in this. But it may be, argues 
Swinburne, that both cases are possible. It could be the 
latter case if a person acknowledged the use of different 
standards, and was consistent in the use of them, such that 
his arguments about religion are never infected by normal 
standards. 86 If a person claimed, for example, that the 
only test for a theistic claim was what was written in the 
Bible and never attempted to justify this claim through the 
use of other inductive standards (e.g., never tried to argue 
that archaeology corroborates the truthfulness of the Bible), 
then it would seem that such a person is usinq one set of 
inductive standards for theistic claims and another for claims 
outside of theism. In such a case, argues Swinburne, it would 
be wrong to accuse that person of being irrationall • There 
would be a coherence about this way of arguinq, even if we do 
not prefer such methods ourselves. On the other hand, if a 
person makes no clear distinction about the application of his 
inductive standards, but seems to apply them inconsistently to 
86 bOd I ~ ., 63. 
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theistic claims and mundane matters alike, then it would seem 
that we could not assign rationalitYl to his beliefs about 
theism. 87 swinburne next argues that we cannot accuse a 
person of holdinq beliefs which are irrational2 unless we 
aqree in advance what makes a belief probable (i.e., the prior 
and posterior probability of the belief on evidence, toqether 
with the procedures one uses for evaluatinq the evidence). 
Once aqain, rationalitY2 beliefs draw on a qreater deqree of 
the evidence available to a person at the time of his belief. 
Swinburne writes: 
A man's belief is rational2 if and only if it is in fact 
rendered probable by his evidence, and his evidence 
consists of basic propositions which he is justified in 
holdinq with the degree of confidence with which he holds 
them. 8 S" 
So if a person is to be accused of irrational2 belief, it can 
only properly take place, argues swinburne, "by extrapolatinq 
from the most particular judqements which we make and then 
seeinq whether we are prepared to stick by any particular 
judqements which do not conform to the resulting 
standards. 1189 It may be that the inductive standards we 
extrapolate from our judgements in disciplines outside of 
theism (which we make sufficiently qeneral to have application 
to theistic belief) end up yieldinq different judgements about 
theistic claims from those which we are initially inclined to 
87I bid. 
88I bid. 
89I bid., 64. 
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make. That being the case, we might conclude that those 
standards require us to see the existence of the universe as 
evidence for theism, even though we were inclined to think 
otherwise at the start. Or it could equally well be the 
converse. Whatever way it is, argues Swinburne, we have to 
reflect what seems intuitively most obvious. Those standards 
come from our particular judgements in the religious field, or 
the general standards extrapolated from other fields. The 
point is that we will have to modify our account of the true 
inductive standards accordingly.90 
swinburne acknowledges that the task of discovering 
the true inductive standards is a process that involves the 
consideration of a wide number of possible alternative sets of 
principles which a person must test against his own 
intuitions. Such is the work of confirmation theory, and it 
is Swinburne's contention that we will eventually be able to 
codify our inductive standards, since he is convinced that 
such standards are implicit in most of the judgements which we 
make and which seem to be intuitively correct to us. 91 
But as Swinburne further reminds us, the rationalitY2 
of a person's beliefs involves more than just using correct 
inductive standards; it also involves evidence consisting of 
basic propositions which one is justified in holding to the 
degree of confidence with which one holds them. This, as we 
90I bid. 
91I bid., 64-5 
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may recall, involves the element of truth, that is, whether a 
person's justification of a belief is based on reasons (i.e., 
testimony, authority, mental states, or other evidence or 
arguments) that a person thinks are true and make it more 
likely than not that a belief is true. Such evidence consists 
of prior propositions and initial propositions. Swinburne 
remarks: 
[A person] is justified in believing prior propositions if 
they seem to him to be true, intuitively, on qrounds of 
reason, and if he is not too hasty in making such a 
judgement •••• If a man's beliefs are based on initial 
beliefs that someone has told him so-and-so or that he has 
seen so-and-so, his sensations toqether with his memories 
of past e~eriences have to justify the initial 
beliefs. 92 
Thus, with respect to a prior belief, Swinburne arques that if 
a person's theistic belief is grounded in an ontoloqical 
argument, the premises of that argument must be ones which 
seem evident to that person and on which that person has given 
sufficient reflection (although we may disaqree with respect 
to the amount of reflection that is necessary) to determine if 
there is any possible way in which they could be false. 
Initial beliefs, on the other hand, may seem initially 
reliable (e.g., that one is seeing a UFO or a man walking on 
water), but over the course of time a person can investigate 
whether the judgments he initially makes tend ultimately to be 
correct or turn out false. The success or failure of his 
92 I bid., 65. 
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judgments can be used to determine the justifibility of his 
past initial propositions. 93 
It is Swinburne's conviction that the extent to which 
a person accepts those basic propositions which he believes 
his experience justifies him in believinq (and thereby comes 
to hold further propositions which are warranted on the basis 
of his basic propositions and true inductive standards), makes 
his beliefs rational2' Since a person's evidence for 
rational2 beliefs will include his basic propositions, some 
claim that their evidence makes it probable that theism is 
true, and some claim that the evidence makes it probable that 
theistic belief is a false description of the world. And as 
Swinburne further asserts, the most controversial issue in 
dealing with rational2 beliefs has to do with the manner in 
which any individual piece of evidence or all of a person's 
evidence put together (along with true inductive standards) 
renders it probable that claims of theistic belief are 
true. 94 
The level of potential inadequacy in rational1 and 
rational2 beliefs for rational theistic belief forces 
Swinburne to turn his attention to rational3' rational4' 
and rationals beliefs, which, as it might be remembered, 
deal with the matter of belief being backed up by adequate 
earlier investigation. He states: 
93Ibid. 
94I bid., 66. 
199 
A belief is rational3 , you will recall, if it is based on 
evidence resulting from investigation which was in the 
subject's view adequate and the subject has subjected his 
inductive standards to criticism which was in his view 
adequate, and checked in his view adequately that by them 
his belief was rendered probable by his evidence. 95 
Crucial to rational3 beliefs is Swinburne's notion that what 
constitutes adequate investigation depends on a person's 
belief at earlier times about (1) the probability of 
investigation affecting the probability of the conclusion, 
(2) one's belief about the importance of holding a true belief 
about the hypothesis, and (3) one's belief about the 
importance of the belief in general (i.e., when a person 
thinks it is important to have a correct belief on the 
matter).96 According to rational3 beliefs, a person's 
religious beliefs are automatically rational3 at any point in 
which that person is objectively certain about the truth of 
those beliefs (i.e., he has good reason to think that all the 
appropriate evidence has been marshalled in favor of the 
belief). If he is objectively certain, then no further 
investigation is required. For to be objectively certain is 
to know that all the available evidence for a believe has been 
properly considered and evaluated. A person in this situation 
would have no further rational obligation to investigate their 
truth. On the other hand, should that person consider his 
religious beliefs at any time to be dubious or only fairly 
95I bid. 
96I bid. 
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probable, then, for his beliefs to be rational), be bas a 
rational obligation to investigate them. There can be at 
least two reasons for this: first, it may be a result of a 
person's subjective certainty, and has to do with that 
person's level of conviction that a belief is either true or 
false, possibly despite what the evidence would seem to 
suggest. Second, it may have to deal with a person's 
knowledge that the objective case he's previously made is not 
as good as it might be. But, as Swinburne has earlier 
indicated, it is only by investigation that a person has any 
chance of acquiring beliefs which are very probable. 97 
swinburne argues that the matter of knowing when 
investigation is required and how much investigation is needed 
for a rational) religious belief is a complex issue. People 
will come to different conclusions in this regard. swinburne 
explains: 
How a man investigates an issue depends on what he already 
knows about the field and, in particular • • • on his 
beliefs about who are the authorities in the field • • • • 
There are fields and cultures where a man has no idea 
bow to set about investigating further the answer to some 
question. I so interpret my definition of rationalitYJ 
that in that case a man's belief, even though he does not 
believe that it has a probability close to 1 and even 
though he has done no investigating, is still rationalJ • 
In one way the man does not believe that his investigation 
has been adequate-- for there is more which he believes 
ought to be done; but in another way he does believe that 
the investigation has been adequate--for he has done all 
that he can. Since the definition of rationality! was 
designed to pick out the rationality which lies w thin a 
97 I bid., 66-7. 
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man's powers to achieve, I shall say that in such a case a 
man's beliefs are rational3.98 
Swinburne's point is that one may approach the rationality of 
religious beliefs along similar lines. A person may believe 
on balance that there is a God and yet have no idea how he 
might pursue a further investigation of theistic claims. 
Initially, then, his belief would qualify as a rational3 
belief. But it is only a matter of time before such a person 
would come to learn that the subject of God's existence is a 
disputed one, and in order to continue holding a rational3 
belief, he would be required to make further investigation 
into the relevant fields of inquiry. As the evidence begins 
to mount (either for or against his belief), he may need to 
reconsider whether he is justified in believing the basic 
propositions which form the foundation of his re1igious 
beliefs with the degree of confidence he has in them. 99 
Rational3 beliefs, according to Swinburne, allow every 
area of evidence to be openly investigated. A person's 
inductive standards, for example, represent the most critical 
area of further inquiry. Whatever standards a person judges 
98I bid., 67. Swinburne states, for example, that a 
four-year-old boy asking his father about some matter in 
astronomy may be the only authority required at his level of 
inquiry for an adequate investigation of that issue; the 
ten-year-old his science teacher, the sixteen-year-old his 
physics teacher; but a man with a Ph.D. in the field will 
likely seek out a foundation to provide him with a grant to 
study the issue on his own (although he probably takes for 
granted the results published by other physicists). 
99I bid., 67-8. 
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to be correct must be applied honestly to all the evidence at 
one's disposal. The more a person seeks to have rational3 
beliefs about religion, the more likely it is that his beliefs 
will converge with other beliefs. Swinburne believes that 
such a process will result in a greater sharing of evidence 
and a common basis of evidence from which to make valid 
inferences to religious truths. For it is only through a 
rational3 inquiry that a person can expect to obtain rational4 
and rationals beliefs. lOO A rational4 belief is one where a 
person has "by his own standards adequately investigated the 
evidence, his inductive standards, and the force by them of 
his evidence. HlOl And one has a rationals belief, then, 
only in cases where one's inductive standards are standards 
based on objective certainty. rt may be that, even if a 
person follows his own standards, they may ultimately fail to 
be true standards, and, consequently, his beliefs may fail to 
count as rationals beliefs. 
rn the final analysis, Swinburne has provided various 
kinds of rationality that may potentially lead a person to 
rationals religious beliefs. For it is only in relation to 
rationals beliefs that the notion of truth accounts for the 
greatest difference (i.e., one has in fact verified one's 
beliefs as true on evidence). Swinburne argues that we have 
lOorbid., 69-70. 
lOlrbid., 70. 
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objective factors which determine how much investiqation is 
needed to have rationals reliqious beliefs. He writes: 
Beliefs are rationa13 in so far as they are based on 
investiqation which was, in the believer's view, adequate. 
If it matters that I have a rational3 belief on some 
issue, it matters because ensurinq that I have a rational3 
belief is all that I can do towards ensurinq that I have a 
rationals belief. Ensurinq that I have a rationals belief 
is all that I can do towards ensurinq that I have a true 
belief. 102 
And as one may expect, this brings the discussion back to the 
matter of probability. For the rationalitys of a reliqious 
belief depends on how probable the belief is at the start. It 
further depends on how probable it is that posterior evidence 
results in the rational conviction that the belief has in fact 
been verified as true. 
We come full circle, then, in the effort to determine 
the probability of a reliqious belief. Swinburne arques that 
an adequate investiqation for a rationals reliqious belief is 
a function of four thinqs: (1) the importance of the belief in 
the specific field of inquiry; (2) the prior probability of 
the belief apart from any subsequent investigation; (3) the 
posterior probability that an investigation of the belief will 
lead to evidence confirminq the belief; and (4) the deqree to 
which a person thinks it is important to hold a correct belief 
on the matter. These functions for rationals beliefs are 
somewhat consistent with what Swinburne arques is necessary 
for establishing the prior and posterior probability of 
102I bid., 72. 
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theories. And without going into more detail in these areas, 
it should be sufficient to see that swinburne has simply 
argued for a system of justification and rationality that 
intends to allow for increased levels of the likelihood of 
truth as a person moves from rational3 beliefs to rationals 
beliefs. 
Assessment of SWinburne's Hodel of Rationality 
Before we go on to consider some of the more 
positive features of Swinburne's model of rationality for 
theistic belief, it may be helpful to look at some potential 
weaknesses that surface out of his arguments for the 
probability of theories in general. Feinberg has argued that 
Swinburne's use of simplicity as the key criterion to prior 
probability has difficulties. More than one theory can do 
well on the matter of simplicity, and this seems to suggest 
that determining prior probability will likely involve an 
appeal to something other than simplicity, like background 
knowledge. A complex theory, for example, may fit background 
knowledge better than a simple one. 103 Furthermore, argues 
Feinberg, it is difficult to decide what is included in the 
background knowledge for all theories and what is included in 
the evidence for a particular theory. So depending on how a 
cognizer wants to shape the outcome, there can be a certain 
degree of assessing the criteria from a non-public 
l03Feinberg, Evil, 247. 
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(subjective) point of view, either to include information in 
background knowledge in order to increase the prior 
probability or to include information in the evidence that 
will be considered later in calculating posterior probability. 
The point is that calculating the prior and posterior 
probability of a theory depends on all sides aqreeing on where 
the information belongs. But since we can (and sometimes do) 
manipulate the information, it is not clear that people will 
agree on which pieces of information belong to either 
background knowledge or the evidence of posterior 
probability. 104 
In addition, Feinberg indicates that the overall 
probability of a theory does not necessarily depend on trying 
to establish that a theory (e.g., theism) has qreater prior 
probability than any other hypothesis. So long as it is 
established that the prior probability of the theory in 
question is not 0 nor its opponents' 1, a theory can have 
greater probability than its opponents' on the basis of the 
total evidence. As long as the posterior evidence for the 
theory in question makes the theory's probability exceed .5, 
one is within one's epistemic rights to think that the theory 
is more likely true than not. 
So a model of rationality that is going to account for 
enough of the right kind and quality of evidence (i.e., our 
answer to the evidentialist notion of sufficient evidence in 
l04 I bid. 
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terms of indubitability) must be based on the total evidence 
relevant to the theory. If there is the potential to consider 
only one kind of evidence (or somehow manipulate the evidence 
in advance so as to assign any numerical value to represent a 
probability judgment), then the justification of a theory or 
belief (in terms of its likelihood of truth) has the potential 
to be more a reflection of the subjectivity of the assessor 
than a reflection of an objective (fair and unbiased) 
consideration of the appropriate evidence. Probability 
judgments should be persuasive in terms of the evidence and 
arguments that one can marshall for the truth or falsity of 
any theory or belief. Such evidence can be rationally 
convincing enough (i.e., what is meant by objective certainty 
on our proposed model of rationality) to show that one has 
good reasons to think a theory or belief is either true or 
false. That is, in terms of justification, one is then in the 
possible position to attempt to verify a theory or belief as 
true on evidence. Having said this, it is always possible, as 
Feinberg notes, that one may grant the truth of arguments and 
evidence but still find them unconvincing for psychological 
reasons. In such cases, one may deny that the arguments or 
evidence establish the truth of the theory or belief in 
question. lOS Since the goal of Swinburne's system is to 
offer as much evidence as possible in order to argue for the 
probability of theistic belief, it seems necessary to drop the 
lOSIbid., 293. 
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requirement of simplicity as being the must crucial factor in 
determining the probability of a theory (or belief) on 
evidence. 
Having stated the above concerns, Swinburne's 
approach, with few exceptions, is closest to the model of 
rationality I shall propose in chapter five. The features of 
his system attempt to account for the total available evidence 
when considering whether a belief is more likely true than 
not, even though this does not require one to in fact verify a 
belief as true in order to be rational. In addition, his 
degrees of rationality seem to account for greater attempts to 
verify a belief's truthfulness on evidence when possible. 
Furthermore, Swinburne's approach attempts to offer a moderate 
foundationalist structure for rational belief. In such a 
model of rationality, a proposition must be based on evidence 
in the right way.106 Pojman summarizes Swinburne's account 
of rational belief in the following terms: 
Our basic evidence or beliefs are 'initial propositions' 
(sense experience, mental states, and memory reports) and 
'prior propositions' (truths known a priori, such as the 
laws of logic or that '2+2=4'). From these we reason 
deductively or inductively to conclusions. A problem in 
deciding what constitutes rational believing is the fact 
that we differ on inductive standards. Although all 
people reason inductively, we may read the evidence quite 
differently (e.g., the gambler who has just become a 
father of a baby boy may bet on a horse called 'Sonny 
Boy', thinking it an omen).107 
106See Louis P. Pojman, What Can We Know? 90-1. 
107Louis P. Pojman, Religious Belief and the Will, 
(London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 127. 
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As indicated above, Swinburne is optimistic that we can come 
to some agreement on what should count as qenerally relevant 
inductive standards. This means, for Swinburne, that a belief 
(including theistic belief) is rational at the point in which 
a person applies her inductive standards to the available 
evidence. One is rational (in the sense of rationals beliefs) 
in holding a belief that is thought to be true based on one's 
past investiqation in light of true inductive standards. 
There is every indication, then, that Swinburne's 
proqram for rational reliqious belief represents a fallibilist 
position. By fallibilism I mean essentially the epistemic 
position that our properly basic beliefs need not be 
infallible, incorriqible, self-evident, or evident to the 
senses. What is self-evident or properly basic is more 
relative to the individual's perspective than is thouqht to be 
the case in the stronqer forms of foundational ism. The thesis 
of falliblism asserts that, while we may require an epistemic 
structure in which basic beliefs are offered in support of 
non-basic beliefs (where theistic beliefs are considered 
non-basic beliefs), our basic beliefs could turn out to be 
false, although we do not expect them to be false. loa 
On Swinburne's model of ratonality, justification is a 
reason-based conception in which a cognizer may appeal to 
evidence in the form of other basic (or prior) beliefs, one's 
lOSLouis P. Pojman, What Can We Know?, 93-4. Cf., 
Pojman, Religious Belief and the Will, 128. 
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other mental states accepted on the basis of one's experience, 
or one's inductive standards. Alston, however, describes this 
as a form of psychological foundationalism, since it seems to 
include the possibility that a cognizer can infer other 
non-basic beliefs from basic beliefs that are held for 
psychological rather than for evidential reasons. 109 Basic 
(or prior beliefs) are beliefs that a cognizer tends to hold 
for non-evidential reasons. Part of the reason for this is 
found in Swinburne's notion that such beliefs are acquired 
involuntarily. Such involuntary acquisition of beliefs comes 
through hunches, intuitions, and other mental states of which 
the cognizer is both aware and unaware. This seems to raise a 
potential weakness in Swinburne's model, since it would 
suggest that one can hold and infer other non-basic beliefs on 
the basis of basic beliefs that most people would consider 
irrational (e.g., various superstitious and prejudiced 
beliefs). 
Swinburne appears to anticipate these difficulties by 
stating that a basic proposition will be believed (and 
consequently included within the category of one's basic 
beliefs) unless one's other basic beliefs render it 
improbable. There may be evidential reasons (in the form of 
one's other basic beliefs) in which one is not justified in 
holding a given belief as basic. So while it is not typically 
the case that basic beliefs are described in terms of piS 
l09AI s ton, "Swinburne on Faith," 24. 
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being rendered more probable than not (or than any of its 
alternatives) by one's evidence, it is not entirely ruled out 
in advance. 110 Swinburne argues that a cognizer is likely 
to initially hold a basic belief simply because he is inclined 
to believe that it is forced upon him by his experience of the 
world. But as indicated above, he is open to the possibility 
that one's basic belief is not indubitable and may require 
further justification on evidence. In one sense, Swinburne is 
simply admitting that people will not always acquire their 
basic beliefs for the right reasons (i.e., the best available 
evidence and with attempts to verify as true if possible). 
But in another sense, one always has the rational opportunity 
to determine whether a belief is more likely true than not on 
the basis of one's total evidence, including one's other basic 
beliefs. So if propositional evidence (in terms of one's 
basic beliefs) helps to det£rmine the overall probability of 
one's non-basic beliefs, why cannot the same be said for basic 
beliefs as well? It seems that it would involve little effort 
to make this adjustment in Swinburne's system, without 
violating the essential structure of justification for which 
he has argued. We will argue for the criteria to do just this 
in our proposed model of rationality in chapter five. 
But even if we grant this concession, it could be 
argued that Swinburne's program for rationality is even too 
involved and complex to stand as a general account of 
llOIbid., 24-5. 
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non-basic belief. lll Alston has suggested, for example, 
that at the most basic and rudimentary level of cognitive 
thought, people have beliefs about things they encounter in 
their everyday experiences, and it is unlikely that they have 
any beliefs at all about the extent to which various 
propositions are rendered more or less probable by 
evidence. ll2 Alston notes, for example, that he may form 
the non-basic belief that a certain building is not finished, 
based on the (possibly basic) belief that no windows have yet 
been installed on one of its sides: 
Did r form the belief that the proposition that the 
building is not yet finished is rendered more probable 
than some alternative--such as its negation--by my set of 
basic propositions? If so, I regularly carry out such 
doxastic ooerations in a way ideally calculated to escape 
my notice. ll3 
Alston's illustration is in response to Swinburne's idea that, 
even though a person does not make very explicit calculations 
when forming beliefs about comparative probabilities, an 
individual does seem to have the conceptual resources for 
making probability judgements, or one regularly makes use of 
them whenever one comes to accept a non-basic belief. But 
Alston suggests, instead, that it seems entirely possible that 
a person can have a belief that p without having any belief at 
all about the probability of p. So if we eventually come to 
lllIbid. 
ll2r bid. 
ll3Al s ton, 26. 
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the point where one's belief that p is just to believe that p, 
why not do this at the outset, rather than (as Swinburne 
thinks) believing only in comparative probabilLties?114 
But this need not detract from Swinburne's essential 
point on the rationality of beliefs. The probability of a 
belief, on Swinburne's account, is more a matter of evaluating 
the evidence in teras of the likelihood of truth. Swinburne's 
account of degrees of rationality is designed to show that the 
closer one comes to rationalitys, the closer one is to being 
rationally convinced of the probability of a belief as true on 
evidence. To think that a belief is more likely true than not 
is to determine that the total evidence availab1e at the time 
makes it more rationally convincing to accept the belief as 
true than it is to continue doubting it. This is a matter of 
reflecting on the evidence available for a belief, and as 
Swinburne indicates, it is typically a process that takes 
place over a period of time, especially when it is difficult 
to determine what evidence is available relative to a given 
non-basic belief. So while there may be greater degrees of 
comparative probability as one moves closer to rationals 
beliefs, the lower degrees of rationality (i.e., beliefs for 
which one has good reasons to think are true, but has not 
attempted to verify as true) can account for the acceptance of 
non-basic beliefs without one appearing to have probable 
beliefs about them. 
114I bid., 29. 
213 
As indicated above, Swinburne's account of rationality 
attempts to be as close to scientific theorizing as possible. 
But, as we have also noted, SWinburne's account of the 
rationality of a belief based on pos~erlor probability is 
restricted to non-basic beliefs, the only category of belief 
in which Swinburne arques that a person can legitimately 
inquire into the probability of belief on evidence. Basic 
beliefs, among which are included one's initial propositions 
(sense experience, mental states, memory reports, and other 
factors), are either justified or not. 11S Alston writes: 
But, on his account, what renders a basic belief 
justified--that it is held not solely on the basis of 
evidence and that it is not rendered improbable by other 
basic beliefs--certainly has to do with the likelihood of 
the belief's being true. So why restrict the account of 
rationality to non-basic beliefs?116 
But as we have indicated above, Swinburne's rationality model 
can be slightly modified and improved by considering posterior 
evidence in determining the rationality of basic beliefs as 
well. ll7 The point is that, if what Swinburne means by the 
epistemic probability of a proposition is a consideration of 
the evidence in light of one's inductive standards (i.e., the 
way in which one goes about evaluating prior and posterior 
11SAlston, "Swinburne of Faith and Belief," 31. 
116Al s ton, 31. 
117r bid. Cf., Swinburne, Fal~h and Reason, 45. 
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evidence), then there is no qood reason why such a process 
should not work equally well with both basic and non-basic 
beliefs alike. 
Further, Swinburne's account of rationality is always 
restricted to what evidence a cognizer has at the time he is 
considerinq the probability of a belief. SWinburne seems to 
indicate that a coqnizer's available evidence may not always 
be the same thinq as having all the available evidence for 
that belief (with the possible exception of rationals beliefs, 
since such beliefs are said to be rationally convincinq). 
This is another reason for distinquishinq between different 
deqrees of rationality. Swinburne seems to think that one 
can be rational and justified in holdinq non-basic beliefs for 
which the evidence (in terms of the appropriate kind and 
quality for the belief in question) has not been established 
as true, althouqh being rational is always about reasons one 
thinks are true. 
It seems, then, that the primary caution against 
Swinburne's model of rationality has to do with the epistemic 
weight he gives to one's basic beliefs, as well as one's 
inductive standards. This is critical, since he argues for an 
essentially foundational structure in which one's non-basic 
beliefs are justified in part on the basis of both features. 
Swinburne's proqram needs to qive some account for people's 
differing inductive standards if it is to be consistent. 
Similar to our concern about Swinburne's criteria for the 
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prior probability of theories, if there are no aqreed upon 
criteria for why one should or should not accept certain basic 
beliefs (or inductive standards), then one's justification for 
belief is likely to be influenced by factors (e.g., 
psychological) other than what the evidence suggests. And 
this would seem to go against Swinburne's attempts at a model 
of rationality which accounts for the total available 
evidence, including procedures for how one goes about 
inductive reasoning. 
Swinburne argued that one's evidence (including one's 
inductive standards) consists of the set of one's basic 
beliefs (i.e., the beliefs one holds on the basis of prior 
probability or the deqree of initial confidence one has in 
them), a process which Swinburne suggests we normally do not 
associate with investigation of the evidence (especially with 
respect to one's inductive standards). One's perceptual 
beliefs, memory beliefs, or beliefs of experience, as well as 
one's beliefs in self-evident propositions are basic beliefs 
and are either accepted or not accepted. In other words, they 
are not investigated in the normal sense of the term; they are 
either justified or not, independently of the merits of the 
investigative procedures. ll8 But it seems that Swinburne's 
notion of R3 , R4 , and Rs beliefs (as resulting from the 
evidence and with attempts to verify as true if possible) can 
be modified to follow a model of rationality in which all of 
ll8Al s ton, "Swinburne on Faith and Belief," 32. 
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one's beliefs, not just those that are basic for a person, are 
justified on the basis of sufficient evidence. The extent to 
which it is possible to do so is the focus of our next 
chapter. 
Chapter Five 
Toward a Resolution for Rationality 
A Middle Ground synthesis 
rf we are to suqqest a credible model of rationality 
for theistic belief, we must first define what it means to be 
rational and then perhaps qo on to suqqest an epistemic system 
Which, in a rather broad sense, offers the features that are 
best thouqht to satisfy the necessary criteria for 
rationality. The issue of rationality, then, toqether with 
the various features that are essential to it, is our 
fundamental concern in this chapter. Furthermore, with this 
immediate task in mind, it is anticipated that the essential 
features of the proposed model of rationality will open the 
way to an epistemic system for theistic belief which, broadly 
speaking, provides the necessary criteria to either directly 
challenge or else reinforce certain features in the rational 
systems of Murphy, Plantinga, and Swinburne. 
On this basis, then, we may sugqest the following 
model of rationality as having more favorable criteria for 
discerninq whether one is more likely to be rational about 
one's beliefs: There is one sense in which to be rational in 
holdinq a belief, one must hold it on the basis of sufficient 
evidence (i.e., qood reasons, evidence or arguments). 
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Sufficient evidence is evidence offered to show that one does 
have good reasons (i.e., a reason-based conception of 
justification) for one's beliefs, and that those reasons are 
not arbitrary. Furthermore, this sense of rationality 
maintains that it is not rational to hold a belief in the 
absence of sufficient evidence or on the basis of blind faith. 
But there is another sense in which to be rational 
about one's beliefs involves the process of verification, that 
is, attempts to marshall enough of the appropriate kind, 
quality, and amount of evidence so as to be so rationally 
convinced of the truth or certainty of a given belief that one 
can no longer maintain a reasonable doubt. In this sense of 
the term, to be rational about one's beliefs, one is at least 
attempting to be right, and that, while one can be rational 
without verifying (in the sense of marshalling the appropriate 
kind, quality, and amount of evidence) or attempting to verify 
one's beliefs as true (e.g., one can be rational simply by 
offering a reason-based conception of justification for one's 
beliefs), one may be in a position to verify one's beliefs as 
true on the basis of good arguments and evidence. In other 
wordS, there is a sense in which rationality involves a 
reason-based conception of justification which may coincide 
with attempts to establish the truth or certainty of a 
proposition, but it need not. It is not necessary that 
justification presuppose the truth or certainty of a given 
belief (a matter of verification). 
219 
This approach to rationality recognizes that it is too 
high a standard to maintain that one is rational in holding a 
belief only when the cognizer has in fact verified (i.e., 
marshalled the appropriate evidence) that belief as true or 
certain. One may be rational in holding a belief arising out 
of a reason-based conception of justification in which 
sufficient evidence can rest on other beliefs (basic or 
non-basic), or it can rest on mental or perceptual states for 
which the cognizer believes he has good reasons to think are 
true (even if a cognizer makes no attempt to verify his 
beliefs as true, or even if those beliefs, mental states, or 
perceptual states turn out to be false). So long as a 
cognizer holds those beliefs for reasons he thinks are likely 
true (otherwise it is difficult to see how one would count 
them as reasons), he is rational in holding them. In 
addition, it is sUggested that a necessary corollary of this 
model of rationality is that a cognizer should attempt to 
employ adequate methods for collecting and evaluating data 
(evidence or arguments) for one's beliefs in such a way as to 
be fair or unbiased with the data. That is, one can be 
objective (in the sense of being fair and unbiased with the 
data) when considering the evidence for one's beliefs. This 
model of rationality further suggests that the more likely it 
is that others will challenge the truthfulness of a belief 
(due to insufficient or underdetermined evidence), the more 
one is expected to provide evidence for that belief if one is 
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to be rational in holding it (although that evidence need not 
be indubitable or involve conclusive arquments). rt also 
suggests that, given insufficient or underdetermined data, a 
cognizer is more likely to be rational in holding such a 
belief more tentatively. So while our model of rationality 
allows room for the possibility that some of a cognizer's 
beliefs may be provisional on evidence, it does not expect 
this possiblity to be a governing criterion for the 
rationality of one's beliefs. 
Given this model of rationality, we can agree, for 
example, that Murphy's system offers valuable insights for 
improving and revising various problems and difficulties in 
current models of rationality based on classical 
foundationalist approaches to epistemology and correspondence 
theories of truth. But such insights need not imply her 
alternative model of rationality which argues that our beliefs 
and theories (scientific, theistic or otherwise) can at best 
have a tentative status. l 
Isee, for example, Jesse Hobbs, Religious Explanation 
and Scientific Ideology (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 
rnc., 1993) xviii. Hobbs states that Murphy is commendable in 
her attempts to take seriously Kubnian insights on the 
incommensurability of conceptual frameworks and the 
tenativeness of Lakatosian research programs, but he rightly 
questions her position that the criteria for rationality can 
be found in certain core beliefs which are thought to: (a) 
allow one's research program to make adequate theoretical and 
empirical progress; and (b) provide a plan for extending the 
program and defending it against competitors. These criteria 
are insufficient in that satisfying such conditions does not 
necessarily direct itself toward truth and realism in the 
correspondence sense. 
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Plantinga argues that one can have rational belief 
(theistic or otherwise) if that belief is held on the basis of 
variously qualified experiences (religious or otherwise) and 
the proper functioning of one's noetic faculties in 
environments suitably designed for them. One of the 
difficulties with this view is that, in the absence of 
defeaters, one is at best only within one's epistemic rights 
to believe that God exists (i.e., one has only prima facie 
justification or warrant for theistic belief). At some point, 
and particularly in the face of potential defeaters, if one 
hopes to go beyond what is simply rational to believe (in the 
sense of initial epistemic permissibilty), it seems that the 
requirement for sufficient evidence becomes more rigorous and 
requires marshalling the kind of evidence or arguments that 
Plantinga argues are not necessary for being warranted (and 
rational) in holding that belief at the prima facie level. An 
arguable belief (e.g., a child's belief in the tooth fairy) 
that is only prima facie justified has little rational 
endurance when assailed by the seas of conflicting coqnitive 
claims. It seems unavoidable, therefore, that one must 
ultimately be able to suggest adequate reasons (i.e., evidence 
or arguments) for why one's belief does in fact satisfy real 
conditions and referents in the world (i.e., that one's belief 
is true in some correspondence sense of the term). While 
Plantinga's notion of rationality seems promising, especially 
in the manner in which it no longer confines rational belief 
222 
to the rigors of evidentialism in the classical 
foundationalist sense, it appears that his system needs 
supplementation from a model of rationality that offers 
possible solutions for bridging the epistemic gap between what 
a person is within his epistemic rights to believe (i.e., 
rational in a properly basic sense) and what is rational (and 
true in a robust sense of the term) because it does in fact 
satisfy real conditions and referents in the world. 2 
And finally, while the model of rationality in 
Swinburne's epistemic system appears to be the most promising 
out of the three systems we have considered, it is anticipated 
that certain modifications can be made to add strength to his 
arguments of probability and the inductive standards one uses 
to determine the probability of a theory (or belief) on 
evidence. Most importantly, we will see that Swinburne's 
approach can follow a broadly foundationalist structure, while 
refraining from the stronger forms of foundational ism which 
require that all non-basic beliefs must be inferred from a 
privileged set of self-justifying beliefs (i.e., basic 
beliefs).3 
2see Paul X. Moser, Dwayne H. Mulder, and J. D. Trout, 
The Theory of Knowledge: A Thematic Introduction (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 185. The authors suggest that 
such a model of rationality aims at the twofold cognitive goal 
of achieving truth in the correspondence sense and avoiding 
error. Cf., Hobbs, Religious Explanation and Scientific 
Ideology, xv. 
3xelly Clark, for example, indicates that most of the 
theistic evidentialists mentioned in his book, Return to 
Reason, are classical foundationalists (including 
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Rationality and Truth 
One of the most critical features of rationality has 
to do with the nature of truth. The notion that truth is a 
relationship of some sort (on an ontoloqical level) between 
language and the world has been a long-standing position in 
traditional forms of rationality (e.g., modern notions of 
evidentialism and scientific or philosophical realism). This 
notion of truth is typically referred to as the correspondence 
theory or truth. 4 The correspondence theory of truth asserts 
probabilistic arguers like Swinburne who do not demand 
deductive connections between the various levels of beliefs 
but do demand probabilistic connections). Clark thinks that 
any epistemic system (such as that suggested in Swinburne's 
The Existence or God) which views one's proofs as starting 
from premises that are, in some sense, self-presenting, is 
troublesome in that such premises are said to have a claim on 
all reasonably attentive people. 
Since, in Clark's estimation, Swinburne seems to be a 
contemporary Lockean about knowledge (more so than Descartes, 
Locke demanded reason for all of one's beliefs), his system is 
in need of some revision. More specifically, Clark states 
that: (a) if one's system of rationality accords roughly 
self-presenting status to a certain class of beliefs (i.e., 
basic beliefs) and (b) one believes that there is a single 
deductive or probabilistic conclusion (i.e., that God exists) 
that follows from those basic beliefs, then one is committed 
to some form of classical foundationalism. Clark argues that 
Swinburne's proqram for rationality seems committed to both 
(a) and (b). That is, Swinburne's system argues for 
self-presenting basic beliefs which coerce (rationally or 
probabilistically) non-basic beliefs. Thus, while one can be a 
coherentist or a reliabilist and still embrace the 
Enlightenement view of rationality, it is, in Clark's view, 
more typically connected with classical foundationalism. 
[Correspondence with Kelly Clark, e-mail, 
tprovenz@harper.cc.il.us., December 3, 1997.] 
4see , for example, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. 
"Correspondence Theory of Truth, by A. N. Prior, 2 as cited 
in John S. Feinberg, "Truth: Relationship of Theories of Truth 
to Hermeneutics," in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, & the Bible, ed. 
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that a proposition is true if and only if what it asserts 
about a qiven state of affairs is the case. For example, "The 
present kinq of France is bald" is true if and only if France 
does in fact have a currant kinq who is bald. If what is 
asserted by the content of the proposition does not in fact 
describe the state of affairs as it really is, then the 
proposition is false. Thus, it is only in the case of 
propositions or statements that we can inquire into the matter 
of truth or falsity. Furthermore, since truth is a quality or 
property of propositions, only propositions can be loqically 
considered either true or false. 5 
A proper notion of truth distinguishes between its 
ontoloqical and epistemoloqical qualities. John Feinberq 
offers helpful insiqhts on this distinction. Feinberq states 
that what it means to say of any statement that it is true is 
Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Zondervan Publishinq Company, 1984), 7 and 43, n. 17. Prior's 
essay, as Feinberq notes, provides a summary of the major 
adherents of the correspondence view (e.q. Aristotle, Bertrand 
Russell, and the early Wittqenstein of the Tractatus) , alonq 
with arquments for and aqainst their position (includinq 
Wittqenstein's later qualifications aqainst strict 
correspondence in his Investigations). 
5Harold Netland, Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism 
and the Question of Truth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 
1991), 113-114. A helpful introduction on the distinction 
between sentences and propositions can be found in Irvinq M. 
Copi and Carl Cohen, ad. Introduction to Logic, 9th ed. 
(Enqlewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1994), 4-5. See also, 
and J. L Austin, "Truth," in Truth, ed. Georqe Pitcher 
(Enqlewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964, 20; and Alan White's 
helpful introductory discussion on propositions and their 
relation to truth in his Truth (London: Macmillan, 1970), 
chap. 1. 
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an ontological question. Questions of whether any specific 
statement is true or false is an epistemological matter. 6 
Our purpose at this point is simply to consider what features 
of lanquage make a proposition true (an ontological matter) 
and then consider whether we are in a position to objectively 
evaluate propositions to determine their truth or falsity (an 
epistemological exercise). That is, with respect to 
rationality, once we determine what sort of thing truth is, it 
is expected that we can demonstrate with reasonable 
sUfficiency that, as knowing subjects, we have as part of our 
cognitive equipment (and as part of our perceptual processes) 
the ability to discern what is true. Thus, while a theory of 
truth may net supply us with the specific conditions or 
procedures for verification (the epistemological concern), it 
does suggest that one will probably have some idea of how to 
verify or falsify a statement. When this notion is applied to 
the correspondence view, for example, we are simply 
considering whether a given proposition meets the condition of 
corresponding in some sense to the world, while the 
verification of such a correspondence would involve some kind 
of perceptual or rational interaction with the world. 
In addition, the correspondence theory of truth is 
consistent with certain other metaphysical assumptions about 
6John S. Feinberg, "Truth: Relationship of Theories of 
Truth to Hermeneutics," in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, & the 
Bible, ed. Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan Publishing Company, 1984), 4. 
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the external world, such as the notion of realism. Realism is 
the belief that "material objects exist externally to us and 
independently of our sense of experience."' Or to put it 
more precisely, realism is the view "that among the conditions 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the truth of 
a belief (proposition, sentence, or whatever) is a condition 
to the effect that a certain [mind-independent] state of 
affairs must obtain."8 While realism itself is not a 
competing theory of truth, there are theories of truth that 
are realist theories (e.g., some form of correspondence). 
Kirkham writes: 
Exactly which state of affairs must obtain for a given 
belief or statement to be true? It is the state of 
affairs that the statement asserts or the state of affairs 
believed. Thus on a realist theory of truth, the belief 
that snow is white is true only if snow is white in the 
extramental world (not if and only if snow is white, for a 
Realist theory may hold that there are other conditions 
necessary to the belief's being true).9 
The point is that realist theories suggest that such external 
realities do exist. So, while realist theories do not ensure 
that we will get beyond our own psychological and personal 
predilections for how we determine the data of our beliefs (or 
that we really know what is in the objective world), they do 
offer an idea of what kind of conditions a statement (or 
'Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s. v. "Realism," by R. J. 
Hirst, 7; as quoted in Michael Divitt, Realism and Truth, 2d 
ed. (princeton University Press, 1991), 13. 
8Richard L. Kirkham, Theories of Truth (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992), 73. 
9I bid., 75-76. 
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belief) must attempt to satisfy in order for one to be 
considered rational in holding it. While other theories of 
truth (e.g., the coherence and pragmatic theories) do not 
necessarily exclude the condition of correspondence to the 
world in order for a proposition to qualify as true, such 
correspondence is not a necessary condition for truth. 
The correspondence theory offers one of the best 
possibilities for avoiding a confusion between epistemic and 
ontological factors when considering the rationality for one's 
beliefs. This is critical to our model of rationality. The 
cognizer is aware that the ontological conditions for what 
makes a statement true are different from the epistemological 
procedures one uses to determine whether a given statement is 
in fact true. One's approach to epistemic justification 
(i.e., the reasons a cognizer gives for holding a belief, 
together with the relation among those reasons), while it 
bears some relation to one's theory of truth, does not require 
a specific theory of truth (i.e., the ontological conditions 
that a statement must satisfy in order to be true). In other 
words, one's theory of truth is not about what gives a 
cognizer a right to his belief. It's about what makes an 
assertion true in terms of the conditions a claim must 
satisfy. The point is that an assertion may be true, even 
though no one believes it to be true (or even if no cognizer 
has verified it or been in a position to verify it as true). 
This means, in addition, that it is the matter of epistemic 
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justification (i.e., the warrant, evidence, or grounds that 
one gives for holding a belief) that makes a cognizer rational 
in either holding a belief or rejecting it as false. And 
while being rational about one's beliefs can involve attempts 
to verify one's beliefs as true (if possible) with arguments 
and evidence, it does not require that all of our beliefs be 
verified as true in order to be rational in bolding them. 
Being rational does not necessarily mean that one is always 
right, but as we will also see, it does not mean that one can 
be rational in holding a belief for reasons that are arbitrary 
or without any basis in reason at some level. The 
justification of a belief and the truthfulness of a belief may 
be determined on the basis of different criteria. 
It should be clear at this point that the 
correspondence view of truth stands in contrast to the 
pragmatic and relativistic theory of truth in Murphy's system. 
Since her meaning for truth is one of unsurpassability (i.e, 
a true statement is one which will never be shown to be 
inadequate in its central contentions), there is no 
correspondence criteria or conditions for truth. 10 But as 
lOSee Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity: 
Philosophical Perspectives on science, Religion, and Ethics 
(Boulder, Colo.: westview Press, 1997), 125. Cf. Alasdair 
MacIntyre's conception of truth in Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988); idem, First Principles, Final Ends, and 
Contemporary Philosophical Issues (Milwaukee: Marquett 
University Press, 1990); and idem, "Moral Relativism, Truth, 
and Justification," in Moral Truth and Noral Tradition: Essays 
in Honor of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe, ed. Luke 
Gormally (Blackrock, Ireland: Four Courts Press, 1994), 6-24. 
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we saw in chapter two, Murphy appears to confuse the 
ontological question of the meaning of truth with the 
epistemoloqical matter of determining whether a given theory, 
tradition, or stataaent ia true. And aa we indicated, one 
cannot automatically rule out a correspondence notion of truth 
simply because it is difficult to determine epistemoloqically 
whether or not certain conditions have in fact been satisfied 
in determining whether a given sentence is true or false. ll 
Rationality and Reasoning 
To suggest that there is something like a core 
rationality common to every human culture is at the same time 
to suggest that there are at least some criteria that are not 
theory-laden, context-dependent, or relative to some 
preconceived theoretical ideas. Such criteria, at least in 
principle, can be used to appraise various competing theories 
and claims to truth. 12 They in fact betray certain rules of 
inference or kinds of reasoning (e.g., deductive and 
inductive) and argue that certain assumptions, ideas, and 
propositions seem common to every culture (e.g., that there 
are other minds, that there is time, that things move, that 
perceptions are generally to be trusted). 
IlFeinberg, "Truth," 4-5. 
12Harold Netland, Dissonant Voices: Religious 
Pluralism and the ouestion of ~ruth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Eerdmans, 1991), 180. 
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But how do we know our intellectual equipment works 
accurately? It seems that the best response we can qive to 
this question is that, as wittqenstein has noted, there is no 
other way our intellectual equipment works that makes sense to 
us, and to raise doubts in this matter is to call into 
question the whole framework of rational thouqht and 
interaction with the world. 13 We have no way of knowinq 
what any proposition means apart from how it is understood 
relative to our most fundamental ways of thinkinq and 
interactinq. To doubt that our intellectual equipment works 
accurately qoes beyond challenqinq our content presuppositions 
(althouqh that is at issue) and calls into question our 
methodoloqical presuppositions, namely, the very assumptions 
we make about what intellectual equipment we have and how it 
functions as we interact with the world and learn anythinq 
about it. FUrthermore, to call our rational framework into 
question would require replacinq it with still another 
framework constructed out of the very rules of our existinq 
ways of thinkinq.14 But this would be self-referentially 
incoherent. One, for example, would have to invoke the law of 
non-contradiction (i.e., that no statement is both true and 
13Ludwiq Wittqenstein, On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. 
Anscombe and G. H. von Wriqht, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. 
Anscombe (New York: Harper' ROw, 1972), secs. 341-346, 44e; 
and secs. 369-370, 48e. 
14I bid., sec. 337-339, 43e. 
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false at the same time and in the same way) in order to 
suggest that the law of non-contradiction does not apply. 
And any attempt to make an argument against the law of 
non-contradiction would prove that very argument wrong, since 
to make an argument against the law of non-contradiction, one 
would have to presuppose the law in the very attempt to 
dismiss it. In uttering the sentence that one would have to 
utter to deny the law of non-contradiction, one would be 
uttering a sentence which both asserts and denies the same 
thing at the same time. So one ends up incorporating the very 
rule he is attempting to avoid. 1S One could utter the 
nonsense statement, "Round squares exist in a triangular 
universe," but it is difficult to imagine what kind of rules 
would make sense out of such a statement if our existng laws 
of logic do not apply. 
The basic principles of classical logic (i.e., the 
principles of identity, noncontradiction, and excluded 
middle), are rules for demonstrating the way in which the 
equipment of human reasoning works. For example, when applied 
to statements, the principle of identity asserts that if any 
statement is true, then it is true. The principle of 
non-contradiction affirms that no statement can be both true 
and false at the same time and in the same way. The principle 
of excluded middle holds that any statement is either true or 
1SHarold Hetland, Dissonant Voices, 183-85. 
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false. 16 Reflection on these principles shows us that they 
are not mere social preferences, nor are they simply cultural 
or linquistic frameworks. Such principles can be shown to 
transcend our social, linguistic, and cultural frameworks in 
that they satisfy objective standards (i.e., fair and unbiased 
procedures) for correctness and rational discourse. As Harold 
Netland puts it: 
The three principles are important in that they provide 
necessary conditions for meaningful and intelligible 
thinking and discourse on any subject whatsoever. They 
are not merely assumptions that have been adopted because 
they prove useful; they are among the necessary conditions 
for making any assumption in the first place. Nor are 
they simply descriptive of the way people reason. They 
are normative or prescriptive in being among the rules 
which dictate the conditions under which one can have 
meaningful and intelligible thinking and discourse.,,17 
Basic logical principles, in other words, are crucial to the 
rationality of beliefs in that they appeal to criteria of 
reasoning which are public and repeatable. And furthermore, 
such criteria are independent of a cognizer's psychological 
states, such as one's predilections, one's sense perceptions 
(or even one's theory of perception), or even the degree of 
verification or confidence with which one holds a proposition. 
A further way in which we see reasoning demonstrating 
a core rationality is in the area of arguments. Arguments 
provide the reasons for a claim or assertion. In an argument, 
16see Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction ~o 
Logic, 9th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994), 
372. 
17Netland, Dissonant Voices, 183. 
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a finite series of statements (premises) is offered in support 
of another statement (conclusion).18 It is common, for 
example, to distinguish between deductive and inductive 
reasoning (or arguments). A deductive argument, for example, 
is one in which the reasoning is conclusive in a certain 
respect. At the very least, when reasoning deductively, we 
want our arguments to be deductively valid (i.e., when the 
structure is such). This is usually stated in two ways: 
deductively valid arguments are such that if the premises are 
true the conclusion must be true. Or as it is often put, it 
is logically impossible for the premises of a deductively 
valid argument to be true and the conclusion to be false. The 
reason for this is because the information contained in the 
conclusion of a valid deductive argument does not go beyond 
the information contained in the premises. 19 
This is consistent with our model of rationality in 
that the rules for deductive validity, once again, do not 
surface as a result of a cognizer's predilections. Knowing 
subjects reason from premises which logically entail their 
conclusions, and they do so because such argument forms are 
not private matters which merely reflect a person's 
18Merrie Bergman, James Moor, and Jack Nelson, The 
Logic Book. 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company), 
5. See also, Moser, Mulder, and Trout, The Theory of 
Knowledge, 129. 
19Moser et al., The Theory of Knowledge, 129. See 
also, Nancey Murphy, Reasoning and Rhe~oric in Religion 
(Valley Forge, Penn.: Trinity Press International), 33. 
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preferences. That our cognitive equipment regularly works 
this way is evidence that it cannot function differently than 
it does and still make sense to us. 
In deductive arguments, the claim or conclusion is 
already contained (implicitly) in the premises. So, for 
example, to make the claim that all men are mortal is to 
include in that claim the knowledge that the man Socrates is 
mortal. Deductive arguments (especially in the form of modern 
logic) can make us aware of something new, psychologically 
speaking, but they typically do not increase or expand our 
knowledge in appreciable ways (i.e., deductive arguments can 
confirm that something is the case).20 
Inductive arguments, on the other hand, can provide 
genuinely new knowledge. Good inductive arguments are 
essential for expanding our knowledge, but they do so in such 
a way that the truth of the premise (or premises) does not 
guarantee the truth of the conclusion. This is because 
inductive reasoning is essentially an argument form in which 
the claims or conclusions enlarge upon, or go beyond the 
evidence. The premises do not entail the truth of the 
conclusion, but they do purport to offer good reasons for 
accepting the conclusion. If, for example, all our 
observations of foxes are that they are red, then we may form 
the generalization that the next fox we see will also be red. 
20see , for example, Nancey Murphy, Reason & Rhetoric 
in Religion (Valley Forqe, Penn.: Trinity Press International, 
1994), 35. 
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But we can never be sure that the next fox will not be grey. 
So good inductive arguments (i.e., arguments that rightly 
expand our knowledge) do so at the expense of the certitude of 
deductive reasoninq.21 
The point is that our conceptual framework is such 
that we recognize that there is always some measure of 
probability with inductive arguments. We can make rational 
inferences from observed pheomena to future possibilities, but 
we recognize that this is not a guarantee that our conclusions 
will be true. Sometimes our perceptual and cognitive 
apparatus do not get things right, but the fact that we are 
aware of this is what is important for rationality. We can, 
in most instances, check our perceptions and recollections 
through some publically accessible means. In addition, both 
deductive and inductive arguments involve inferential 
reasoning, that is, some type of connection (whether entailed 
or implied) from the premises to the conclusion. This is not 
always done correctly. But, once again, the point is that our 
conceptual frameworks can make us aware of this, and since 
this is the case, we are typically in positions to take 
21This most typical kind of inductive argument is 
mentioned to make a general point about how inductive 
arguments work. Inductive arguments are divided into several 
kinds, all of which are forms of nondemonstrative reasoning, 
in which, as Max Black notes, "the truth of the premises, 
while not entailing the truth of tbe conclusion, purports to 
be a good reason for belief in it.- Encylcopedia or 
Philosophy, 1967 ed., s. v. "Induction," by Max Black. See 
also, Howard Kahane, Logic and PhiLosophy: A Modern 
Introduction, 6th ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 1990), 336-60. 
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adequate steps to correct the potential problem that a 
cognizer may understand the premises and yet deny that there 
is some logical connection between the premises and the 
conclusion. 
Rationality and Objectivity 
One of the central questions concerning the nature of 
rationality has to do with its relation to objectivity and 
truth. That is, to what extent does holding a given belief 
(or theory) satisfy the criterion of objectivity? Such an 
enquiry is desiqned to determine the extent to which 
theorizing in a given discipline is a conceptual enterprise 
that employs a conscious awareness of objective and subjective 
distinctions within conceptual endeavors. John Feinberg has 
suggested an approach which offers an adequate response to 
these issues based on various insights on the nature of 
rationality and objectivity.22 Feinberg states that when 
one is inquiring into the objectivity of a given conceptual 
enterprise, one is asking the question whether or not one can 
approach the study in such a way so as to avoid skewing the 
results by one's conceptual framework or one's 
predispositions. The issue of objectivity has to do with the 
human attempt to employ a model of rationality in which we are 
able to arrive at the truth without simply working out the 
22John S. Feinberg, "Rationality, Objectivity, and 
Doing Theology: Review and critique of Wentzel Van Huyssteen's 
Theology and the Justification of Faith,· ~rinity Journal 10 
NS (1989): 161. 
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implications of our presuppositions. If the best that one can 
expect to attain in conceptual theorizing is siDply working 
out the implications of one's own subjective preferences, 
then, as Feinberg contends, it is impossible (on an epistemic 
level) to come to ultimate decisions about what is right and 
wrong with respect to one's theories or beliefs. 23 
There are two different senses of subjectivity being 
employed at this point. There is subjectivitYl in the sense 
of a cognizer using his own intellectual equipment in the 
acquisition of knowledge. This kind of subjectivity is a 
necessary part of the relation between a knowinq subject and 
the object of knowledge. One cannot acquire knowledge without 
the use of one's own intellectual equipment. But there is 
also subjectivitY2 in the sense of being biased and unfair 
with the data. Subjectivity in this sense is not necessary to 
the acquisition of knowledge and is possible to avoid to an 
adequate extent. 
We are also saying that there are two different senses 
in which we understand what it means to be objective. In the 
first sense, to be objective l means that the object of 
knowledge is something that is ontoloqically apart from the 
knowing subject. But in another sense, objectivitY2 is the 
sense we have in mind when it 1s suggested that one can (and 
does) approach knowledge of a thing in a manner that is fair 
and unbiased with the evidence and reasons. Part of our 
23 I bid. 
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concept of rationality argues that we cannot have objectivitYl 
when it comes to a cognizer's knowledge of something, but this 
does not force us to operate with the second kind of 
subjectivitY2' so that we have no choice but to be unfair and 
biased with the evidence and reasons given in support of a 
belief. 
Belief that we can be objective2 relies on a model of 
rationality that does not view all data as theory-dependent. 
Although we do possess conceptual frameworks that influence 
the way we think, it is possible to have knowledge about the 
way the world really is on the notion that there are such 
things as theory-neutral facts. In other words, there is an 
external world, an accessible reality that is external to our 
minds. The knowing subject can have knowledge of such an 
external world (i.e., the object) when one leaves behind one's 
presuppositions and observes facts apart from how a person's 
theories might skew his perception of those facts. All 
theorizing is to some extent provisional and open to further 
clarifications and revisions in light of additional evidence 
and the undisputed conclusions of other disciplines. As a 
consequence, if there is to be an objective2 understanding of 
the data between conceptual enterprises, it must be done on 
the basis of certain shared standards of rationality. 
It would seem, then, that the question of rationality 
and objectivity in theorizing (theistic or otherwise) begins 
with the methodology one uses when evaluating and 
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investigating the potential evidence for a given belief or 
theory. Feinberg writes in this regard: 
. it must be admitted that often one's prior training 
and beliefs do influence his theorizing. • • • Hence, more 
often than one might like, subjectivity colors theorizing 
and removes objectivity (objectivity in the sense of 
unbiased investigation and decision making) from it. On 
the other hand, I do not think this means subjectivity 
(bias, predilection for one view over another) must always 
be involved in theorizing so that it is impossible to 
discover objectively (i.e., in an unbiased way, not 
predetermined by one's prior commitments) what is true or 
to convince others of one's views. 24 
This is so whether we are talking about cultural, perceptual, 
linguistic, historical, or theoretical conditioning. By this 
line of thinking, we are not forced to conclude with Kuhn and 
others that our sociocultural history so conditions the way we 
look at reality that we cannot escape our subjective notions 
and interpret data (whether empirical or rational) in an 
unbiased manner. 25 
While it is true that our conceptual frameworks play a 
crucial role in forming our concepts, such concepts can be 
held independently of any particular objects in the world, and 
as such can be applied to any number of theories about the 
world. But as Israel Scheffler has stated, such objective and 
subjective distinctions are not always easy to identify. An 
adequate model of rationality must give so.e account of how 
one can make observations indepedent of one's conceptual 
24Feinberg, "Truth," 182. 
25see Thomas Kuhn, The structure oL Scientific 
Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970). 
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schemes, while not denyinq that one's conceptual framework is 
operative. 26 This places the knowinq subject in the 
precarious position of havinq to consider at any point whether 
or not one's theorizinq and investiqation of the evidence 
(includinq one's standards of rationality) are in fact 
predetermined by views one already holds. 27 
Scheffler arques that we do in fact have objective 
standards (in the sense of unbiased investiqation) for 
determininq whether we have forced our previous views on the 
conceptualization process. In so doinq, he distinquishes two 
notions of determination. In the first sense, a person deals 
with a cateqory system (system of concepts) which, accordinq 
to Scheffler, n(imposes] order in qeneral and in advance on 
whatever experience in that context may brinq.n28 That is, 
a category system tells us in advance what thinqs are 
individuated as belonqinq to that cateqory. Before one can 
identify a scarecrow as a scarecrow, one must have the concept 
of a scarecrow. It is by havinq the concept of a thinq (e.q., 
a tree, scarecrow, snowman, bicycle, etc.) that one can limit 
(or determine) the kinds of thinq that can riqhtfully belonq 
to that concept. 
26Israel Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity 
(Indanapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishinq Company, 1982), 22. 
27I bid. Cf., Feinberq, "Rationality," 182. 
28scheffler, Science and Subjectivity. 22. 
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In the second sense, determination refers to the 
assiqnment of specific items or objects into their respective 
place in the cateqory scheme. We mean by this the specific 
desiqnation of an item as an example of a given concept. It 
is that sense of determination in which one's perceptual 
experience and conceptual awareness leads one to identify an 
actual scarecrow as a scarecrow and a snowman as a snowman. 
But what is critical to the issue of objectivity is that, as 
Scheffler arques, merely havinq a category scheme does not 
determine how it will be applied in specific cases. Havinq 
the concept of a snowman, for example, allows us to determine 
that it does not belonq to the category of scarecrows. He 
writes: 
Cateqorization does not, in other words, decide the forms 
of distribution which items will in fact display, nor does 
it, in itself, determine the categorical assignments of 
any particular item or class of items yet to be 
encountered. • . • It means that we can understand a 
hypothesis which conflicts with our favored hypothesis of 
the moment, in terms of the very category system to which 
the latter appeals. 29 
So while one's conceptual framework determines (in the first 
sense) what one perceives, it does not at the same time force 
one to identify an item (determination in the second sense) as 
belonqinq into one's preferred cateqory. This is because the 
set of concepts of which one is aware is held independently of 
any particular objects in the world. The implication of all 
this is that our concepts can be used in any number of 
29scheffler, 38-9. 
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theories that we formulate on evidence, even if those theories 
ultimately conflict. 30 
In light of this, we are not forced to conclude, for 
example, as does Van Huyssteen, that our linguistic frameworks 
so influence our theorizing that no attempt at theorizing can 
be prelinguistic or pretheoretical. 31 If our language so 
conditions our view of the data that reality is nothing more 
than our cultural and lingistic constructs, and if, as Van 
Huyssteen asserts, while there is a referential component to 
our language, all we really have access to are our theories 
which are no better or worse than other theories at solving 
problems, then we can never actually get to the referential 
object (in the correspondence sense) to which our language 
refers. 32 We could, if Van Huyssteen's estimations are 
correct, have no independent access to real conditions and 
referents in the world. If, as Van Huyssteen argues, 
religious language is in large part metaphorical and 
redescribes reality in a relational context (rather than a 
referential context), then the best we have is language that 
Van Huyssteen argues only approximates the truth and gives us 
incomplete access to the external world. The best that we can 
expect is access to the best available theory (i.e., best in 
30Feinberg, "Rationality," 183. 
31See Wentzel van Huyssteen, Theology and the 
Justification of Fath: Constructing Theories in Systematic 
Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1989), 128. 
32I bid., 128 and 137-8. 
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the sense that it is thought to provide better solutions to 
specific problems in specific situations). It ultimately 
agrees with a pragmatic theory of truth and denies that there 
is any corresponding sense of our lanquage to the world. But 
the insights of Scheffler's two senses of determination mean 
that our identifications need not be biased in the direction 
of our previously held concepts. One may have the concept of 
a scarecrow and prefer scarecrows over snowmen, but this does 
not force one to identify a snowman as a scarecrow. Having a 
preference for certain notions or concepts does not rule out 
properly identifying concepts that differ from what we expect 
or prefer. 33 
33See Harold I. Brown, Observation and Objectivity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 143-49. Brown arques, 
for example, that we often become aware of items in the 
external world that are siqnificantly different from what our 
previously formed theories would lead us to expect. This is 
particularly clear in the area of scientific observation. It 
is precisely because we are not forced to interpret preceptual 
data according to some preconceived conceptual scheme that we 
can formulate alternate theories to explain the data in a 
manner different from our previous notions. He further 
indicates that our sensory apparatus can make distinctions 
between an effect and its cause by recognizing that (a) 
an effect need not resemble a cause (e.g., the music that 
flows out of my compact disk player does not resemble the 
compact disk itself, or the laser eye that reads the disk); 
and (b) an effect may at the same time be both the result of 
causes upon which it is ontoloqically dependent and causes 
from which it is ontoloqically independent (e.g., a person's 
physical welfare is in part ontologically dependent on food, 
water, and air, but is ontologically independent of the 
environment from which it is supplied). See also, Harold I. 
Brown, Perception, Theory, and Commitment: The New Philosophy 
of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Larry 
Laudan, Progress and Its Problems (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977); and Jarrett Leplin, ed. Scientfic 
Realism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 
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Thus, while we are strongly affected by our conceptual 
schemes, unbiased methods for obtaining and judging evidence 
relative to a given belief or theory are possible between 
conceptual frameworks. This goes beyond simply communicating 
between systems; rather, such an approach to rationality and 
objectivity places the knowing subject in a position to know 
what is more likely true in the correspondence sense described 
above. Our manner of evaluating evidence, while strongly 
affected by our conceptual frameworks, does not preclude 
communication across worldviews so that we can get at what is 
true in the correspondence sense. Jesse Hobbs, for example, 
offers the following valuable insight on objectivity and 
incommensurability: 
It has been commonplace since the work of Thomas Kuhn to 
allege that there can be neither evidence nor perception 
except within the framework of some worldview or 
other. • • . Lines of incommensurability are those across 
which discussants are failing to communicate, or are 
talking past one another, not where communication is 
impossible. Even if everything can be seen only from the 
standpoint of one worldview or another, that does not 
preclude worldviews from being flexible enough to permit 
suspension of judgment on particular disputed issues. 34 
In other words, one may recognize the depth of influence a 
conceptual framework has on the theorizing process and still 
maintain that objectivity between frameworks is possible. 
One is not forced to simply work out the implications of one's 
34Hobbs, Religious Explanation and Scientific 
Ideology, xvi-xvii. See also, Thomas Kuhn, "Reflections on My 
Critics," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. Imre 
Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970), 232-3, 267-8, 276-7. 
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presuppositions in theory formulation or with respect to the 
acquisition of one's beliefs. 
The upshot of our treatment of objectivity, then, is 
that we do not have to be so controlled by our own conceptual 
categories that we cannot gain some understanding of another's 
conceptual scheme. We can critically reflect and see the 
weaknesses of our own conceptual systems. We can then seek 
for a more adequate explanation. It is possible for reason 
and perception to play a significant role in the examination, 
revision, and rejection of one's current beliefs and the 
acquisition of new beliefs. 
For example, where it may be legitimately argued that 
people are clearly influenced by their linguistic and 
conceptual frameworks, such conditions do not force us to 
entirely subjective investigations and biased conclusions. 
And although a certain degree of cultural bias does pervade 
our assessment of the world, such cultural biases need not be 
constraining and can be adequately overcome. The argument 
here is that we can (and often do) overcome our subjective 
biases and do theorizing appropriately, especially when one 
considers that our conceptual and linguistic frameworks 
(together with our perceptual capacities) are instruments 
employed largely for the distinct purpose of assessing 
individual truth claims and overarching theories. In light of 
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this, such frameworks can be entirely adequate for accessing 
mind-independent reality.35 
Rationality and Certainty 
Crucial to our .odel of rationality is the notion that 
a statement's truth is not the same think as it's certainty. 
Feinberg remarks, for example, that "the truth or falsity of 
any statement has nothing to do with whether or not it can be 
verified as such or with the deqree of certainty to which it 
can be proved or disproved."36 Of course, to talk about 
certainty is to say something about the criteria or conditions 
for what makes a statement certain. In our model of 
rationality, we have been arquing that the Enlightenment idea 
of cartesian certainty (i.e., one in which the evidence for a 
belief leads to the infallibility or indubitability of that 
belief) is far too rigorous a criterion to be workable. This 
would seem to suggest that a more workable model should lessen 
the requirement for what counts as sufficient evidence for 
350ne of the more popular criticisms against this 
model of rationality and truth can be found in the radical 
pragmatism of Richard Rorty. For a good introduction to his 
views, see his "Science and Solidarity," in Rhetoric of the 
Human Sciences: Language and Arguments in Scholarship and 
Public Afrairs, ed. Nelson et ale (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1987), reprinted as "Dismantling Truth: 
Solidarity versus Objectivity," in Philosophy: The Ouest for 
Truth, 4th ed., ed. Louis P. Pojman (Belmont, Calif.: 
Wadsworth, 1999): 197-204; idem, contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and 
idem, Objectivity, Relativism, and ~ruth (New York: Cambridqe 
University Press, 1991). 
36Feinberq, "Truth," in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and 
the Bible, 19. 
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justification and rationality. Part of suggesting such a 
model has to do with the distiction between objective 
certainty and subjective certainty. 
stated briefly, objective certainty relates to the 
matter of truth and certainty (i.e., whether a cognizer has a 
right to say something is verified). Objective certainty has 
to do with the amount, kind, and quality of evidence that is 
marshalled for the truth of a proposition. Subjective 
certainty, on the other hand, has to do with the degree of 
persuasion or conviction a person has (i.e., one's degree of 
certitude toward the truthfulness of a given proposition). 
Subjective certainty deals with the psychological factors a 
cognizer brings to the matter of a proposition's truth. Of 
course, in our model of rationality, the goal is to have one's 
subjective certainty stem from objective certainty, that is, 
the degree to which a statement can be verified on evidence. 
But the problem is that, as we will see, subjective certainty 
can come about from factors not related to the verification of 
a proposition. One may choose to be subjectively certain for 
all kinds of reasons not related to the quality and quantity 
of the evidence. One may, for example, go against what the 
evidence seems to suggest, or choose to be subjectively 
certain even when there is insufficient evidence for the 
belief in question. 
When considering the matter of certainty and the 
rationality of one's belief, we are primarily concerned with 
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the amount and kind of evidence available for the truth of a 
given proposition. This is what is meant by objective 
certainty. But to have an idea of what that evidence might 
be, one must distinguish between different kinds of statements 
and the manner in which the available evidence argues for or 
against them. It is here that we can draw upon certain 
notions from the philosophy of wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein argued, as Feinberg notes, "that certain 
statements (e.g., 'I have a mind') are beyond any question of 
doubt, because they are so foundational to all we are and do 
that they could not reasonably be brought into question. 1I37 
This is what is said of analytic statements (e.g., statements 
of math and logic). Analytic statements (i.e., statements 
which assert that some relation among ideas exists, that, for 
example, 2+2=4) are true by definition. Such statements have 
100% objective certainty. In other words, we are saying that 
there is no other kind of evidence that could be marshalled in 
favor of their certainty. This is the point that was made 
earlier relative to the basic laws of lO9ic, such as the law 
of non-contradiction. 
other statements, however, can be doubted on a 
meaningful basis, but one may be in a position to marshall 
enough of the appropriate kind of evidence to be rationally 
37Feinberg, "Truth, II 21. 
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convinced that it no lonqer makes sense to doubt them. 38 
This is the case with synthetic statements (e.q., assertions 
of empirical matters of fact). The difference here is that 
one can, at most, marshall 99' objective certainty for 
synthetic statements. For it is always possible that some 
future evidence could count aqainst one's belief, even thouqh 
a coqnizer does not expect that to be the case. So when one 
is considerinq whether it is rational to hold a qiven 
synthetic statement, one is concerned with the extent to which 
one can marshall sUfficient evidence (i.e, objective 
certainty) to conclude that a proposition of this sort has a 
99% probability (or as close to it as possible) of beinq true. 
wittqenstein's notions on objective and subjective 
certainty are desiqned to show that doubtinq and provinq are 
matters of objective certainty, while the conviction that 
somethinq is true is a matter of subjective certainty. He 
arques that the kind of certainty is the kind of lanquaqe-qame 
(i.e., objective certainty).39 The emphasis here is on the 
distinction between the kind of certainty and the degree of 
certainty. The point of this distinction is to show that one 
can achieve subjective certainty (i.e., the conviction that a 
38I bid. See, for example, Ludwiq Wittqenstein, On 
Certainty, sec. 559, 73e; sec.370, 48e; sec. 257, 34e; and 
sec. 519, 68e. 
39Ludwiq Wittqenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
224e. Cf., John S. Feinberq, "Noncoqnitivism: Wittqenstein," 
in Biblical Errancy: An Analysis of its Philosophical Roots, 
ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1981), 
184-85. 
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statement is true) to the same degree in the language-game of 
religion, history, or science as in the language-game of 
mathematics and logic, but the kind of objective certainty 
upon which it is based will differ. In other words, the 
methods a cognizer uses to verify the statements of math and 
logic (along with one's awareness of the kind of evidence 
appropriate to such statements) are different from those used 
in science or history, because the language-games are 
different. 40 So when a cognizer claims to have subjective 
certainty about a given synthetic statement (whether in math, 
science, philosophy, or theism), that claim is rational to the 
extent to which he is aware of the appropriate evidence for 
that belief, together with the extent to which his conviction 
that the belief is true is based on the kind and quality of 
evidence mashalled for that belief (i.e., its objective 
certainty). 
It's important to note that if a cognizer has 99\ 
objective certainty of a synthetic statement, there is no 
sense in which he can be more objectively certain about it. 
So he is rational in being as subjectively certain about that 
belief as he is about some analytic statement. But a further 
question for rationality has to do with cases in which we have 
less than 99' objective certainty relative to empirical 
matters of fact. What degree of subjective certainty is 
allowed in these cases if a cognizer is to remain rational in 
40Feinberg, "Truth," 21. 
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holdinq such beliefs? This is a more difficult matter to 
ascertain. If the way one qoes about obtaining objective 
certainty in the lanquaqe-qames of reliqion, science, or 
history is different than the way one's qoes about qettinq 
objective certainty in math or logic, as Wittgenstein 
suqqests, then the matter of how one knows whether there is 
appropriate evidence upon which to establish a statement's 
truth will differ according to the lanquage-game in question. 
Feinberq indicates that there are appropriate kinds of 
evidence and appropriate amounts of evidence when considerinq 
the matter of objective certainty relative to synthetic 
statements. The appropriate kind of evidence is evidence 
relevant to the issue under discussion, evidence that is true, 
and evidence that is used properly when structuring one's 
argument (i.e., the argument contains no errors in reasoninq). 
As to the appropriate amount of evidence, Feinberq suqqests 
that "one has enouqh evidence when the evidence of the kind 
mentioned is so rationally convincinq that one cannot 
reasonably maintain a doubt. n41 Of course, with synthetic 
statements, we will not always have enouqh evidence to make 
them rationally convincinq. But for those instances in which 
enouqh objective certainty has been marshalled for the truth 
of a statement, it makes no sense to continue doubtinq until 
one thinks some "final explanation" has been reached. The 
reason for this is because a cognizer may already have that 
41Feinberq, "Truth," 46, n. 62. 
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explanation and simply not realize it, or he may have no idea 
of what that explanation might look like should it be offered. 
In the final analysis, argues Feinberg, when it comes to how 
one knows whether there is an appropriate amount of evidence 
to establish a statement's truth, "there is no set number of 
arguments or pieces of evidence that must be reached to remove 
doubt. ,,42 
On our model of rationality, then, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that a cognizer is rational in holding one's 
beliefs when one retains the degree of rational conviction 
that is warranted by the objective certainty (i.e., the 
appropriate kinds, quality, and amounts of evidence). This 
will have much to do with the quality of the evidence or 
arguments. This is easier to accomplish in the lanquage-qames 
of math and loqic, since the kinds of procedures one's uses to 
determine an analytic statement's truth involve rational 
proofs and the possibility of uncovering contradictions in 
arguments. So one may be in a better position to offer 
evidence for the objective certainty of analytic statements 
(and consequently have a right to a greater deqree of 
subjective certainty about them) than for the synthetic 
propositions of theism, but this does not rule out the 
possibility of one beinq equally subjectively certain about 
the statements of theism (or at least having a degree of 
subjective certainty that is consistent with the evidence). 
42 I bid. 
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Furthermore, while our model of rationality can accept 
certain aspects about the distinctions between objective and 
subjective certainty, we are not forced to conclude with 
wittgenstein that the languaqe-game of theism does not deal 
with factual claims that are open to being verfied or 
falsified on evidence. 43 One does present evidence for the 
synthetic claims of theism; they are in fact synthetic and in 
need of inductive procedures for verification, but they are, 
nonetheless, assertions like those of science, history, and 
philosophy. Wittqenstein asserts, as Feinberg notes, that 
"after a certain deqree of evidence is produced, it no longer 
makes sense to doubt the statement's truth (i.e., to question 
whether objective certainty warrants subjective certainty in 
such a case, regardless of whether the statement comes from 
the lanquage-game of history, science, mathematics, or 
whatever).,,44 If one can marshall 99% objective certainty 
for a synthetic statement's truth, one is warranted in being 
absolutely subjectively certain of the statement's truth, even 
thouqh it is synthetic. But we cannot be as doqmatic about 
such statements where the objective certainty is not as 
strong. still it is important to point out that a statement's 
truth does not depend on either subjective or objective 
certainty. As we have indicated, a statement's truth is a 
43wittqenstein, Lectures and Conversations, 61-62. 
44Feinberq, "Truth," 21. Cf., Wittgenstein, On 
Certainty, sec. 257, 54; and Wittqenstein, Investigations, 
sec. 87, 40e-41e and 180e. 
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matter of whether it satisfies certain conditions and 
referents in the world. We simply may not be in a position to 
verify a statement as true. 
The above distinctions help to clarify the matter of 
what kind of evidence is sufficient if one is to be rational 
about one's beliefs. In addition, objective certainty relates 
to the matter of objectivity stated above, in that it attempts 
an approach that uses fair and unbiased procedures when 
reasoning from the evidence to a qiven conclusion. It assumes 
that a certain quantity and quality of evidence is publically 
available. So on our model of rationality, we are claiming 
that the public nature of the evidence makes it possible for a 
coqnizer to investiqate and determine whether the concept in 
question fits a qiven object in the world. 45 For there to 
be objective certainty, the evidence must be publically 
accessible. Furthermore, sufficient evidence cannot be based 
entirely on private sensations and experiences, since neither 
the particular person considerinq the evidence nor any others 
have criteria (public or otherwise) to determine what they 
are. This means that a good deal of our synthetic statements 
will be based on less conclusive evidence, and there still may 
be legitimate room for doubt and explanation. 46 
45Ludwiq wittqenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
(New York: Macmillan, 1968); and idem Lectures & Conversations 
on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril 
Barrett (Berkeley: University of California Press, n.d.), 
56-57. 
46Feinberq, "Rationality," 183. 
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Nevertheless, it still may be considered that, although the 
evidence is public, a given person's investigation of it may 
be wrong or just underdetermine the issue. While this is 
certainly possible, it can be held into check when we do our 
investigating and theorizing (whether theistic, scientific, or 
otherwise) in community. That is, if the public evidence is 
conclusive in one direction, then its probability of falsehood 
is not high, and doubting, proof and explanation must end at 
some point. 47 
As we have seen, Swinburne's model comes closest to 
satisfying criteria for the distinctions between objective and 
subjective certainty. On his model of rationality, one should 
be subjectively certain only on the basis of the appropriate 
evidence for a belief. The rationality models of Murphy and 
Plantinga, however, are much more likely to utilize subjective 
certainty for reasons other than what follows from the 
evidence. In Murphy's case, it is because the evidence for a 
statement's truth (i.e., its objective certainty) is almost 
always tentative and provisional. It is unlikely that we will 
have anything close to 99' objective certainty with respect to 
our synthetic claims, but one can have prior commitments to 
certain research proqrams (or a presuppositions of content) 
that are highly suggestive of subjective certainty. 
Plantinga's system, on the other hand, suggests that a 
cognizer has an epistemic right to be subjectively certain (in 
47wittgenstein, Philosophical Invescigacions, 180e. 
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the way that we have been defining it) of the belief that God 
exists simply on the basis of prima facie evidence (i.e., 
apart from any attempt to verify the evidence for a belief 
according to the criteria for objective certainty). 
Rationality and Justification 
While a person may be in a position to obtain 
objective certainty by way of the verification processes 
indicated above, and while it has been argued that a rational 
model of cognitive claims to knowledge (including theistic 
belief) involves some form of the correspondence theory of 
truth, it must be stated that there is more to rationality 
than the mere quality of having a true belief. There are, to 
be sure, many instances in which a person may hold a true 
belief while holding that belief in the absence of adequate 
reasons and reliable processes. If I only feel a hunch that 
my friend is holding four aces in his hand, my belief, while 
it may turn out to be true, is not based on good reasons or 
evidence. In contrast, my friend, because he can see the 
cards in his hands, has more than likely appealed to the best 
evidence that his cognitive equipment has to offer for saying 
that he is holding four aces. We would say that he has 
perceptual grounds for his belief. So while both beliefs are 
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true, only my friend has appealed to reasons consistent with 
objective certainty.48 
This illustration raises the question of the nature of 
justification and its relation to verification. Epistemic 
justification signifies offering acceptable reason-giving 
answers in support of our beliefs and claims to knowledge. On 
our model of rationality, justification involves the reasons, 
evidence, or arquments (i.e., the objective certainty to which 
one appeals) for holding a given belief. Where it is 
possible, it involves attempts to verify one's beliefs as true 
with good arguments and appropriate evidence. But it does not 
necessarily require that the cognizer verify a belief as true, 
or even attempt to verify a belief. This raises the matter of 
a significant distiction in our proposed model of rationality. 
There are multiple senses (or two different respects) in which 
a person can be rational in holding a belief. In the first 
place, as indicated in the previous section, there is a sense 
in which rationality is tied to the stronger notions of truth 
and certainty. In this sense of rationality, one is rational 
in holding a belief in virtue of the fact that one has 
verified one's belief as true by appealing to the appropriate 
kind, quality, and amount of evidence for the belief in 
question. In such a case, it no longer makes sense to say 
that one's belief does not satisfy the conditions of being 
48Louis P. Pojman, What Can We Know? An Introduction 
to the Theory o~ Knowledge (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1995), 8. 
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rational. One can do no better than to verify one's belief as 
true on evidence. 
But there is another sense in which rationality 
relates to the matter of justification, and this sense of 
rationality is not identical to the first. It is clear that 
we are not always be in a position to verify a belief as true, 
but we are typically in a position to offer reasons for why we 
think our beliefs are true. In doing so, we are dealing with 
a sense of rationality in which one is rational for holding a 
belief that, while not verified as true (a matter of objective 
certainty), one is at least attempting to offer a reason-based 
conception for why he thinks his belief is true. In making 
this distinction, it is important to recognize that a rational 
(or justified) belief is not necessarily the same thing as 
knowledge. The reason for this is because, on our model of 
rationality, justification can lead to knowledge only if a 
cognizer has verified a belief as true by marshalling enough 
evidence for it. But a cognizer's theory of knowledge (i.e., 
epistemic justification) is a different thing from one's 
ability to verify a given belief. And further, one's theory 
of knowledge does not necessarily determine one's theory of 
truth. So if a person's verification of a given proposition 
(objective certainty) offers good reasons for believing it 
(e.g., given a correspondence view of truth), then such a 
person has adequate justification for claiming that one's 
belief is knowledge. 
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While we may agree that hunches, guesses, conjectures, 
and wishful thinking do not yield cases of knowledge even if 
they are true, there is still the matter of what reasons a 
person must have for a belief if she is thought to be 
justified (and rational) in holding that belief. Concerns 
such as these raise the issue of what has come to be known in 
philosophy as the Gettier problem. 49 Prior to Gettier, it 
was generally thought that S knows that p if and only if: (1) 
S believes that Pi (2) p is truei and (3) SiS belief that p is 
justified. These three conditions had to be satisfied in 
order to constitute what was necessary and sufficien~ for 
knowledge, that is, all three conditions must be present for S 
not to fail to know that p. Edmund Gettier challenged this 
"tripartite analysis" of knowledge by offering counterexamples 
in which a person could hold a justified, true belief entirely 
by accident or coincidence. It may be, for example, that a 
current reading of the barometer on my barn door is giving me 
justification for forming the belief that a storm is in the 
offing. It turns out that there is in fact a storm in the 
offing, but unbeknownst to me, the barometer is broken and is 
only coincidentally indicating that a storm is on the horizon. 
So while my belief about a storm in the offing is in fact 
true, my belief is based on an instrument that is not 
49Edmund L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?" Analysis 23, no.6 (1963): 121-123. See also, Linda 
Zagzebski, "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems," The 
Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 174 (1994): 65-73. 
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functioning properly. Although my true belief seems quite 
justified (the barometer has always produced reliable readings 
in the past), it also seems that I cannot really know (i.e., 
if knowledge is justified-true-belief) that there is a storm 
in the offing, since my belief is based on a reading of the 
barometer that is only true coincidentally. Such 
couterexamples take the following form: (1) S believes that p; 
(2) p is true; (3) SiS belief that p is justified; (4) p is 
entailed by or probabilistically inferred from some 
proposition q; (5) S is justified in believing q; (6) q is 
false; and consequently (7) S doesn't know that p.50 
The field of epistemic justification is replete with 
seemingly unsuccessful attempts to offer a fourth condition to 
the traditional justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge 
emerging out of Gettier-type counterexamples. 51 In 
addition, we have seen that the Enlightenment conceptions of 
evidentialism have traditionally employed models of 
justification that rely on classical foundational ism or 
coherent ism in knowledge. In both cases, there is some sense 
in which a person's beliefs are justified in relation to other 
beliefs she may hold. But in foundationalist theories, as we 
have seen, justification is ultimately made by an appeal to a 
50I bid., 72. 
51see , for example, stephen Robert Jacobson, "What's 
Wrong with Reliability Theories of Justification," (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Michigan, 1989), 24. See also, George 
Pappas and Marshall Swain, eds. Essays on Knowledge and 
Justification (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978). 
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privi1eged set of beliefs (i.e., basic beliefs) that are said 
to have indubitable status. 52 In response to this, we have 
considered two current models of rationality and justification 
(i.e., Murphy and Plantinqa) that take exception to 
evidentialist conceptions of rational belief. We have seen, 
for example, that Murphy's Lakatosian system rejects all 
models of rationality that rely on any foundationalist theory 
of know1edqe as inadequate notions of the way theories and 
beliefs are actually formulated and justified. She ultimately 
replaces traditional (i.e., Enliqhtenment) notions of 
evidentialism and rationality with a postmodern version of 
rationality. In Murphy's system, a cognizer is rational only 
to the extent that she follows a theory of justification 
(i.e., one that is non-foundationalist) which allows for the 
tentative and provisional status of one's beliefs, qiven a 
theory of truth which substitutes unsurpassibility for 
correspondence. 
Second, the concept of proper basicality offered in 
Plantinga's system appears to call for, at the most 
fundamental level, a qualified modification of classical 
52In addition to Pojman's book, What Can We Know? An 
Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, excellent preliminary 
discussions on justification in epistemology can be found in 
Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 3d ed. Foundation 
of Philosophy Series, ed. Elizabeth Beardsley and Tom L. 
Beauchamp (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1989); and 
John L. Pollock, contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Savage, 
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986). For a more advanced study of 
justification, see Georqe S. Pappas and Marshall Swain, ed. 
Essays on Knowledge and Justification (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1978). 
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foundationalism's distinction between the basic and non-basic 
beliefs of one's noetic structure. In light of his argument 
that classical foundationalists criteria of proper basicality 
are inadequate, Plantinga appears to offer what he thinks is a 
workable criterion for proper basicality, one according to 
which people are warranted (i.e., within their epistemic 
rights) to hold beliefs that are formed by our our cognitive 
and noetic faculties functioning properly in environments 
specifically designed for them (i.e., they are aimed at the 
acquisition of true beliefs in the correspondence sense). And 
once again, we have seen that Plantinga's system presents us 
with the pressing problem that one may be rational in holding 
that belief in God is properly basic (i.e., one may be within 
his epistemic rights to hold that belief on prima facie 
evidence), but even if his arqument holds, it applies to only 
one kind of belief, namely that God exists. Plantinga's 
argument that belief in God is properly basic cannot be 
applied as a model of rationality for a wide range of other 
religious and theological propositions that Plantinga would 
readily agree are made rational on the bas~s of evidential 
arguments and reasons. 
On our model of rationality, then, we have been 
arguing that one can be rational in believ~ng a proposition 
without verifying it or attempting to verify it. Of course, 
one can be rational in holding a belief in which one's 
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reason-based conception of justification coincides with 
attempts to verify one's belief as true or certain in light of 
the appropriate available evidence (e.g., in a way similar to 
Swinburne's different levels of rationality), but this is not 
necessary for justification. What this means is that one can 
be justified in holding a belief that he has not verified 
(i.e., verified in terms of offering public, unbiased rational 
or empirical evidence). Furthermore, it does not mean that 
any reason offered for a belief must be irrefutable if that 
belief is to be justified. It is difficult to argue against 
the simple thesis that a person may be justified (rational) in 
believing x at time t given a background set of beliefs y.53 
So while one's belief may be justified without verifying it as 
true (or even attempting to verify it), it is, nevertheless, 
not held arbitrarily or without some basis in reason. 
So on our model of rationality, justification is a 
reason-based conception in which a person could hold a false 
53r am indebted here to Harold Hetland's distinction 
between two levels or sense of rationality. On the first 
level, justification (or rationality) is not tied in with the 
notion of truth in the hard sense. On this level, it is 
reasonable for a person to hold belief x at time t given a 
background set of beliefs y. On the second level, however, 
justification (or rationality) takes place only in the 
stronger sense where truth is operative. On this level, what 
is reasonable to believe is related to what is in fact the 
case, and it is rational because it is in fact a true claim 
about reality. [Correspondence with Harold Hetland, e-mail, 
tprovenz@megsinet.net, June 15, 1999]. Cf. also, James A. 
Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), 99. 
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belief but be justified in doing so.54 As stated above, 
this does not necessarily mean that one's reasons will be 
right, but it does suggest that one has reasons for one's 
beliefs, reasons he thinks make that belief true. They can be 
reasons based on other beliefs a cognizer thinks are true, but 
they can also be based in other nondoxastic states of which a 
cognizer is in some way aware. But once again, a person's 
justification for a belief can be a different matter from a 
belief's truthfulness or certainty. But in the same way that 
a statement's truthfulness does not depend on a person's 
ability to verify it, so, too, a person's reasons for being 
justified about a qiven belief do not depend on its 
truthfulness, or even the kind of objective certainty that 
could verify the belief. 
Can one be rational, then, in holdinq a belief for 
which one is not justified? If we mean by justification, at 
the very least, the reasons that one offers for a belief 
(i.e., reasons that are thought consistent with the kinds of 
reasons people typically give for their everyday putative 
beliefs), then one is rational in holdinq only a belief for 
which there is some level of justification for it. But as 
Swinburne has suqqested, the reasons that a cognizer offers in 
support of a belief can be considered epistemically justified 
only to the extent that they are reasons which the coqnizer 
54See Stephen Robert Jacobson, "What's Wronq with 
Reliability Theories of Justification?" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Michiqan, 1989), 122. 
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thinks are true. Such reasons may seem initially intuitive to 
a person. Reasons can also be based on testimony, or 
authority, or especally prior beliefs that one already accepts 
as true. Reasons are also based in perception, or memory, or 
some other experiential or rational state of which the 
cognizer is aware. But the point is that the cognizer thinks 
he has some non-arbitrary reasons for thinking that his belief 
is true, even if it turns out to be false. 
Summary and Conclusuion 
Must the rationality and justification of a cognitive 
belief (theistic or otherwise), then, conform to the standards 
of certainty and evidentialism associated with Enlightenment 
epistemology? It seems that we are not rationally compelled 
to accept this thesis. Rather, we have seen that a person's 
justification for a belief may be based in various kinds of 
reasons, such as a child's being told something by a parent, 
or a student by his teacher. Justification can be doxastic 
(i.e., a relation among beliefs) or nondoxastic (i.e., based 
on factors in addition or apart from one's other beliefs), so 
long as a cognizer is offering reasons for his beliefs. So 
when a person seeks to justify a belief on some reason-based 
conception, those reasons may take a variety of acceptable 
forms (whether rational evidence, perceptual evidence, beliefs 
of memory, or at some level an awareness of one's mental 
states). 
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The criteria for rationality outlined above calls for 
a modified form of foundationalism. It argues that the 
features of foundationalist theories (i.e., its conceptions of 
truth, evidence, doxastic and nondoxastic relation among 
beliefs, objectivity, and rationa1ity) from which it receives 
its epistemic structure are essentially correct. While 
certain modifications and revisions of the epistemic and 
rational features of foundationalist theories may prove 
necessary, one may argue that there is still an essentially 
foundationalist structure for rational belief that does not 
conform to the tentative and provisional status of beliefs so 
characteristic of Murphy's brand of postmodernity. And 
further still, we can aqree with Plantinqa's critiques of 
classical foundationalism (i.e., that it is difficult to 
arrive at aqreement on the criteria for basic beliefs) and 
conclude that we are not necessarily forced to trace all our 
non-basic beliefs back to basic beliefs. This is not to say 
that one could not trace one's non-basic beliefs back to basic 
beliefs (on the assumption of some form of foundationalist 
structure), but rather, that there is no need to do so once 
enough evidence has been supplied. 
In addition, as we have indicated above, our proposed 
notion of rationality argues for two respects or senses of 
rationality which are not identical: the first sense of 
rationality involves truth and certainty (or verification). 
But there is also a second sense of rationality that involves 
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justification, and the use of both respects or senses amounts 
to a modified or moderate foundationalism. The reasons for 
this are modest in nature. In the first place, as it has been 
suggested earlier, not all beliefs need to be traced back to 
basic beliefs for their justification. All we need do is 
supply sufficient reasons or explanations. This allows us to 
circumvent the stronger forma of evidentialis., while 
continuing to offer evidence, reasons, and explanations for 
our beliefs and theories. 
Moderate foundationalism, moreover, is a fallibilist 
position that is not committed to the indefeasibility of 
foundational beliefs. That is, one is open to the possibility 
that further evidence could show a given belief (or theory) to 
be false, even though it is not expected that such will be the 
case. This epistemic structure argues for fallibilism in at 
least three ways. First, one's foundational beliefs may turn 
out to be unjustified or false or both; second, non-basic (or 
inferential) beliefs are only inductively (and consequently 
fallibly) justified by foundational beliefs. One's 
non-foundational beliefs can turn out false, even when the 
foundational beliefs from which they are inferred are true; 
and third, the possibility of discovering error, even among 
foundational beliefs, is left open. 55 
In addition, a fallibilist position raises the further 
question of the manner in which evidence relates to one's 
55Audi, The structure of Justification, 135. 
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basic (or foundational) beliefs. If it is qranted that there 
is always the possibility of discovering error among one's 
basic beliefs, then it seems reasonable to suggest that a 
cognizer may at some point legitimately reassess those beliefs 
in light of additional evidence. That is, if at some later 
point, at least for me, my basic beliefs are challenged by me, 
I may apply evidence against those beliefs in a manner similar 
to the way in which I apply evidence against my non-basic 
beliefs. In such a case, it is difficult to know whether my 
basic belief continues to remain among my foundational 
beliefs. But it seems reasonable to suggest that, should I be 
in a position to marshall enough of the appropriate kind of 
evidence so as satisfy my own challenge and become so 
rationally convinced that it no longer makes sense to 
reasonably maintain a doubt, then there seems to be no good 
reason why my belief cannot once again resume its place among 
the basic beliefs of my noetic structure. 
Furthermore, since the coherence among one's beliefs 
plays a significant role in what is rational for one to 
believe in a fallibilist position, then incoherence among 
one's beliefs may defeat verification or knowledge, even of a 
foundational belief. For example, my justification for 
believing that unicorns do not exist prevents me from 
remaining justified in believing that there is one in front of 
me. Coherence may also account for an increasing number of 
independent mutually consistent factors a cognizer believes to 
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support the truth of a proposition. My justification for 
believing that the bag of apples is from the Clarkes, for 
example, increases with each new belief I acquire, all of 
which independently support that conclusion. 56 But while 
fallibilism grants that incoherence can defeat the 
verification of foundational beliefs, it does not regard 
coherence as a basic source of justification. Coherence by 
itself is not sufficient for justification. 57 This model of 
rationality incorporates the valid insights of Murphy, 
Plantinga, and Swinburne without succumbing to the problems 
indicated in their systems. 
56Audi, Epistemology, 205. 
57I bid., 206. 
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